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Constant Love in ‘The Winter’s Tale’

Introduction

As is his habit, Shakespeare obliquely introduces his overall theme in the opening scene of The Winter’s Tale. Archidamus admits that were Leontes to return Polixenes’ visit to Syria, as is expected, the relative poverty of the hospitality that Bohemia would be able to offer him could be “justified in [their] loves” (1.1.1-16).[i] Camillo underlines the significance of this casual remark when he reassures Archidamus that the “rooted” attachment between the two kings, formed when “they were train’d together in their childhoods,” obviates any need for Polixenes to repay the “magnificen[t]” hospitality which he has enjoyed in Sicily (1.1.17-24). So assiduously has the two kings’ early “affection” been sustained through a constant

             interchange of gifts, letters, loving embassies, that they have seem’d to be together, 

though absent; shook hands, as over a vast; and embrac’d as it were from the ends 

of oppos’d winds.

(1.1.28-31)

This conversation highlights both the strength of the drive to establish and maintain intimate attachments and the painstaking, equitable “interchange” of care that it entails.

The apparently arbitrary introduction of the subject of Leontes’ son, Mamillius, at this point is more pertinent than it seems, for, although Archidamus claims that nothing “in the world” could ever “alter” the attachment between the two kings, he knows in reality that love can only be “continue[d]” in some sense after death through the “unspeakable comfort” of children (1.1.31-35). The prince provides “hope…that, indeed, physics the subject, makes old hearts fresh,” presumably because he represents a “promise” that their beloved country will flourish after their own deaths (1.1.35-39). The adoration of Mamillius has almost become a cult among the older subjects, who are the most aware of their own mortality: “they that went on crutches ere he was born desire yet their life to see him a man,” and in fact would perhaps “be content to die,” were they not sustained by the patriotic hopes which they have invested in him (1.1.39-42). Camillo qualifies this claim with characteristic scepticism– “Yes; if there were no other excuse why they should desire to live”–but Archidamus refuses to accept that any passion could act as a substitute for this need to “continue…loves,” and at the same time makes it clear that the point is essentially a general one: although Mamillius “is a gallant child,” even “if the king had no son, they would desire to live on crutches till he had one” (1.1.38-46). The overall implication of this conversation is that the overriding intensity of parental, or in this case quasi-parental, devotion is driven by a combination of the instinctive need for constant attachments and a rational awareness of mortality.

Thus, the opening scene hints that Shakespeare’s aim is to explore the intense desire to form intimate attachments and to “continue” these, both in life and, as far as possible, posthumously, which expresses itself both through a painstaking “interchange” of care in friendship and romantic love, and a deep investment in the “promise” of children. The main body of this essay is structured around these three types of attachment, although there is also a section on the broader influence of attachment, exemplified in the opening scene by the patriotism which so “physics the subject.”

Friendship

Surprisingly, it is the reunion of Leontes and Camillo, rather than that between the two kings, or even Florizel and Perdita’s nascent love, which best illustrates the true nature of constant attachment (5.2.10-19).[ii] This friendship was initially triggered by Camillo’s consistent loyalty, which led Leontes to trust him repeatedly “with all the nearest things to [his] heart,” after which, “priest-like,” the faithful courtier habitually “cleans’d [the] bosom” of the “penitent” king (1.2.235-39). Ironically, Leontes turns first to Camillo to help him revenge himself on Polixenes, precisely because he attributes to him the virtues of wisdom, moderation and courage which both men agree are the essential requirements for a loyal friend (1.2.242-67; see below for a fuller analysis of this conversation). Later, in an unexpectedly extended eulogy–which, at fifteen and a half lines long, completely dwarfs the one and a half which he spends on his plans to “reconcile…to” Polixenes and “woo [the] queen”–the penitent king affirms fervently, although not as we shall see entirely accurately, that his friend possesses precisely these virtues, since his “good mind” could not be moved to murder Polixenes either by promises or threats, but rather chose the “hazard” of exile (3.2.155-72). This speech represents a belated acknowledgement that Leontes’ deepest attachment has always been to Camillo. Camillo has earnt Leontes’ special trust through his thoughtful restraint, which has allowed him to care for his friend assiduously, without demanding the reciprocal concern which the king is at first unable to provide. 

When summoned from Bohemia by Leontes, Camillo quickly engineers his return (see below), in order to resume his role as confidant (4.2.6-9). When the two friends are reunited, Leontes seeks Camillo out first and exclusively, unlike his other guests, whom he subsequently sees together (5.2.10-19, 5.2.43-58). The very fact that both men simultaneously and wordlessly share their horror at the enormity of Leontes’ offence against their friendship is itself enough, not only to remind them of the depth of their bond, but to deepen it still further: 

They seem’d almost, with staring on one another, to tear the cases of their eyes. 

There was speech in their dumbness, language in their very gesture; they look’d as 

they had heard of a world ransom’d, or one destroy’d. A notable passion of wonder 

appear’d in them; but the wisest beholder, that knew no more but seeing, could 

not say if th’importance was joy or sorrow, but in the extremity of the one it must 

needs be.

(5.2.11-19)

The two men are full of “wonder,” presumably at the power of a truly intimate attachment to endure under the most adverse circumstances. Guilt and “sorrow” at the loss of his friend, which feels like a “world…destroy’d,” have finally taught Leontes to moderate his proud self-assertion. The sympathetic connection between the two men, which is underlined by the first gentleman’s repeated use of the third person plural pronoun, is allowed to flow, untrammelled by any attempt at self-justification or self-regarding pleas for forgiveness on the part of the king, or indeed seemingly by any words at all. It is in this way that Leontes “ransom[s]” the attachment which fulfils his deepest desires. 

On his part the wise and moderate Camillo neither reproaches Leontes nor demands an apology. He knows that this moment of absolute harmony “justifies” all of Leontes’ destructive actions, in Archidamus’ phrase, since it not only promises to satisfy his own “thirst to see” his friend and yearning to “allay” his “feeling sorrows,” but also suggests that his care might finally be fully reciprocated (1.1.9, 4.4.512-13, 4.2.7-9). Thus, Camillo’s humble, diligent, unobtrusively passionate investment of care, which goes well beyond what Polixenes could have managed (see below), and which has therefore earnt a much deeper trust from Leontes, is ultimately rewarded in a way which perhaps exceeds his wildest dreams. Leontes now assumes the burden of unselfish care which must inevitably be shouldered by all truly passionate lovers: it is significant that his final act in the play is to arrange a marriage for Camillo, rather than to attempt to ingratiate himself with his own queen. 

Whereas Leontes speaks to his other unexpected guests, to “ask Bohemia forgiveness,” to show Perdita how much he regrets his treatment of her mother, and to thank the shepherd, he simply shares with Camillo a “speech in dumbness, language in their very gesture,” in which the “changes” observable in the two men are “very notes of admiration” -that is, exclamation marks, rather than words (5.2.42-58, 5.2.10-14). The two men are struck “dumb…” at this moment, I would suggest, because they are experiencing the summum bonum of a constant intimacy, which, precisely because it provides the ultimate standard by which all endeavours are measured, cannot itself be appraised in any rational way, but can only be intuited by those who are able to align themselves with their own deeper nature. The corollary of this point is that Leontes’ comparative eloquence in the presence of Polixenes and Perdita reflects the relative superficiality of his relationship with his daughter and his oldest friend. Analysis of the means by which intimacy is established can be useful, as is demonstrated by the play itself, and by Camillo and Leontes’ earlier discussion of the virtues of a true friend (1.2.243-64, 1.2.301-02), but speech about love itself is only truly useful in courtship: Florizel’s passionate speeches are motivated by a yearning to secure the “wave” of constant intimacy, the fulfilment of which would render them redundant (4.4.140-46). 

The first gentleman’s “broken delivery” shows that he is indeed one of those who can appreciate true depth of feeling, whereas the smooth eloquence of the third gentleman– evident, ironically, in the redundancy of his claim that the “encounter…lames report to follow it and undoes description to do it”–undermines the latter’s declaration that the king’s meeting with Polixenes and Perdita is so passionate that it is “a sight to be seen, cannot be spoken of” (5.2.9, 5.2.56-58, 5.2.42-43). Indeed, we can infer from the third gentleman’s initial concern to establish that his interlocutor did not actually “see the meeting of the two kings” that his account may even be partly invented, or at least highly overblown (5.2.39-40). Whereas the first gentleman describes Leontes and Camillo as simply staring at each other, as if they are about “to tear the cases of their eyes,” the third gentleman has the two kings “casting up” their eyes and “holding up” their hands in a much more stylised manner (5.2.46-47). It is possible to infer that the two reunions get the narrator they deserve: while the less intimate encounter is rendered still shallower by the third gentleman’s self-important and clichéd additions and exaggerations, the first gentleman’s “broken” account of the violent, but apparently entirely silent intensity of Leontes’ reunion with Camillo stands out as a sincere attempt to convey in words the inexpressible core of a deep intimacy. 

It is significant that Shakespeare himself has chosen not to dramatize the reunion of Leontes and Camillo: he uses the perspective of “the wisest beholder, that knew no more than seeing” to appeal to the sympathies of those in the audience who retain an intuitive appreciation of the good, rather than attempting any sort of rational articulation or appraisal of the emotions which the two men are experiencing (5.2.15-19). He provides the third gentleman’s account, which focuses mainly on the principal characters in hierarchical order, for those in his audience who are concentrating primarily on the main story-line, assuming, with characteristic restraint, that many will not appreciate the significance of this passionate encounter (5.2.42-56). Nevertheless, his underlying purpose is to illustrate in its purest form the ultimate good of a trusting intimacy, which almost all of the characters in the play are pursuing, whether they know it or not. 

Early on in the play, Leontes and Camillo agree that constant friendship requires moderation, wisdom and courage, since it involves eschewing the “willful-negligen[ce],” “folly” and “fear” respectively of “a gross lout, a mindless slave, or else a hovering temporizer” (1.2.243-64, 1.2.301-02). The unexpectedly precise way in which the point is made, and then reiterated fifty lines later, offers a characteristically veiled hint that the play’s analysis of constant attachments is structured around these three cardinal virtues and their corresponding vices. Camillo, Paulina and Hermione are used to explore the roles played by wisdom, courage and moderation in creating the just exchange of self-denying care that can deliver a constant intimacy. The first two also exemplify “fear” and “folly” respectively, while Leontes himself embodies the “willful-negligen[ce]” of a “gross lout.” The fourth of the cardinal virtues, justice, which is the overall product of the other three, is fully represented in the play only in the reunion between Camillo and Leontes and in the romance between Florizel and Perdita, where there is a precisely equitable exchange of sympathetic concern. Since the enduring element of romantic love is intimate friendship rather than physical desire, we shall see that many of the following points apply equally to committed sexual relationships (see below). 

Camillo presents his thoughtful ability to “weigh…well the end,” which he implicitly identifies as his intimacy with Leontes, as underpinning all the other virtues, since it has enabled him to restrain potentially divisive desires and fears (1.2.250-62). His distinctive prudence is shown by the fact that his efforts to prevent Leontes from “reiterat[ing]” his “dangerous” fantasies are from the start as vehement as his defence of Hermione (1.2.279-84, 1.2.296-98). After recognising relatively quickly the futility of further argument, he surprisingly considers actually committing the murder that the king is proposing, but only on the condition that Leontes would “give no blemish to [Hermione’s] honor, none,” not only for her sake and that of her son, whom, as the opening scene implies, Camillo also loves deeply, but also for the sake of the country as a whole, which might otherwise be exposed to “the injury of tongues in courts and kingdoms known and allied” to Sicily (1.2.333-41). Although Camillo soon breaks this informal contract, the very fact that he toys with the idea of murder demonstrates, albeit in a highly unorthodox manner, that he does indeed “weigh…well” both “the end” and the means by which it may be achieved: killing Polixenes “with no rash potion, but with a ling’ring dram that should not work maliciously like poison,” would have enabled him to protect all his beloveds at once, as well as the country to which he is so clearly devoted (1.2.319-21; see also 4.4.666-67).

At the same time, Camillo’s momentary impulse to murder Polixenes confirms that he is passionate as well as thoughtful. Like the young lovers, who put the shepherd’s life in such danger (4.4.420-22, 5.1.198-202),[iii] the prudent and restrained Camillo is for a moment tempted to allow his devotion to his queen and country to override all other duties and ties, as he seriously contemplates murdering a man to whom he has acted as cupbearer for nine months, and whom he evidently respects as a loyal friend to the king (1.2.345, 1.1.21-32). Thus, Shakespeare suggests that constant attachments, in this case in the form of friendship and patriotism, naturally override codes of honour and nobility. 

However, Camillo eventually abandons queen, prince and country to their fate, not, apparently, deterred primarily by the enormity of the crime which he is contemplating–although he claims parenthetically that he would “not do’t” either way–but by the prudent reflection that there is no “example” of anyone who has “flourish’d after” killing a king (1.2.356-63). Fearing that “to do’t, or no, is certain…a break-neck,” since either way he would know too much about Leontes’ turpitude to be allowed to survive, he decides to flee, rather than making any attempt to protect Hermione, whether by murdering Polixenes, or in any other way: “O miserable lady! But for me, what case stand I in…” (1.2.362-63, 1.2.351-52). It is probable also that a doubt as to whether Leontes would keep his promise to spare Hermione plays a part in Camillo’s decision not to commit the murder, since he admits from the start that he can be “fearful to do a thing, where [he] the issue doubted,” even when he is sufficiently convinced of the need to act for “the execution [to] cry out against the non-performance” (1.2.258-62). 

Although Camillo’s abrupt flight is of course a perfectly understandable response to the enormous pressures to which he is being subjected, it nevertheless demonstrates that his attachments are in the end not quite strong enough to override his instinct for self-preservation. It is significant that in the exploration of the virtues conducive to friendship discussed above, Camillo expresses a confidence that he generally avoids “folly” and “willful-negligen[ce],” but admits that “fear…oft infects the wisest”: we can infer that moderation comes much more naturally than courage to those of a prudent temperament (1.2.254-64). The contrast between Camillo’s flight and the absolutely courageous constancy displayed by Florizel, Perdita and Paulina highlights the limitations of the former’s prudent temperament. Unlike the lovers, who are prepared to elope unaided, albeit as a last resort, Camillo not only prioritises his own survival over his attachment to queen, prince and country, but also takes care to establish that Polixenes is grateful enough to offer him service in Bohemia before making his escape (1.2.439-41, 1.2.460-62, 4.4.498-504). Thus, the suggestion is that prudent temperaments tend to baulk at the dangers which deep attachments may entail, presumably because they can anticipate them with peculiar clarity (4.4.565-72). 

As he grows older in self-imposed exile, however, Camillo realises that his prudence cannot moderate his deepest desires. It is clear that he has led an unfulfilled life in Bohemia, despite having thrived under Polixenes in worldly terms, for, like the shepherd, who wishes above all to be buried with his father’s “honest bones,” he is driven by a compelling “desire to lay [his] bones” in the place where he was born, and has a “woman’s longing” for “dear Sicilia” (4.2.4-20, 4.4.455-56, 4.4.511, 4.4.665-67). Above all, Camillo has finally been “sent for” by the “penitent King,” whom he still humbly thinks of as his “master,” and whom he now “thirst[s] to see,” since he longs once again to be in a position to “cleans[e his] bosom” of his “feeling sorrows” (4.2.6-9, 4.4.512-13, 1.2.238). His unconditional forgiveness of Leontes is contrasted with the ongoing vexation of the less passionate Polixenes, who has determined to “speak no more” about him, and in fact only sees his oldest friend again because of his angry pursuit of Florizel (4.2.20-23).

Despite his innate shrewdness, Camillo is therefore a deeply unworldly and genuinely passionate character. Driven as he is by love for Leontes, he is completely unmoved either by Polixenes’ hints that he might offer him financial rewards to stay in Bohemia– “heaping friendships”–or by his flattering assurances that he is vitally important to Bohemian politics (4.2.10-20). The contrast between the passionate Camillo and the courtly Polixenes is highlighted when the former praises the “sound affection” which leads Florizel to swear to value power, beauty and knowledge purely as the means to deepen his love for Perdita, while the less passionate and more status-conscious king merely comments grudgingly that his son’s heartfelt devotion is “fairly offer’d” (4.4.370-79). Whereas Leontes trusted Camillo “with all the nearest things to [his] heart,” offering him worldly rewards purely out of love (1.2.235-39, 1.2.313-14; although see 1.2.309-11), Polixenes’ response to his request to be allowed to return home shows that the king’s priorities are, characteristically, primarily political; in fact, he shows as little sympathetic concern for Camillo as Leontes showed when responding to Polixenes’ own similar wish earlier in the play (4.2.1-21, 1.2.1-19).[iv]

Camillo’s shrewdness remains a formidable force, but it is now entirely focused on providing the means by which he can resume his life in Sicily with Leontes. He does not openly oppose Polixenes’ insistence that he stay in Bohemia, but manages to engineer his own repatriation without risking the king’s wrath, simply by encouraging Florizel to go to Sicily and then informing his father of his plans in the hope that he will pursue them there (4.2.4-33, 4.4.466-72, 4.4.508-13, 4.4.662-66). This plan is as wily as the one which allowed him to escape from Sicily in the first place, since he “betray[s]” Florizel, who has hitherto trusted that his “honesty…endur’d all weathers,” and tricks both the kings with as little compunction as he deceived Leontes at the start of the play (5.1.193-95). Although this second voyage is different in that it also allows him to secure “love and honor” for the prince, to whom he shows considerable generosity, and for whom he clearly feels considerable affection, Camillo is nevertheless prepared to sacrifice his lesser ties if necessary, as he was when contemplating murder, since he knows that there is no vantage point higher than the passion of lovers from which these unscrupulous tactics could be condemned: it should not be forgotten that from Camillo’s perspective, Leontes could easily have taken Polixenes’ side once he understood that Perdita was a commoner (4.4.510, 4.4.585-94). All in all, Camillo’s thoughtfulness allows him pursue his deep attachments without the encumbrance of artificial conceptions of nobility.

Camillo’s underlying nature remains deeply erotic, despite the fact that his prudence can occasionally degenerate into fearfulness. His name, which means ‘acolyte,’ might imply that he is in the process of learning the mysteries of constant love as the play goes on. He actually admires Perdita for countering his own argument that love is “alter[ed]” by “affliction” with the assertion that troubles may “subdue the cheek, but not take in the mind,” acknowledging that he could learn a great deal from her stalwart passion: “she seems a mistress to most that teach” (4.4.572-83). After the “wonder” of his reunion with Leontes, he is less sceptical about the power of love to endure, for even as he urges the king to allow time to “blow away” his sorrows, as it does almost all passions, he tacitly excepts truly constant attachments from this rule: joys which last may be “scarce,” but he now concedes that they do nevertheless exist (5.3.49-53). It is hard, although not quite impossible, to imagine him leaving Sicily again at the end of the play, even if he were in great personal danger, for experience has taught him that a loveless life is not worth living. Camillo’s wisest act may be to marry the staunchly constant Paulina, whom he has apparently always admired, since she is likely to ensure that his characteristic prudence will never again lapse into expediency (5.3.141-43). Such a lapse would otherwise, however, remain a perpetual possibility, since temperaments such as Camillo’s are innately fearful. 

Paulina shows precisely the courageous determination which Camillo lacks, when, defying his threat to have her “burnt,” she insists that Leontes’ treatment of the queen “savors of tyranny” (2.3.114-23). Before boldly fabricating Hermione’s death, she confronts Leontes with the destruction which he has caused in a characteristically assertive manner, daring him to retaliate by “tortur[ing]” her (3.2.175-214). It is the intensity of her love for the queen, “the sweet’st, dear’st creature…,” which allows her to defy Leontes in this way, while his less passionate courtiers “creep like shadows” around him (3.2.201, 3.2.228, 2.3.34).[v] As well as herself caring for the queen in a “remov’d house,” and visiting her “twice or thrice a day” for sixteen years, she constantly demands that the king and his courtiers remain devoted to her memory (5.2.104-07, 5.1.23-84, 5.1.94-106, 5.1.224-27). Shakespeare shows the power of her staunch constancy to generate trusting relationships: the jailer is easily persuaded to let her have the infant Perdita because he knows that Paulina is “a worthy lady,” who will “stand betwixt [him] and danger;” Emilia respects her deeply; Antigonus gives her “the rein” to rebuke Leontes because “she’ll not stumble;” Hermione presumably relies on her entirely for sixteen years; Leontes comes to depend on her “worth and honesty;” while the discriminating Camillo seems always to have admired her (2.2.4-18, 2.2.63-64, 2.2.40-44, 2.3.50-52, 5.1.81-82, 5.3.141-46). 

However, Paulina fails to see that her insistent attempts to “soften” Leontes’ heart “at the sight o’ th’ child” might be counterproductive: indeed, since he has made no effort to see the baby, and his initial reaction is simply to demand that she be taken away, we may infer that it is precisely this insistence which eventually provokes the king into exposing Perdita (2.2.35-40, 2.3.74-183).[vi] Paulina has no further strategy once her “true” words turn out not to be “medicinal” in the way that she had hoped (2.3.36-39). Her plan to conceal Hermione permanently–as she must presume–arguably shows a similar strategic naivety, since it involves attempting to prevent the king from remarrying, even though “dangers, by his Highness’ fail of issue, may drop upon his kingdom,” thus indirectly threatening all that she loves (5.1.27-29). There is therefore an unintentional irony in her remark that she is sure to “do good” if “wit flow from [her tongue] as boldness from [her] bosom,” for her “wit,” although by no means inconsiderable, is thoroughly overshadowed by her “boldness” (2.2.50-52). Her very passion leads her to adopt direct methods which are often highly imprudent.

By contrast, we have seen that the prudent Camillo quickly sees the futility of opposing Leontes’ rage (1.2.279-350). Camillo, who, as Polixenes confirms, is a shrewd politician, would disagree with Emilia’s view that “goodness” such as Paulina’s “cannot miss a thriving issue,” since he knows that indirect or unscrupulous tactics are often necessary, even if one’s aims are benevolent: it is significant that his deception of Florizel allows him to secure the young lovers “love and honor,” even as he satisfies his own desire to return home, whereas Paulina’s direct and noble assault on Leontes could easily have led to Perdita’s death as well as her own (4.2.10-17, 2.2.40-44, 4.4.508-13). However, we have seen that Camillo’s prudence can collapse into simple fearfulness (albeit only under extreme pressure): whereas he abandons both his country and Hermione, despite understanding fully their “dangerous” and “miserable” position, Paulina risks her life to defend the queen and then gives her refuge for sixteen years (1.2.296-98, 1.2.351). Paulina and Camillo’s engagement can therefore be taken as an indication that, just as their shortcomings are contrasting–one tends towards “folly” and the other to “fear”–so their virtues are complementary: thus, the suggestion is that prudence and courage need to be combined in an ongoing dialectic (5.3.141-46).

Quite apart from her lack of prudence, Paulina refuses to acknowledge that passionate constancy itself has its natural limits. Her own love for the queen naturally continues undimmed, since she is actually seeing her two or three times a day, but Leontes is ready to remarry after sixteen years of grief and guilt, as his desire for Perdita suggests (5.2.104-07, 5.1.95-103, 5.1.224-27). Paulina’s reminders that Leontes has in effect “kill’d” a “perfect woman” and a “jewel of children” extend the penitent king’s guilt and sorrow to a point where they seem likely to “unfurnish [him] of reason”: one courtier tells her that she could have said “a thousand things that would have done the time more benefit, and grac’d [her] kindness better” (5.1.12-23, 5.1.115-23).[vii] The fact that she attempts to persuade courtiers as well as the king to retain their love of the queen confirms that these reminders are inspired by her own continuing adoration of Hermione–there is “none [so] worthy”–rather than simply by a worry that Leontes might end up unconsciously committing bigamy (5.1.94-106, 5.1.34-35). 

Paulina argues that a second marriage would “to the heavens be contrary”–as did her namesake, St. Paul–for Apollo has proclaimed that the king “shall not have an heir till his lost child be found,” and plays on Leontes’ piety further by conjuring up a fearful vision of Hermione’s ghost shrieking “Remember mine” in protest if he were ever to remarry (1 Corinthians vii, 5.1.34-71). These words seem to echo the invocation of the ghost in Hamlet, which shocks the prince of Denmark into what I have argued elsewhere is an imprudent and unnaturally prolonged allegiance to his father’s memory.[viii] Like the ghost, the spirited Paulina assumes that it is shameful as well as impious to allow love to “ebb…” after the loss of a beloved (5.1.95-105). However, the very fact that she has to turn to conventional codes of piety and honour in an effort to sustain Leontes’ and the unknown courtier’s devotion to Hermione in all its original intensity is itself evidence that this intensity will naturally soften somewhat after a bereavement, even if grief never fully fades. The noble steadfastness that Paulina strives to instil artificially in Leontes and the courtier is thus very different from Florizel’s brave resolve to devote himself to Perdita come what may, which stems from an entirely natural desire to ensure that his current joy will continue indefinitely, like “a wave o’ th’ sea” (4.4.140-42). 

One cannot, therefore, dismiss Camillo’s opinion that mourning which is “too sore laid on” should be left to “kill…itself” (5.3.49-53). Indeed, Paulina’s tacit willingness to marry Camillo, despite having just declared that she will spend the rest of her life “lament[ing]” her “mate (that’s never to be found again),” like “an old turtle,” indicates that her own effort to maintain absolute loyalty is ultimately unsustainable after a bereavement (5.3.132-46). Perhaps she understands in the end that such an effort must be driven by artificial principles of nobility and piety, since it is no longer being sustained naturally, by a delightful interchange of constant devotion. Her engagement to Camillo may suggest that prudent thought is more consistently useful to stalwart lovers than the piety which Antigonus embodies (see below), despite the occasional tendency for such prudence to degenerate into mere expediency. In sum; just as Paulina’s steadfastness will no doubt continually remind Camillo that affliction cannot “take in the mind,” so the shrewd and sceptical Camillo provides the antidote to Paulina’s tendency to extend her spirited loyalty beyond its natural limits, or to exercise it in a manner that is virtuous rather than productive.

Just as Camillo and Paulina are used to explore wisdom and courage respectively, so the relationships between Polixenes, Leontes and Hermione are designed to illustrate the role played by moderation and its corresponding vice, “willful-negligen[ce],” in constant friendships (1.2.254-56). The courtly Polixenes’ repeated attempts to soothe Leontes’ disappointment at his decision to return home bears out the implication of the opening scene that the king is prepared to exert himself in order to “justif[y] in [his] loves” Leontes’ lavish hospitality (1.1.8-31). Aware that mere expressions of gratitude will not be sufficient to mollify his more passionate friend, he uses a variety of strategies to excuse his departure, assuring the king that he would stay longer “were there necessity in [his] request;” highlighting the “charge and trouble” which his visit has caused; and claiming that his return is motivated by pressing “fears of what may chance or breed upon [his] absence,” even though messengers have recently reported that “all in Bohemia’s well” (1.2.1-33). These tactful remarks, when taken alongside his eventual decision to extend his already lengthy stay in Sicily by a week, demonstrate that Polixenes entirely understands that constant friends must strive to soften the impact of potentially divisive desires, lest they disrupt the exchange of sympathetic care which sustains the friendship (1.2.38-59).

However, Polixenes’ eventual concession is a minor one, while his tactful words cost him nothing. His attempt to shoulder some of his friend’s guilt at the end of the play may be dismissed as nothing more than a decorous gesture, just as his easy rapprochement with Leontes may remind us that he has less invested in the relationship than characters like Camillo and Hermione, whose whole “world” has been “destroy’d” by the king’s actions (5.3.53-56; 5.2.43-52, 5.2.14-15). In fact, Polixenes substitutes a superficial courtliness for the humble care which truly passionate attachments demand. He is by no means completely passionless, as his affectionate relationship with Florizel shows, but compared to Leontes he is relatively unerotic, as the queen perhaps implies when she assumes that her husband was “the verier wag o’ th’ two” friends when they were children (1.2.65-66).

If, as the above argument suggests, the level of self-denial shown by friends tends to be commensurate with the intensity of their attachment, then Leontes is clearly the exception, at least in the first half of the play, since the king is simultaneously more passionate than his friend and much less moderate. Leontes fails to persuade Polixenes to stay because his proud self-love leaves him with no strategy other than to issue peremptory demands, which he insists there is “no gainsaying”: “Stay your thanks a while, and pay them when you part” (1.2.9-19). (Self-love is used in a narrow sense as a synonym for pride throughout this essay). His direct and unrestrained assertion of desire is bound to be divisive, as we can see when Polixenes’ resentfully compares his friend’s tyrannical approach to a “whip” (1.2.23-25). Overall, Leontes’ spirited self-assertiveness leads him to resist the paradoxical process which Florizel’s courtship exemplifies, by which the desire to possess the beloved for oneself, which is the foundation of all passionate attachments, is naturally sublimated into humble self-denial and loyal care, once it is understood that this is the only way to establish the sympathetic union which is in fact the deepest and most enduring form of possession.

By contrast, Hermione’s pleas succeed precisely because of her restraint and sympathetic care. She indirectly conveys her appreciation of the strength of Polixenes’ paternal devotion (see below) through her insistence that she would “thwack him hence” if he were to confess that his true motive for returning home was that “he longs to see his son” (1.2.34-37). She is able to pretend to ignore this longing because of Polixenes’ gruff reticence, but she gracefully disarms him, not only by her implicit acknowledgement of her own sly tactic and her insight into his motivation, expressed with such tactful indirectness, but also by her implication that she is requesting a fairly minimal extension precisely because she does not wish to ride roughshod over his paternal feelings: “Yet of your royal presence I’ll adventure the borrow of a week” (1.2.38-39). She manages to make the same point as Leontes about the inadequacy of Polixenes’ “thanks”–indeed, at one point almost in the same words–but in a gentler, more bantering manner, calculated to appeal to the king’s own conscience, while at the same time defusing the tension which her husband’s more domineering approach has created by playfully threatening to keep him “as a prisoner, not like a guest” (1.2.51-56; compare 1.2.9-10). 

Unlike the comparatively bland Polixenes on the one hand and the intensely demanding Leontes on the other, Hermione combines moderation with intense passion: her tactful pleas are motivated mainly by a desperate desire to win Leontes’ praise (1.2.90-101), but also partly by a real affection for Polixenes, which is evident in her unexpectedly passionate insistence that she would “thwack” him hence immediately, if he were to confess to a longing to see his son.[ix] Her promise to encourage her husband to extend his proposed return visit by a month, which would more than requite Polixenes for agreeing to stay for another week, illustrates her capacity for self-denial, since, as she declares with humble understatement, she loves Leontes “not a jar o’ th’ clock behind what lady she her lord” (1.2.39-44, see also 1.1.5-7). Polixenes succumbs to her persuasion almost immediately because he recognises that it would be churlish to assert his own desires too forcefully in response to such an onslaught of graceful charm (1.2.56-59). Thus, Hermione engages as gracefully as Florizel in the complex negotiations which intimate attachments inevitably demand, fostering trust and gratitude by ensuring that any expression of need is balanced by demonstrations of sympathetic concern. The contrast between Hermione and Leontes underlines the fact that the latter is too proud to accept that the constant intimacy for which he longs can only be achieved by restraining his own desires and pride, while focusing instead on caring diligently for his beloveds. 

Even leaving aside the fact that he has no evidence for his suspicions, Leontes’ relationship with the queen seems too cool to spark his jealous rage. At the same time, he surely could not have gained the affection of Camillo as well as Polixenes if he were habitually given to such arbitrary outbursts (1.2.235-39, 1.2.324, 4.2.6-9, 4.4.512-13, 1.2.238). As Leontes himself points out, Paulina would not dare to suggest that he was a tyrant if he actually were one (2.3.116-24).[x] I would argue that his jealousy is in fact focused on Polixenes: his priorities can be deduced from the fact that he only belatedly modifies his claim that Hermione “never spoke… to better purpose” than when persuading his friend to extend his stay, after her query has prompted him to except the moment when she agreed to marry him (1.2.88-105). Whereas he courted his wife merely for “three crabbed months,” his “interchange” with Polixenes has been sustained diligently since childhood (1.2.101-05, 1.1.22-32). His apparently casual remark, “At my request he would not [stay],” marks the moment when he suddenly suspects that his friendship is not fully reciprocated, deducing, with some justification as we have seen, that Hermione’s successful persuasion of Polixenes is a sign that she has developed a deeper intimacy with his friend than he himself has ever managed to do (1.2.87). The misleading casualness of this aside is in fact a sign of his determination to repress this insight, which he finds unbearably humiliating.

This interpretation is borne out by the fact that it is Polixenes whom the king initially tries to poison, whereas his original aim is apparently to spare the queen with “no blemish to her honor, none” (1.2.312-41). Only when it becomes evident that “the harlot king is quite beyond [his] arm…plot-proof” does he begin to wonder whether, if Hermione “were gone…a moi’ty of my rest might come to me again” -thus implying that he might actually have kept his promise to Camillo spare her, which he claims at the time only formalises the “course” already “set down” in his own mind (2.3.1-9, 1.2.339-41). It is the “thought of him” that disrupts Leontes’ peace, while punishing his wife is a secondary consideration (which is not to deny that some of his jealous spite is reserved for her, as the object of his friend’s apparently fickle affection): “For present vengeance, take it on her” (2.3.18-23). It should be no surprise that there is “a jealousy of friendship, as well as of love,” as one astute critic claims, for Shakespeare habitually presents friendship as rivalling romantic and parental devotion in its power to generate deep and enduring attachments.[xi]

Since Leontes resembles the lion after which he is named in his fierce pride and concentration on his own gratification, his response to his sudden realisation that he is less intimate with Polixenes than he had thought–a frustration which is, as we have seen, itself an inevitable consequence of his arrogant approach to relationships–is not to strive humbly and diligently to become a better friend, but to search for an external cause for the king’s fickleness. The invention of the adulterous affair not only provides such a cause, but goes some way towards justifying the vindictive rage by which he attempts to relieve his humiliating sense of exclusion. Leontes can only avoid acknowledging his intense frustration at his failure to achieve the same level of intimacy with Polixenes as Hermione by displacing his pain in the most disruptive manner possible.[xii] It is a measure both of the intensity of this pain and, ironically, the intransigence of his self-love that the fantasy by which he hopes finally to find “rest” eventually involves not only destroying or attempting to destroy all those to whom he is closely attached, but also “disgrac[ing]” and tormenting himself with “goads, thorns, nettles, tails of wasps” (2.3.1-2, 2.3.8-9, 1.2.187-90, 1.2.325-33). 

To sum up on the play’s exploration of friendship: passionate friends have an intuitive appreciation that the ultimate good is a perfectly harmonious, constant intimacy, which naturally leads to a thoughtful effort to control potentially divisive desires and fears. Thus, enduring, intimate friendships are founded on moderation, wisdom and courage. The contrast between Hermione’s and Leontes’ approach to their relationships illustrates Shakespeare’s teaching that an intense desire to unite with a beloved forever can only be fulfilled by humbly moderating any direct assertion of this desire and focusing instead on establishing trust through sympathetic care. It is therefore an absolute priority for passionate friends to restrain their pride, since it is this that is likely to prevent them from engaging in this paradoxical process. At the same time, courage and thoughtfulness need to be carefully balanced: thought underpins the moderation of intimate friends, and helps them to pursue their attachment prudently and without regard for conventional morality, but it may easily collapse into fickle pusillanimity, whereas stalwart constancy, although one of the key attributes of a loyal friend, is not necessarily pragmatic or even ultimately, in the long aftermath of a bereavement, emotionally sustainable. All these points apply equally to romantic love, the enduring element of which is trusting intimacy, although we shall see that the initial intensity of sexual desire generates a unique set of problems and opportunities.

Romantic Love

The young lovers provide the benchmark by which the other romantic relationships in the play can be judged. Florizel’s name suggests that he embodies the qualities traditionally represented by the spring flowers that Perdita wishes to give him: these comprise daffodils, violets, primroses, oxlips, the “fleur de lis” and “the crown imperial,” or fritillaria, which symbolise respectively hope, faithfulness, virginal innocence, “bold[ness],” chastity and perpetual devotion, the latter of which is, I would argue, the overall goal, or ‘crowning’ achievement, that is facilitated by these virtues (4.4.118-29).[xiii] This list indicates that even the intense, but potentially fleeting sensuality of young adulthood, which is the only element in romantic love that distinguishes it from intimate friendship, may well express itself–perfectly naturally, as the floral imagery which pervades the conversation implies–as a constant, self-denying devotion, which regulates both desire and fear. This is because many young lovers can recognise that faithful devotion–as represented by violets–although relatively “dim,” may, when fully reciprocated, be “sweeter” than immediate physical desire, symbolised here by “the lids of Juno’s eyes, or Cytherea’s breath” (4.4.120-22). Perdita’s own chaste fidelity illustrates this point, although at the same time her reference to Proserpina’s rape, her own longing to have Florizel “quick and in mine arms” and her mistaken assumption that Mopsa and Dorcas are virgins all serve to remind us of the almost ungovernable intensity of sexual desire (4.4.109-32).

Whereas Shakespeare assigns wisdom, moderation and courage to particular characters in his study of friendship, he ensures that the young lovers combine all four of the cardinal virtues. The romance is founded on justice and wisdom, which are the overarching virtues of the four. Florizel’s apparently self-effacing willingness to renounce his right to succeed to the throne in order to marry Perdita actually forms part of a perfectly just, or equitable, erotic transaction: the price of this enduring intimacy is high, nothing less than constant care, but the reward is the ultimate good of Perdita’s commensurate trust and fidelity – “there is not half a kiss to choose who loves another best” (4.4.31-51, 4.4.175-76). “I’ th’ virtue of [his] daughter” the shepherd can offer Florizel “a portion equal” to the prince’s own extraordinary prospective wealth, for, as in the case of the two kings, material inequalities between lovers may be “justified in [their] loves” (4.4.383-89, 1.1.9). Indeed, Florizel has to make a much deeper and more self-denying investment in his courtship than less passionate characters like the clown or Polixenes, who buy their mistresses “knacks” and “silken treasury” simply in order to secure a “happy holding” (4.4.309-23, 4.4.347-56). Just as Polixenes can easily deprive his wife of his presence for nine months, since he sees his marriage merely as a way of satisfying his “stronger blood”–the sensitive Hermione does not even consider the possibility that it is marital devotion which has triggered the king’s determination to return home (1.2.71-75, 1.2.34-37)–so he is entranced primarily by Perdita’s dancing rather than, by the combination of her dancing, singing and conversation, as are Florizel, and, no doubt, the shepherd, who delights in her ability to do “anything” equally skilfully (4.4.176-77, compare 4.4.57-58, 4.4.136-43). 

Although attachment is an absolutely fundamental instinct, which is by no means even exclusively a human preserve,[xiv] in rational beings it is refined by an understanding of what is required to secure a lasting intimacy. Although Florizel is seemingly “advis’d” purely by “fancy” in choosing to be “heir to [his] affection” rather than the conventional crown which he would otherwise inherit, his assertion that “reason” might also “thereto be obedient” hints that his apparently “desperate” determination not to “violat[e]…[his] faith” could actually be seen as prudent from the largest perspective, since he knows that he must strive at every turn to prove his loyalty to his passionate, but understandably distrustful, mistress (4.4.482-85). Unlike Paulina, however, he combines this insight with a pragmatic evaluation of the means by which the ultimate good can best be achieved: although he is ready simply to seek his own fortune as a last resort, he is under no illusions as to the dangers of such a course, as is shown by his willingness to adopt Camillo’s devious plan (4.4.520-94).

Nevertheless, Florizel is without doubt courageous, as well as just and wise, since he would have abandoned the comforts of court in order to elope with Perdita, leaving himself with no means of support (4.4.462-504). Quite apart from such extreme sacrifices, Autolycus provides a glimpse of the stalwart, humdrum self-denial which constant love necessarily entails, when he reports ruefully that he was unable to raise the subject of the shepherd’s bundle on the voyage to Sicily because the “overfond” prince was focusing entirely on caring for the “much sea-sick” Perdita, even though he was “himself little better” (5.2.114-20). 

Florizel is also moderate, or, more accurately, he subordinates all his other desires to his intransigent passion:

…were I crown’d the most imperial monarch,

Thereof most worthy, were I the fairest youth

That ever made eye swerve, had force and knowledge

More than was ever man’s, I would not prize them

Without her love; for her, employ them all,

Commend them and condemn them to her service,

Or to their own perdition.

(4.4.372-78) 

Florizel’s pride, curiosity and physical attraction–a list which perhaps dimly echoes the classical tripartite division of the soul, as seen most famously in Plato’s Republic–are all regulated by a desire to win Perdita’s trust. In particular, his sexual desire does not “burn hotter than [his] faith” (4.4.34-35). As we have seen, Florizel admires his beloved’s conversation, her singing and her dancing equally, which suggests that the beauty of her intellect, passionate spirit and body have merged together seamlessly in his mind (4.4.136-46). The potentially transient sexual element in this attraction–which, both here and elsewhere in the scene, is symbolised by dancing–is subordinated to an ongoing reverence for the “singular” majesty of her character, “that crowns what [she is] doing in the present deeds” and makes him wish that she “might ever do nothing but” dance, as “a wave o’ th’ sea” might roll on indefinitely (4.4.140-46). Thus overall, Shakespeare suggests that the cardinal virtues are ultimately derived from the austere imperatives of love: Florizel’s clear-sighted decision to devote every effort to earning a constant intimacy with Perdita through disciplined care drives him to control any potentially divisive desire or fear. 

Perdita is courageous because her desire for the supreme prize of Florizel’s love overshadows even her intense fear of Polixenes (4.4.16-24). After Polixenes’ intervention, she declares that she would not have been too “much afear’d” to tell him that “the self-same sun that shines upon [his] court hides not his visage from our cottage,” but implies that she was distracted from the king’s threats by the much more fearful prospect of losing her beloved (4.4.434-50). This remark shows that Perdita’s courageous pursuit of the summum bonumis supported by her thoughtful ability to make the distinction between nature and convention, which was integral to philosophy as it was classically understood.[xv]

As we have seen, Camillo praises the wisdom of her remark that “affliction may subdue the cheek, but not take in the mind,” presumably because it reinforces his own growing sense that the potential rewards of love justify any outlay of steadfast fortitude (4.4.575-79). He sees that Perdita’s willingness to risk execution, or at the very least a life of penury, as it must seem, by eloping with her beloved is underpinned by her understanding that love must be earnt (4.4.420-504). 

Perdita’s moderation also stems from an instinctive fear of losing Florizel, which is reinforced by prudent thought: she reproaches herself hastily for allowing the prince to tease her into comparing him to “a bank, for love to lie and play on,” for she knows that her beloved may well have “woo’d [her] the false way,” or will not in the end be able to bring himself to renounce his birth-right (4.4.127-34, 4.4.146-51, 4.4.35-40, 4.4.446-50). Perdita knows that sexual desire can distract lovers from their underlying needs, while offering only ephemeral rewards in return. She draws on the distinction between nature and convention to suggest that a primarily physical passion may only ever be sustained by artificial means: she compares the “art” designed to “mend nature” that “nature” itself originally “makes,” which is what enables the grafted “gillyvors,” or carnations–significantly, their latter name is derived from their flesh-like colour–to remain “the fairest flowers o’ th’ season” even as “the year grow[s] ancient,” to the use of ingenious aids to stimulate and prolong physical attraction, declaring that she would not wish Florizel to “desire to breed by [her]” simply because she was “painted” (4.4.79-103). Thus, Perdita understands that immoderate lovers may dissipate their energies in an engrossing effort to prolong sensual pleasure through artificial stimulation, which is yet bound to be frustrated in the end: ultimately, even the grafted carnations will be destroyed by winter.

Perdita’s passionate attachment and thoughtful ability to align herself absolutely with her deepest needs regulate not only her sensuality, but her pride. She reproaches herself for self-love as well as sensuality after fantasising about “play[ing] on” Florizel, declaring that “with wisdom [she] might fear” that his “praises are too large”: thus, her worry that “this robe of mine does change my disposition” reflects her understanding that vanity–that is, the pleasure of being admired by any lover, let alone a prince–may often work hand in hand with physical desire to distract lovers from their underlying need for constant intimacy (4.4.130-51). The “piedness,” or variegated colour, of the carnations hints at the way in which this combination of pride and unrestrained sensuality can be grafted on to attachments, as it were, thus distorting their underlying nature: of course both these more ephemeral motives are, like the carnations, rooted in nature, but both have to be weeded out with care, since they culminate in artificial, “painted” displays, which provide no substantial fulfilment. Perdita’s prudent restraint forces Florizel to realise that there is no point in buying her “silken treasury” in the way that Polixenes suggests, since “she prizes not such trifles,” but only the “gifts [which] are pack’d and lock’d up in my heart”: the queenly outfit which he has bought Perdita is not designed to flatter her, or to increase her beauty, but to symbolise his decision to enthrone her as his ultimate, or ‘crowning’ good (4.4.347-60, 4.4.1-14).

By contrast, Mopsa and Dorcas, who are less prudent and restrained, use artificial aids to beauty, exemplified by the trinkets which Autolycus peddles, in a sort of escalating arms race, which bolsters their vanity and prolongs their own sexual pleasure, but, as Autolycus’s third ballad implies, leaves them without the security of an enduring commitment: their part in the song is to beg the clown repeatedly, but ineffectually, to reveal his plans (4.4.218-50, 4.4.297-308). The clown’s recent jilting of Dorcas confirms that the shepherdesses’ immoderate sensuality is likely to be counterproductive in the end, for, in contrast with Florizel, the stimulation which their lover is pursuing is as fleeting as his material outlay is nugatory: “being enthrall’d as I am, it will also be the bondage of certain ribbons and gloves” (4.4.231-41). The shepherdesses thus practise an art designed to “mend nature” which “nature makes”: by grafting a garish display, inspired by pride and sexual desire, onto their underlying attachment, they have in fact reduced their chances of securing the lasting commitment which they most of all desire, since sensual pleasure will fade in the end, however skilfully it is prolonged (4.4.81-97).

Autolycus’ first ballad implies that worries such as Perdita’s can only be avoided by those who totally lack passion: the “usurer’s wife,”–the song’s main protagonist–whose marriage was presumably purely prudential, and who longs to eat only cold-blooded creatures, “adders’ heads, and toads carbonado’d” when she is in labour, produces only “money-bags,” indicating that she is concerned entirely with self-advancement (4.4.262-65). The other two ballads outline the dilemma which male inconstancy poses for more passionate women, who hope to form warm attachments, and to nurture children who will “continue their loves,” rather than merely generating “money-bags” (1.1.32). The protagonist of the second ballad undergoes a surreal version of the fate which Perdita herself would have suffered if Florizel had proved disloyal, namely, that of being “turn’d into a cold fish for she would not exchange flesh with one that lov’d her” (4.4.275-80). (Perdita probably expects this to be her fate at the start of the scene, since she figures primroses, which represent chastity, as “maids” who “die unmarried, ere they can behold bright Phoebus in his strength” -4.4.122-25). Nevertheless, the third song implies that even this frustration is ultimately preferable to the insecurity and jealousy of Dorcas and Mopsa, who have clearly committed themselves deeply, and “exchange[d] flesh” with the clown, without securing any guarantees of his future intentions (4.4.286-308, 4.4.237-41, 4.4.162-63). 

Traditionally of course the onus has been on women more than men to practise continence. This is partly because illegitimate children are naturally a more pressing problem for women: the “streak’d gillyvors,” which are “Nature’s bastards,” bloom freely in high summer, but Perdita is determined not to “get slips” of them -a term which can be applied both to bastards and carnations (4.4.82-85). Although at some point Dorcas may disrupt the clown’s carefree life by attempting to “give him again” the baby which Mopsa alleges her rival has conceived, he would still perhaps have the option of denying that he was the father (4.4.239-41). 

There is, however, a more fundamental reason for this imbalance in gender roles: Autolycus’ songs about female continence and male fickleness are quickly followed by a “rough” and extremely energetic dance involving twelve men (4.4.324-31). The suggestion is that the twelve dancers share natural characteristics which are generically male, since, despite being drawn from a variety of manual occupations, they all perform the same “gambols.” The fact that they are all dressed as satyrs, or “men of hair,” provides a hint that men in particular have a tendency to concentrate directly and exclusively on their own sexual gratification. The implication is that this narrow focus on “pleas[ing]” themselves “plentifully” in such an unrestrained way, combined with the spirited pride which leads some of them to “report” that they have “jump[ed] twelve foot and a half” at court, prevents them from showing the restrained care which is needed to develop romantic relationships, for the women reject the dance as “a gallimaufry of gambols, because they are not in’t” (4.4.324-39). It even prevents them from forming close friendships, it would seem, since they share only a rough camaraderie in “threes.” These points are supported by the clown’s earlier reflections on the “four and twenty nosegays for the shearers” which Perdita has requested for the feast: they are again “three-man song-men all and very good ones,” but they have no-one to sing the treble notes, since “they are most of them means and bases,” except, significantly, a restrained “Puritan,” who only “sings psalms to hornpipes” (4.3.41-45). The implication of all this is that men in particular are prone to succumb to a heady mixture of spirited pride and physical desire, which is incompatible with enduring romantic love. 

The clown embodies the mixture of physical passion and pride which is symbolised by the twelve dancers, since he not only uses the hapless Mopsa and Dorcas to satisfy his sexual desire, but appears to relish the power which he exerts over them: he is “so in love with” Autolycus’ third song that he allows the latter to pick his pocket while he is learning “both tune and words” (4.4.309, 4.4.604-09). The tension in male nature between these distracting elements and the longing to form constant attachments, which inevitably entails restraint, is reflected in the disagreement between the shepherd, who wants to send the dancers away, and the king, who insists on being “refresh[ed]” by the entertainment (4.4.332-41). Typically, the moderate shepherd is swayed by the fact that his guests “are pleas’d,” but has no interest in their frenzied performance himself (4.4.340-41). Like Florizel, the shepherd’s enjoyment of watching his beloved wife “dance her turn” in an orderly way–unlike the twelve men, he did not take centre stage himself–merged naturally with an ongoing admiration for her singing and speaking (compare 4.4.55-62 and 4.4.136-46). 

The shepherd has had a life-time to discover what really pleases him, but Shakespeare does not underrate the power that sexual desire exerts over younger men: perhaps even the deeply passionate Florizel might at first have been distracted by the intense stimulus of artificially enhanced physical pleasure, if Perdita had been less continent–although now he would doubtless hotly deny any such imputation–since he implies that he too would have bought his mistress “silken treasury,” if she had not scorned such “trifles” (4.4.356-60). The prince may find it even harder to moderate his sexual desire than Perdita: it is noticeable that, although he declares that his “lusts” do not “burn hotter than [his] faith,” he never claims that they burn any more coolly (4.4.33-35). 

The dancers’ foregrounding of pride and physical desire is ultimately perverse, even though both are of course entirely natural drives, for paradoxically their dance, like the grafted carnations, is an “art” designed to “mend nature” that “nature [itself] makes” in the first place: they have in fact deliberately “made themselves all men of hair” and presumably rehearsed their graceless dances, in what is, despite appearances, an artificial display (4.4.326). This implies that, paradoxically, men too have to distort their underlying nature in order to give free rein to their spirited pride and physical desire, even though they are particularly prone to such incontinence, since they too can only ultimately fulfil their nature through constant attachments. The men’s apparently wild leaping is implicitly contrasted with the beautiful dancing of Perdita and the shepherd’s wife, who, as we have seen, restricts herself to “danc[ing] her turn” (4.4.58, 4.4.140-43, 4.4.176). This measured mode of dancing is an apt symbol for a passion which is restrained by a grace that serves to unite lover and beloved in a perfectly harmonious experience, since the instinctive vigour of such dances is naturally regulated by a sympathetic sense of what might be pleasing to the onlooker. 

Whereas men often find it difficult to moderate their pride and physical passion, even though many will instinctively understand that this is the only way to fulfil their nature, the fact that the three main female characters in the play are all motivated primarily by their deepest attachment indicates that women are less easily distracted from their underlying needs: indeed, the plot is carefully designed to allow Paulina, Hermione and Perdita to provide the benchmark for constancy in friendship, parenthood and romantic love respectively, thus covering the three main types of attachment which the play examines. Although the two shepherdesses are perhaps the nearest female equivalent to the twelve dancers in their vanity and focus on physical desire, they come closer to acknowledging their own deeper passions than the “men of hair,” or their lover, for, as we have seen, their part in Autolycus’ third song is to express a desperate need for constancy; indeed, their self-beautification is itself partly motivated, however mistakenly, by a desire to secure the clown’s love.

Overall, therefore, Florizel and Perdita set the standard of absolute constancy by which the other romantic or sexual relationships in the play are judged. They demonstrate that in order to earn a trusting intimacy, lovers must show courage and moderation, subordinating not only all potentially divisive fears and desires, but any manifestation of pride, or self-love, to their ruling passion. The lovers are wiser than they seem, for their initial continence will help to generate a deep and constant intimacy, whereas the artificially stimulated pride and sensuality of the clown and his mistresses are bound to be ephemeral. Moreover, although Perdita seems to be a “bark of baser kind” from the perspective of the conventional hierarchy, her relationship with Florizel is in fact absolutely just, or equitable–as, ironically, Polixenes himself unconsciously implies when he defends “marry[ing] a gentle scion to the wildest stock”[xvi]–for in reality she is an aristocrat of the soul, so to speak, since her upbringing has prepared her to deliver the ability to cultivate “the crown imperial” of a constant, reciprocal devotion (see below), which, as Florizel realises, is a far more substantial reward than any artificial crown (4.4.92-95).

The shepherd’s marriage illustrates the enduring joy which will be Florizel and Perdita’s reward if they can sustain their mutual care. Like Florizel, the shepherd admired his beloved’s conversation, her singing and her dancing equally, as has been noted, and no doubt helped to stimulate his wife’s unstinting “labor” with extended, heartfelt eulogies such as the one he delivers when he is exhorting Perdita to imitate her virtues (4.4.55-62). In contrast with Leontes’ marriage, where both praise and trust are in short supply (1.2.90-101; see below), the shepherd clearly came to trust his diligent wife so deeply that, far from feeling jealous, he could actively relish the way in which she was “now…on his shoulder, and his,” as she strove to make their parties a success (4.4.57-58). 

The flowers of “middle summer”–all pungent herbs–that Perdita considers to be appropriate gifts for middle aged men, invite us to reflect on the ways in which trust is developed, or on the contrary degraded in mature romantic relationships, since they represent respectively mistrust, virtue, sexual love, joy and grief/jealousy: 

            Hot lavender, mints, savory, marjoram,

The marigold that goes to bed wi’ th’ sun,

And with him rises weeping.

            (4.4.104-06)

Although Hermione is not the principal target of Leontes’ jealous rage, as has been argued above, the king’s paranoid suspicions and the callous way in which he acts them out are of course indications that his marriage is not securely founded on mutual trust and sympathy. His attachment to his queen is primarily physical: he describes his courtship–which was “crabb’d,” even though it only lasted three months, reflecting his characteristic, fiery impatience–in typically sensual terms, as an effort to “make [her] open [her] white hand” (1.2.101-05). After he has driven her away, he misses her “full eyes” and the “treasure” of her lips, rather than, for instance, her singing or her conversation, and, when he finally sees her again, he is disconcerted by her wrinkles (5.1.53-54, 5.3.27-29). Leontes’ perfunctory plan to “new woo [his] queen” betrays a complete inability to appreciate the depth of Hermione’s anguish over her son’s death (3.2.156). Although he undoubtedly has a “bitter” sense of loss after his wife’s apparent death, he is still focused on “the wrong [he] did [him]self,” rather than on the pain he has caused Hermione: he blames himself only for having “destroyed the sweet’st companion that e’er man bred his hopes out of” (5.1.6-12). Thus, even a penitent Leontes finds it difficult to moderate his self-love and sensual desire sufficiently to display the sympathetic care which love demands.

By contrast, Hermione’s love for her husband is almost as deep as Perdita’s for Florizel–it is in fact she who initiates one of the play’s recurring images by referring to him as “the crown and comfort of [her] life”–although, as we shall see, she is constantly hurt by his graceless behaviour (3.2.94). She responds indignantly to Polixenes’ implication that the queens whom he and Leontes have married are in effect “devils” whose physical beauty has “tempt[ed]” them away from the “innocence” of their original friendship, declaring that this claim could only be justified

            If you first sinn’d with us, and that with us

            You did continue fault, and that you slipp’d not

            With any but with us.

            (1.2.84-86)

Leaving aside her bantering reference to the probability that the kings were not virgins when they married, the serious part of Hermione’s riposte is her sardonic demonstration of the absurdity of Polixenes’ idea that a constant marriage could ever amount to a distracting “temptation.” This implicit argument is undermined, however, by the fact that she cannot find a stronger measure of Leontes’ constant love than his sexual continence.[xvii]

Hermione’s repeated, sardonic pleas for “Grace,” in response to Leontes’ remark about her never having spoken “to better purpose,” which is no doubt just the latest example of his boorish disregard, echo her indignant reaction to Polixenes’ implicit denigration of her marriage– “Grace to boot!”–in such a way as to highlight the crucial role played by “grace” in mature relationships (1.2.99, 1.2.105. 1.2.80).[xviii] To lack ‘grace’ is to lack the reciprocal interplay of gratitude and gratification that generates the joyous sense of unity which Shakespeare sees as the ultimate, irreducible good: Hermione is desperate for Leontes to show that he returns her single-minded devotion by praising her, for “praises are [the] wages” which can drive lovers “a thousand furlongs” (1.2.91-96). Ironically, it was a desire for praise which led Hermione to exert herself to make Polixenes extend his stay in the first place: she had intended to remain silent until the latter had sworn to depart, presumably so as to earn the maximum gratitude from Leontes when she eventually stepped in to change his friend’s mind (1.2.28-30).

Thus, although Hermione’s problems are less immediately obvious than the shepherdesses’, her position even at the start of the play is almost as wretched, since she too has chosen the wrong partner in whom to invest her devotion. The marriage has in fact been sustained more by her passionate desire to gain Leontes’ “favor” than by an actual reciprocal intimacy (3.2.94). Even as Hermione is suggesting that “for ever earn[ing] a royal husband” should take precedence over “for some while [earning] a friend,” Leontes is fuming with a jealous anger which, quite apart from the fact that it is focused on his friend rather than his wife, is symptomatic of the underlying pride which has prevented him from returning her sympathetic care (1.2.106-08). In this way, Shakespeare illustrates the torment that can be inflicted within many supposedly well-established relationships, when the craving for intimacy is thwarted. 

Hermione is quite ready to die after losing both her husband and her children, since, like the shepherd, she values her family ties more than life itself (3.2.42-45, 3.2.92-101, 4.4.454-56; see below for Hermione’s maternal affection). She embraces Leontes at the end of the play–having been given several opportunities to appreciate the earnestness of his repentance by the diligent Paulina[xix]–as she must do in order to re-enter society, but does not speak to him; her passionate words are reserved for Perdita, for whom alone she says she has “preserv’d [her]self,” and the play ends with a match made between Camillo and Paulina rather than with a rapprochement between the king and his queen, as one might have expected (5.3.23-42, 5.3.71-73, 5.3.111, 5.3.141-46). The silent implication–made without interrupting the apparently harmonious ending of the play–is that Hermione could never forgive Leontes for his abandonment of Perdita and the death of Mamillius.[xx] Thus, Shakespeare illustrates the inevitable corollary of his teaching that constant devotion must be earnt through self-denying, sympathetic care: through his narrow self-love the king has entirely alienated Hermione, who was in fact offering him the ultimate good.

Parenthood

Shakespeare outlines a hierarchy of erotic devotion in the play, in which characters are ranked not only by their capacity to form constant attachments, but also by their ability to transmit this capacity to future generations through parental care. As the opening scene implies, parental investment in the “hope” and “promise” of children is the consequence of an inevitable clash between the instinctive desire to perpetuate attachments and a rational awareness of death. The intrinsic satisfactions that parents derive from aligning themselves with the interests of their children–which are, as we have seen, common to all deep attachments–are reinforced by the vicarious relish which they take in their child’s future happiness, which arms them against the inevitable moment when death will strip them of all their attachments. Here again Hermione and the shepherd provide the standard by which the other parental figures in the play can be judged. In contrast with Leontes, who, as we shall see, concentrates narrowly on the bodily resemblances between himself and Mamillius, and disowns his daughter because he considers her to be a bastard, the shepherd’s successful adoption of Perdita serves to abstract the desire to “continue…loves” as a motive for parental care from the urge to reproduce genes. (This contrast is sharpened by the fact that he too assumes that the baby is illegitimate, but directs his censure only at the lack of care which its parents have displayed -3.3.72-76.)

The instinctive “pity” which the shepherd feels for the “pretty” child represents the first stage in a process which ultimately leads parents to deliver sympathetic care in order to nurture the “promise” of children (3.3.70-76). His characteristically modest remark that he “should be silent,” rather than boasting of Perdita’s “feat[ness]” and her ability to give Florizel “that which he not dreams of,” actually betrays the fact that his praise of her is partly a celebration of his own achievement in transmitting his passionate constancy to his daughter (4.4.176-80). The vicarious satisfaction which he derives from Perdita’s future happiness is intensified by his knowledge that her loving heart has been nurtured by his own care. The shepherd has indeed made every effort to pass on to Perdita the diligent generosity which has allowed him and his wife to lead such fulfilling lives: in his opening speech he reminds his daughter that she cannot “retire…as if [she] were a feasted one,” but that now, as “the hostess of the meeting,” she should imitate her adopted mother’s “labor,” and welcome even “unknown friends…for it is a way to make us better friends, more known” (4.4.55-68). Secure in the knowledge that he has exerted himself in this way, he can simply relish the intimacy that she has developed with Florizel as an extension of his own passionate attachments, rather than focusing primarily on the sadness of losing a child (4.4.168-80). The thought that it is possible to “continue…loves” into future generations through parental care therefore gives a particularly forceful impetus to parental devotion, even in comparison to the intensity of romantic love or intimate friendship.

In contrast with Polixenes, whose extreme fury with Florizel stems, as I will argue, from his fear of an unremembered death, the shepherd values his life only insofar as it forms an integral link in a great chain of attachments, stretching from his forebears to his descendants: his first reaction to Polixenes’ threats is not to rebuke Perdita, but to pray for his life to end “within this hour,” lest a summary execution should prevent him from fulfilling his wish to “die upon the bed my father died, to lie close to his honest bones” (4.4.453-56). Because he has devoted himself to this enduring chain of attachments, he is able to “keep seeming and savour all the winter long,” like rosemary and rue, the “flow’rs of winter” and of old age, which represent “grace and remembrance” respectively, rather than focusing on his own physical decay and eventual death (4.4.74-76). Just as he honours the memory of his father’s virtues, so he gracefully merges his interests with those of the next generation through his sympathetic care. 

Although one might be tempted to imagine that Perdita is “too noble for this place” because of her royal blood, the truth is, therefore, that her inheritance is a much more substantial “crown imperial” than Florizel’s, since she has been primed to practise and transmit passionate constancy by adopted parents who have themselves received this care from their own “honest” forebears -whereas the prince has experienced a parental love which is, as we shall see, sincere, but in fact impeded precisely by Polixenes’ sense of his own royal dignity (4.4.156-59). Perdita has learnt from her parents’ example that each act of painstaking care is an investment which might gain the supreme reward of an intimate attachment. The role of hostess perfectly illustrates the combination of open-heartedness and discipline which is required to generate such attachments: Perdita’s tactful “labor” to ensure that her two guests are not offended by being offered winter flowers serves to “make [her] better friends” as surely as Hermione’s equally graceful efforts to put Polixenes at ease (4.4.72-79, 4.4.103-12).[xxi] This mixture of generosity and self-control may be partly what inspires Camillo to assist the young lovers, since he praises her both at this point in the play and later, when she blushes at Florizel’s compliments in a way that is simultaneously passionate and modest (4.4.159-61). Similarly, it is the combination of Perdita’s concern lest Florizel woo her “the false way,” and her passionate “swear[ing]” to imitate the turtle doves who “never mean to part” that induces Polixenes, almost despite himself, to express admiration for her “noble” demeanour, thus no doubt facilitating his eventual acceptance of a shepherdess for a daughter-in-law (4.4.146-59).

The shepherd reminds Perdita of the example set by his wife, rather than directly rebuking or instructing her, because he knows that children have their own strong passions, which are not necessarily amenable to any direct form of control. This point is highlighted in the most dramatic manner by Perdita’s secret affair with a prince, but the clown also illustrates perfectly his father’s rueful comment that in the “age between ten and three-and-twenty…there is nothing in the between but getting wenches with child, wronging the ancientry, stealing, fighting” (3.3.59-63). The shepherd wisely limits himself to venting his criticisms of the “boil’d brain[ed]” clown in private–and even there in highly generalised terms, as if he can hardly bear to admit that he is talking about his son–and avoids rebuking him when he eventually appears, although the youth, who is perhaps nineteen (3.3.64), has not only failed to help him to gather the flock, but, judging by the huntsman’s cry with which he announces his presence, was actually himself involved in the very hunt which has just “scar’d away” the “best sheep” (3.3.63-80). The shepherd does not even rebuke the clown for failing to come to Antigonus’ aid, despite the fact that the latter “cried to [him] for help,” although he does leave his son in no doubt that he himself would have interceded (3.3.107-08, 3.3.96).

When the clown reappears sixteen years later, now presumably in his mid-thirties, and so well beyond the danger period outlined by his father, he seems to be much more reliable, since he has clearly been trusted to sell a large amount of wool and to procure everything that Perdita needs for the feast (4.3.32-49). Moreover, he shows a sympathetic concern for the supposedly beaten Autolycus, which contrasts strikingly with the callousness of his response to the deaths of Antigonus and the mariners (compare 4.3.54-114 with 3.3.83-131). Even the pride which he takes in his conquests (see above) is tempered by a degree of shame, for he makes persistent attempts to conceal his incontinence both from his father and from the guests at the party (4.4.161-65, 4.4.242-48, 4.4.309-13). All of this implies that if parents remain patient and concentrate on consistently modelling self-denial and sympathetic care, even the most obdurately wilful child may well come to appreciate the advantages of these virtues. The apparently disinterested generosity consistently displayed by the shepherd, which might even have led him to risk his life in order to defend Antigonus from the bear, can therefore be seen as prudent on the deepest level, since, even where it fails to gain him friends, it enables him to demonstrate to his children the virtues by which the chain of love is sustained. 

In contrast to lovers and friends, parents cannot rely on any return other than the vicarious delight which they take in their children’s current and future happiness, although one can see from the shepherd’s desire to be buried alongside his father that a well-cared for child is almost bound to feel deep gratitude and a desire to perpetuate his or her parents’ values. By adopting Perdita, the shepherd has certainly gained a daughter who could become the mainstay of his old age after the death of his wife–as is implied by the skilful way in which she assumes the role of hostess at the sheep-shearing feast–but it would be unwise to assume that even the most passionately grateful children will consistently reciprocate parental care. On the one hand younger children are primarily needy or “parasit[ic],” in Polixenes’ condescending phrase, while on the other, the vivid attachments and “stronger blood” of adolescence and early adulthood naturally tend to override filial gratitude: leaving aside the clown’s unruliness, Florizel “mean[s] not to see [Polixenes] any more” after eloping with his beloved, while, as we have seen, Perdita’s concealed courtship actually puts the shepherd’s life in mortal danger twice (1.2.168, 3.3.59-63, 4.4.494-95, 5.1.198-202, 4.4.420-22). Even in the best circumstances parents must usually accept that their children will leave them to start their own families, and therefore ideally restrain any trace of possessiveness as gracefully as the shepherd, since any other response might disrupt the alignment of interests which they have striven to establish (4.4.379-91). Overall, parental devotion thus requires an even greater degree of self-control than other forms of constant attachment -although this effort is, as we have seen, “justified” by the fact that the potential rewards are far more enduring.

As we have seen, Hermione’s family is her ruling passion: at her trial she declares that she “only…stand[s] for” her honour because “’tis a derivative from me to mine,” since protecting her children from disgrace matters far more to her than her status as “a great king’s daughter,” or even her own life (3.2.37-45). Subsequently, we have noted that she takes refuge with Paulina mainly because she cannot forgive a husband who has apparently destroyed both of the children who formed the heart of the family to which her life has been devoted. At the end of the play, she declares that she has only “preserv’d [her]self” at all in order “to see the issue” of the oracle’s announcement that Perdita may return some day (5.3.121-28). It is significant that Paulina, who knows Hermione so well, imagines her ghost shrieking “Remember mine,” rather than “Remember me,” like the ghost in Hamlet (5.1.65-67). Overall, Hermione is courageous because her self-love is entirely subordinated to her parental devotion.

Hermione’s parental devotion is wise and restrained as well as courageous. Whereas the first lady retaliates indignantly when Mamillius rejects her–partly for speaking to him as if he “were a baby still” and partly because he prefers a second lady with more attractive “black brows,” the humble queen restrains herself from rebuking the “troubl[ing]” boy, and instead puts the onus on him to tell her a story–because he is “pow’rful at it”–even though this means being subjected to “sprites and goblins” (2.1.1-32). In contrast with the first lady, Hermione’s concern for him is undiminished by the prospect of a second child: she takes the shortest possible break before resuming her effort to give him the undivided attention which he still needs at the age of five (for Mamillius’ age compare 4.1.5-6, 5.1.115-18 and 5.1.126-30). After coaxing Mamillius repeatedly to sit down next to her, just as he has no doubt done countless times before, she is eventually able to recall him to the special intimacy which they both clearly enjoy so much: they decide together that he should tell the tale “softly,” right “in [her] ear,” so that the ladies in waiting “shall not hear it” (2.1.27-32). 

Under Hermione’s auspices the prince learns that he can only satisfy his craving for intimacy by moderating his proud assertiveness and nit-picking concern with physical appearance, and speaking “softly” to those he loves. Without his mother’s guidance Mamillius might have wasted his life–if, that is, he had reached adulthood–in a thrusting and boorish pursuit of a fleeting sensual stimulation, which, like the grafted carnations and the clown’s desire for Mopsa and Dorcas, would have been generated naturally, but subsequently enhanced by artificial means: he already declares that he prefers eyebrows to display “not too much hair there, but in a semicircle, or a half-moon made with a pen” (2.1.6-11). Mamillius’ ultimately fatal terror at the prospect of his mother being executed for adultery is a measure of the extent to which Hermione has secured his enduring affection through her humble, sympathetic care (3.2.144-45). If her son had lived, this care would doubtless have enabled Hermione, whose name means ‘messenger of the gods,’ to transmit her capacity to form deep attachments to future generations. This is the only recompense that devoted parents can reliably expect to gain, but it ‘justifies’ all their sacrifices. If the patient sympathy which Hermione shows Mamillius is distinctively maternal, then it is possible that women are particularly well suited to making these sacrifices, and are therefore more likely than men to gain the ultimate reward.

By contrast, Leontes’ influence is apparent precisely in the boorish arrogance and superficial concentration on physical appearance which Mamillius exhibits when he deserts the first lady for the second -as is perhaps implied by the second lady’s surprised question, “Who taught’ this?” (2.1.7-11). The king praises Mamillius only for his feisty willingness to “fight” anyone who does him down, which he no doubt sees as perpetuating his own noble spiritedness, and, as we have seen, models a marital relationship in which he does not compliment Hermione at all, unless one counts his graceless reference to her “open[ing] her white hand” to his “crabb’d” advances (1.2.153-63, 1.2.101-05). Mamillius may not love his father, as is implied by the wary neutrality of his response to being called a “calf”– “Yes, if you will, my lord” (1.2.127)–but he is certainly influenced by him: the curious abruptness of his declaration that he is “like” Leontes suggests that he has understood enough of the king’s meditations on their physical resemblances and on the fickleness of “a bawdy planet” to feel the full insecurity of his own position (1.2.121-46, 1.2.187-208).[xxii] It is possible indeed that his “troubl[ing]” behaviour in the next scene represents a deliberate effort to confirm this “like[ness],” or even to unleash both in himself and others the “bawd[iness]” which he might now assume to be pervasive. We can infer that the sympathetic Hermione senses that her son’s perspective on the world has somehow shifted, and encourages him to tell his “sad tale…of sprites and goblins” partly in order to exorcise the darker feelings–perhaps adumbrated by the imagery of the “black brows” and the “half-moon”–which are driving him to “trouble” her “past enduring” (2.1.1-32). Thus, the indications are that, without Hermione’s influence, Leontes’ would have passed on to Mamillius only the sensuality and untrammelled pride which lock the king into his own fleeting existence, and so condemned his son to a similar fate.

Leontes loves his son partly because he reflects his own proud self-assertion and partly because they are physically “almost as like as eggs” (1.2.129-35; see also 1.2.122, 1.2.153-63, 2.1.57-58). He is capable of showing a casual concern for Mamillius’ future well-being– “happy man be’s dole” (1.2.163)–but, although he observes him closely enough to worry about his loss of “spirit…appetite [and] sleep” as the trial of Hermione approaches, his assumption that his decline is caused by his “nobleness” reacting with “shame” to “the dishonor of his mother,” leads him to overlook the “conceit and fear of the Queen’s speed” which is in fact what eventually kills him (compare 2.3.10-18 and 3.2.144-45). Thus, Leontes’ proud insistence that Mamillius has inherited his own spirited assertiveness prevents him from forming the sympathetic parental bond which might have allowed him to care for his son. 

Leontes’ emphasis on Mamillius’ inherited assertiveness shows that he too is motivated by the “hope…” for the future which underlies all parental love, although in his case this “promise” is distorted by self-love (1.1.34-46). This point is confirmed by the fact that it is Mamillius’ death rather than Hermione’s apparent demise, or Paulina’s remonstrations, or even Camillo’s flight, that recalls the king to the underlying needs which he has temporarily displaced by his proud rage (3.2.145-72, 3.2.232-43). From this moment on he feels deeply “the wrong [he] did [him]self” in leaving his kingdom “heirless” (5.1.8-10). When Paulina reminds him that he has “kill’d” Hermione, he simply asks her to “say so but seldom,” as the memory is so “bitter,” whereas, by contrast, his son “dies to [him] again when talk’d of,” in a way that is likely to “unfurnish [him] of reason” (5.1.12-19, 5.1.119-23). Mamillius’ death inspires Leontes to display a degree of humble self-discipline, perhaps for the first time in his life: he visits his and Hermione’s grave every day–the latter being included in this ritual, one may infer, mainly because he has “bred his hopes out of” her (3.2.234-43, 5.1.11-12).

Leontes’ willingness to forgive Florizel’s deception and plead the cause of the young couple, who remind him so powerfully of his own children (5.1.130-34), suggests that his losses have at last forced him to appreciate that it is only by striving to merge his interests with those of the next generation through humble, diligent service that he can hope to “continue [his] loves” (5.1.204-34). However, Leontes still feels self-pity rather than an agonised appreciation of the pain that he has caused his children– “What might I have been, might I a son and daughter now have look’d on, such goodly things as you”–and, as we have seen, regrets mainly “the wrong [he] did [him]self” in leaving his kingdom “heirless” (5.1.176-78, 5.1.8-10).[xxiii] We are reminded of his limitations when he “worries…his daughter with clipping her,” and “wound[s]” her in his anxiety to “bravely confess…” to and “lament…” his treatment of her mother–no doubt in an effort to receive an assurance of forgiveness–rather than gaining her trust by applying himself diligently to the bitter task of actually appreciating her feelings (5.2.53-54, 5.2.84-89). Thus, Leontes is unable to complete the alchemical process which has allowed Hermione and the shepherd to transmute the possessiveness of their parental attachment into apparently selfless care. Nevertheless, although he is seemingly only able to suspend his self-love completely in his friendship with Camillo, where he can gain the ongoing reward of a commensurate, reciprocal care, he is clearly straining to restrain his tyrannical impulses in his generous and humble treatment of the young lovers.[xxiv]

As has been noted, the sensitive and passionate Hermione guesses that Polixenes’ desire to return home is sparked by an intense “long[ing] to see his son,” rather than by marital devotion–which she silently discounts as a possible motive, having presumably already understood that he views wives primarily as sexual “temptations”–or by the political threats which he himself blames for his departure (1.2.34-37, 1.2.76-80, 1.2.11-14, 1.2.23-24, 1.2.30-33). Her theory is confirmed later in the scene, when Polixenes himself finally admits that, “if at home,” his son is “all my exercise, my mirth, my matter” (1.2.165-71). Although Polixenes is undoubtedly extremely attached to his son, the disapproval implicit in Hermione’s unceremonious threat to “thwack him hence” if, as she believes, he is indeed feeling the pull of parental devotion, reminds us that a thoroughly devoted father would not voluntarily leave his son for nine months (1.2.36-37). Like Leontes, the ambivalent Polixenes does not seem to appreciate the extent of his need for his son (or his son’s need for him), until he suddenly realises that he feels bereft without him (see below).

Unlike Leontes, who, despite claiming to be as “fond” of Mamillius as his friend is of Florizel, is in fact too taken up with his proud anger to pay him any attention as they walk together, Polixenes genuinely relishes his son’s “varying childness,” partly for its own sake, since he is a “sworn friend,” who “cures in [him] thoughts that would thick [his] blood,” and partly because he shows promise as a “soldier, statesman” (1.2.164-211). Here Polixenes encapsulates the two chief motives for parenthood, but gives them his own distinctive twist, as befits his political priorities: Florizel’s trusting attachment is valued for its own sake, but also for the promise that he can “continue” a tradition of proud and noble patriotism. However, Polixenes’ also notes, with a plaintiveness which is only partly bantering, that his son is a “parasite” who cannot directly return his care, and indeed is as likely to be his “enemy” as his “friend” (1.2.167-68). Taken together, these points indicate that Polixenes occupies an intermediate position in the erotic hierarchy: not only is he as concerned that Florizel should become an honourable “statesman” as he is for his welfare–although this concern is doubtless itself passionately patriotic as well as proud–but his self-love makes it difficult, if by no means entirely impossible, to sustain the asymmetric care that parental devotion inevitably requires.

The conflict between Polixenes’ proud desire to prevent the royal blood from being sullied by a “sheep-hook” and his genuine concern for Florizel’s happiness, implicit in his declaration that the “noble” Perdita would be “worthy” of his son, “but for our honor therein,” leads him to hesitate before parting the lovers at the sheep-shearing feast, even after he has established beyond doubt that Florizel, “a sceptre’s heir,” is treating Perdita as something more than a temporary mistress (4.4.19-20, 4.4.434-37, 4.4.344-417). Even as he is finally steeling himself to “part them” in what he probably hopes will be a relatively calm and measured intervention, his plan is unexpectedly derailed by Florizel’s apparently callous anticipation of his death, which clearly gives the king a pang of intense and purely personal anguish: “One being dead, I shall have more than you can dream of” (4.4.344, 4.4.387-89). At this point Polixenes abruptly forgets about his official mission and resorts to urging Florizel repeatedly to consult his father about the marriage, in a desperate effort to prove to himself that his son is not devoid of filial affection (4.4.391-414). The king’s disguise now becomes symbolic of his fragmented personality: his pleas spring from his underlying needs rather than a concern to uphold the status of the royal family, and appeal to Florizel’s filial feelings rather than his pride in that status -a father’s “joy is nothing else but fair posterity” (4.4.408-09). This impromptu, unacknowledged love test threatens to undermine the king’s proud political mission in a manner reminiscent of the opening scenes of King Lear, for if Florizel had relented, Polixenes could hardly have simply forbidden him to marry Perdita after arguing that the choice of a wife should be left to “reason,” aided by “some counsel” (4.4.406-10). 

The vicious and uncontrolled nature of Polixenes’ eventual response to Florizel’s determined refusal to seek his advice is more a reflection of the shock that he feels at his son’s apparent callousness than his statesmanlike worries about the royal blood (4.4.417-41). However, it is typical of the dignified king to channel his personal anguish into a haughty excoriation of Florizel for stooping to so “base” a courtship -just as he used a political pretext to justify his desire to return home at the start of the play (4.4.418-20, 1.2.11-14). His rage, like that of Leontes earlier in the play, which is also prompted by a beloved’s apparent inconstancy, therefore illustrates the power of pride to distort deep attachments, but also the power of such attachments to sway even the proudest souls (1.1.32).[xxv]

Polixenes’ plan to part the lovers is contrasted with the simple relish which the shepherd takes in the young couple’s love and his assumption that the role of parents is merely to “know” the “choice” which their children have made, secure in the knowledge that they have already modelled the devotion which is needed to establish a happy marriage (4.4.168-76, 4.4.379-91, 4.4.415-16). This serenity might seem foolish, since the young couple are actually concealing Florizel’s real identity, but it is justified on a deeper level, since the shepherd has indeed enabled Perdita to choose a lover who will show her constant care. In contrast with Polixenes, his ability to care about his child’s future and accept that she must now leave him to pursue her new life both stem from, and in their turn reinforce, his confidence that she will “continue [his] love….” 

Although, unlike his less restrained friend, Polixenes restrains himself from torturing his son’s own beloved in the way that he threatens, he nevertheless almost destroys the very intimacy which he craves through his proud anger, since, but for Camillo’s prudent efforts, Florizel might well have deserted him completely at this point: “I mean not to see him any more” (4.4.422-26, 4.4.494-95). Ironically, Florizel’s casual reference to his inheritance is by no means evidence of a callous indifference, as Polixenes assumes: his affection has in fact been secured by a father who has in the past made him “all [his] exercise”–at least when he was at home–as is evident from the guilt and sympathetic concern which the prince shows in requesting Camillo to “cast [his] good counsels upon [Polixenes’] passion,” “when he shall miss me” (1.2.165-71, 4.4.492-96). Nevertheless, Florizel’s elopement does indeed confirm that children are unlikely ever fully to reciprocate the care that has been invested in their upbringing, since they will inevitably prioritise their own friendships and romantic relationships, and ultimately their own children over filial gratitude; not just because of their “stronger blood,” but because they too are arming themselves against time: they know that their parents’ lives are likely to end even before their own. As we have seen, parents should humbly accept this imbalance, since their primary aim is to transmit passionate devotion to future generations through sympathetic care, rather than to establish a reciprocal intimacy.

Underlying the distress which Polixenes feels over his son’s casual remark is his growing sense of his own mortality, evident in his insistence that he is “not stupid with age and alt’ring rheums” (4.4.394-402). The king’s pride prevents him from emulating the shepherd’s ability to transcend his own finitude through “grace and remembrance,” as is suggested by his implicit rejection of the “rosemary and rue,” flowers of winter and old age, which Pedita offers him (4.4.73-79, 4.4.454-56). Ironically, this slightly churlish act forces his hostess to substitute a much less complimentary gift, for, as we have seen, “the flow’rs of middle summer, and…of middle age” can signify mistrust and grief as well as virtue and joy (4.4.103-08). In fact, the ambiguous flowers of middle summer are absolutely appropriate for the ambivalent Polixenes, whose name, which means “one who entertains many strangers” perhaps suggests that he can simultaneously entertain a variety of diverse, and indeed contradictory motives. Although Polixenes loves his son, his self-love prevents him from integrating himself humbly into a network of ongoing attachments, which is the only way of mitigating the mortifying, and ultimately annihilating, depredations of time. 

Polixenes’ name also perhaps hints that he is a product, or victim, of the political hierarchy. Although it is entirely natural for less erotic souls to experience a tension between attachment and pride, since both are instinctive drives, the amour propre which divides Polixenes from his son, and indeed from his own loving heart, is undoubtedly aggravated by his elevated position in this hierarchy. The gulf between father and son in this respect is revealed by the king’s mistaken assumption that Florizel shares his own love of high rank sufficiently to be controlled by the threat of being “bar[red]…from succession” (4.4.429-31). Unlike his son, Polixenes’ passions are not sufficiently intense to override the pride which his social status has encouraged him to prioritise: as has been noted, his attachment to Florizel is from the start tangled up with the pride which he takes in his son’s potential to become a “soldier [and] statesman” (1.2.168). The tension between these two motives is demonstrated when Florizel, who is in fact an affectionate son, actually “yield[s]” to his disguised father’s arguments for consulting him about the match in theoretical terms, but still feels forced to conceal his commitment to Perdita, precisely in the manner that Polixenes finds so painful, by his knowledge that the king would haughtily condemn his love as inconsistent with the “gracious…virtues” which are appropriate to his rank (4.4.410-13, 4.2.26-28). 

The corollary of Polixenes’ relatively unerotic nature is that his attachments are not sufficiently intense to override his concern with social status: he is so far from apologising for his rage that he pursues Florizel to Sicily, where he continues to threaten the shepherd with execution, and presumably only accepts him as a “brother” eventually because Perdita turns out to be a princess (5.1.181-85, 5.1.198-202, 5.2.141-42). As with Leontes, his rage is fuelled by thwarted affection, but unlike his friend, his response continues to be steered by his self-love. It is ultimately the more passionate Leontes who supports the young couple, even after realising that they have deceived him, and regardless of his assumption that Perdita is a commoner (5.1.208-33). Thus, Leontes’ serious, if flawed effort to moderate his pride, which he eventually realises is the only means of satisfying the desire to “continue [his] loves,” is contrasted with Polixenes’ ongoing, futile concern with conventional status, which allows the king to maintain a degree of civilised decorum even in his rage, but which ultimately threatens to prevent him from satisfying his most fundamental needs. The young lovers will always know that it was Leontes, rather than Polixenes who had their best interests at heart in the end. However, Polixenes remains a hybrid character to the end, designed to show the mutually distorting influence which pride and attachment can exert: not only has his early care helped to prime Florizel to love Perdita in the first place, but, as we have seen, his rage is itself fuelled by his deep attachment to his son.

Whereas Polixenes’ pride is sublimated into a concern for his public status, Leontes’ rawer self-love is merely facilitated by his political power, leaving him relatively free of worldly pride. Both types of pride obstruct the devoted care which is the primary business of parenthood, but at first Polixenes’ sense of his own dignity leaves more room for such care than Leontes’ straightforward self-assertion. Whereas the younger Leontes lacks the restraint which is required to sustain the one-sided care that parenthood demands, Polixenes is naturally more stolid and has therefore been a much better father. This implies that moderation is a more vital requirement for fathers than passion, for the aim of parenthood is to deliver and model care rather than to establish an intense intimacy. However, Polixenes remains an intermediate figure in the hierarchy of parental affection precisely because of his relatively unerotic nature, whereas, by the end of the play, Leontes is straining to reach the level attained by Hermione and the shepherd, whose radical moderation is, paradoxically, a function of their passionate attachment to their children.  

Overall, therefore, parental devotion is more deep-seated than romantic love or friendship, because it offers a much more radical way of transcending the narrowness of human existence than other forms of attachment. It is parental love that disrupts the two kings’ apparently impermeable self-love: whereas Polixenes is not deeply affected by Leontes’ rage, or indeed, it seems, by his own marriage (1.2.76-80), the thought that Florizel might be callously indifferent to him overrides his pride–albeit temporarily–and then drives him to stage a far more vehement intervention than his official self might consider appropriate. Similarly, almost as soon as Leontes’ suspicions begin to take hold, his main concern is with Mamillius’ legitimacy (1.2.120-35), while his eventual repentance is triggered and sustained by the guilt which he feels over his son’s death rather than the loss of Polixenes, Hermione, or even Camillo. Even though Leontes’ attachment to the latter is in the end more deeply fulfilling, the posthumous “hope” and “promise” which children offer is still bound to be his most urgent concern. However, although the two kings are used to show that parental affection continues to exercise a pervasive, often unacknowledged influence, even when overlaid and distorted by pride, their stories primarily demonstrate the power of self-love to stunt the humble, generous care which is required to fulfil this promise.  

The Reach of Attachment

The play as a whole implies that the yearning for constant attachments exerts a powerful influence over a wide variety of ideologies and natural drives. As we have seen, truly passionate lovers tend to moderate sexual desire so that it can facilitate a lasting intimacy, whereas the less passionate or prudent may remain content with pleasures which are intense, but fleeting. By contrast, however, passionate friends, lovers and parents strive to eliminate self-love altogether, since it is absolutely incompatible with the humble care which constant attachments demand. Florizel’s willingness to renounce his title to the throne is only the most extreme example of a series of moments in which the play’s most deeply erotic characters sacrifice their pride: thus, Camillo has no more desire to rebuke the penitent Leontes than Hermione has to assert herself in response to the “troubl[ing]” Mamillius, or indeed to stand on her royal dignity in the trial scene, where she defends her honour only because it is “a derivative from me to mine” (5.2.10-19, 2.1.1-32, 3.2.37-45). At the start of the play, Hermione’s almost humiliatingly honest plea for praise contrasts directly with the proud rage expressed by the less temperate kings in response to a similar sense of exclusion (1.2.90-101). 

Lower down the erotic hierarchy, however, attachment and self-love constantly clash, with complex and mutually disruptive effects. Leontes himself registers with some surprise the strength of the feelings which, as we have seen, ultimately spring from his thwarted attachment to Polixenes, although, as we have seen, his pride prevents him from acknowledging their true source:

            Affection! thy intention stabs the centre.

            Thou dost make possible things not so held,

            Communicat’st with dreams (how can this be?).

            (1.2.138-40)

The rages of both kings are driven by frustrated love, but their frustration is itself the consequence of their pride, and their response to it is not to offer humble, devoted care, but to double down on this pride in a manner so savage that, ironically, it disrupts their proud dignity as well as their closest attachments. 

However, even the two kings, whose haughtiness has doubtless been habitually encouraged by their high status, are eventually forced by the very thwarting of their longing to “continue their loves” through their children to acknowledge humbly the depth of this longing -if only temporarily in Polixenes’ case. Although parenthood may therefore be the most powerful natural antidote to pride, the influence of constant attachments in all their various forms is pervasive: it is the dominant force in those who are passionate enough to align themselves with their deeper needs, and, as we can see from Camillo’s desperation to return home and the shepherdesses’ frustrated song, tends in the end to regulate the behaviour even of friends and lovers who are prone to being distracted by more superficial concerns. There is only one example of an absolutely intransigent self-love in the play–that is, Autolycus, although this exception is itself qualified in the manner outlined below–to set against the self-denying devotion of Florizel, the shepherd and the three female characters.

The need for constancy exerts a similarly pervasive influence on those, like Autolycus and Antigonus, who seek deliberately to deny or defy this need, whether for base or noble reasons. Although Autolycus’ hedonism seems to contrast so diametrically with Antigonus’ piety, the two characters are linked, I would argue, by their ineffectual efforts to deny their own most fundamental desires. Having lost his position at court, Autolycus seems at first to approach his new life of petty, itinerant crime in an entirely jaunty spirit: he boasts in his song that he “most go[es] right” when he freely “wander[s] here and there,” stealing, drinking and whoring (4.3.87-100, 4.3.5-18). Typically, he appears unconcerned by the prospect of being called a “rogue,” for being so far officious” as to bring up the subject of Perdita’s provenance, claiming that he is “proof against that title, and what shame else belongs to’t,” and maintaining that “’tis all one to [him]” whether “preferment drop on [his] head” (4.4.837-41, 5.2.113-23). 

However, it is significant that, rather than actually claiming to be “merry,” Autolycus has to enjoin himself to “jog on, jog on…and merrily hent the stile-a,” since “a merry heart goes all the day” while “your sad tires in a mile…” (4.3.123-26). He presumably sings about “the red blood reign[ing] in the winter’s pale,” that is, in spring-time, when “daffadils begin to peer,” despite the fact that the year is “growing ancient”–the sheep-shearing feast is traditionally held at midsummer, “not yet on summer’s death, or the birth of trembling winter”[xxvi]–precisely in order to buoy up his “merry heart” and avoid an unproductive “sad[ness]” (compare 4.3.1-4 with 4.4.79-81, 4.3.123-26). Even the thought of the “pale” of winter–taking the phrase to refer to the ‘pallour’ of the season rather than the transition to spring–is in fact bound to oppress the “red blood” and “merry heart” of those, like Autolycus himself, who have no home to protect them against the elements.

Although Autolycus is arguably the only character in the play who experiences no need to form intimate attachments, Shakespeare shows that even he maintains a sort of loyalty to Florizel, whom he still regularly calls his “master” (4.4.710, 4.4.834, 5.2.151). With typical insouciance, he claims to refrain from telling Polixenes about Florizel’s elopement simply because it is “the more knavery to conceal it,” but when this action is considered alongside his subsequent concern lest the shepherd’s plan to inform the king that Perdita is a “changeling” may form an “impediment…to the flight of [his] master,” it becomes clear that he is actually endeavouring to help the prince (4.4.678-83, 4.4.709-10). His underlying purpose in attempting to give Florizel the news first is to “do the Prince my master good; which who knows how that may turn back to my advancement?” (4.4.834-35). The “honest[y]” which leads Autolycus to pass over two opportunities of being rewarded by the king in order to help Florizel, does not therefore happen “by chance,” as he misleadingly claims, but is, it seems, carefully designed to help him regain the comfort and security of a position at court (4.4.712-13). Although his immediate plan fails because his ‘master’ is concentrating exclusively on caring for the sea-sick Perdita until the lovers arrive in Sicily–at which point the shepherd happens to deliver his news before Autolycus can claim any credit for introducing him to Florizel–he still persists in his effort to be reemployed at court, “beseech[ing]” the receptive clown to give him “a good report to the Prince” (5.2.113-14, 5.2.149-69). 

Although Autolycus has made a fool of the clown three times in the most egregious manner, it may be significant that he concludes the play as his determinedly dutiful servant: it is the virtuous shepherd and his son who have led the more secure life, even according to Autolycus’ own entirely material criteria, as is evident from the large profit that they will make from selling their wool, the product of their committed labour throughout the year (4.4.50-122, 4.4.604-18, 4.4.783-805, 4.3.32-34). Quite apart from the way in which he has been able to provide for a family who will transmit and to some extent return his love, the shepherd’s diligence has enabled him to protect himself from the “pale” of winter much more successfully than Autolycus. 

After acknowledging to himself that he could now earn “preferment” for helping the prince, were it not for the “discredits” of his “former life,” Autolycus vows to “amend” in order to gain the support of his new “good masters,” the shepherd and the clown (5.2.113-22, 5.2.149-74). His self-love remains untrammelled either by close attachments or by divine or human sanctions–he braves the “terrors” of “beating and hanging” and “sleep[s] out” any nagging “thought[s]” about “the life to come” (4.3.28-30)–which means that he will always have the capacity to behave unscrupulously where he can be sure to do so with impunity (5.2.171-73), but he now thoroughly appreciates the importance of diligently maintaining the appearance of virtue. The genuine services which he performs, or attempts to perform, for Florizel indicate that there are many circumstances under which such an effort might be quite indistinguishable from true loyalty. 

Overall, Autolycus therefore exemplifies in its crudest form the paradoxical process by which an originally selfish need for lasting security may ultimately express itself through the provision of dutiful service. Shakespeare demonstrates that even a man who completely lacks emotional attachments, and whose relationship with his fellow men is in fact entirely predatory–Autolycus, whose name means ‘the wolf itself’, is named after a mythical thief–may well be driven to provide loyal care in return for lasting material security. Thus, the lowest level of the play’s erotic hierarchy not only reflects, but even sheds light on the highest, since Autolycus has no pretensions to altruism, as lovers often do: the alchemical process which he illustrates reaches its apogee in Camillo, who similarly wants nothing more than to resume his relationship with his “master,” and Florizel, whose ambitious desire to secure the “crown imperial” of constant, reciprocal devotion is transmuted into a far more painstaking self-denial than Autolycus would ever feel the need to display.

One of the implications of the above argument is that claims to live entirely in the moment–as when Autolycus attempts to fool himself that the neediness which drives his effort to help Florizel is “knavery,” and asserts that he is only “honest…by chance”–are likely to be nothing more than a proud affectation (4.4.681-83, 4.4.712-13). Thus, even at Autolycus’ low erotic level, amour propre conflicts with the humble service which is needed to create any sort of secure attachment.

Like his namesake, Antigone, Antigonus is ruled by his piety. It is clear that his religious belief generally supports his attachments, reinforcing his compassion for the infant Perdita and reverence for the queen: he worries that Leontes will not “be prosperous” after effectively “condemn[ing]” the “poor thing” to death, unless “blessing against this cruelty fight on [his] side,” and initially makes an even more concerted effort than Camillo to defend Hermione against Leontes’ accusations, while covertly supporting Paulina’s more passionate intervention (2.3.189-92, compare 2.1.140-72 with 1.2.279-324, 2.3.41-52). 

Unlike the thoughtful and unscrupulous Camillo, however, who immediately breaks his promise to murder Polixenes, realising that the duty of “obedience to a master” may be suspended when the latter is “in rebellion with himself,” Antigonus feels constrained on his “soul’s peril” to abide by his pious “oath” to expose Perdita, even though Leontes tricked him into engaging in this “ungentle business” in the first place by encouraging him to vow to do anything to save the baby (1.2.318-63, 3.3.30, 3.3.52-53, 3.3.34, 2.3.162-85). From the start, Antigonus disguises the harshness of his mission by imagining that “some powerful spirit [will] instruct the kites and ravens to be [Perdita’s] nurses,” while later his determination to brave a terrible storm and the notorious ferocity of the local predators in order to expose the child in the deserts of Bohemia is reinforced by the conviction that he is the instrument of “sacred wills (2.3.186-89, 3.3.4-14). Moreover, he takes a dream in which he is addressed by what he imagines to be the ghost of Hermione–although of course she has not actually “suffer’d death,” as he assumes–as evidence that Apollo has decreed that the baby should be abandoned in Bohemia, “upon the earth of its right father,” regardless of the fact that the ‘ghost’ makes no reference to the gods or admission of marital infidelity (3.3.15-46). His sudden conviction that Hermione is in fact an adulteress, which runs completely counter to his stout defence of her in act 2 scene 1, shows him unconsciously adapting his piety to rationalise injustice and suppress his instinctive urge to protect the baby. 

These comforting rationalisations are, however, only achieved at enormous psychological cost. The fact that Antigonus cannot in fact “weep” in the way that he is invited to do in his dream, although his “heart bleeds,” reflects his subconscious awareness that his grim mission requires him to repress his “better disposition” (3.3.51-52, 3.3.27-32). His abandonment of the infant Perdita is contrasted–and in fact directly juxtaposed–with the shepherd’s decision to care for her, which is taken out of “pity” and a spontaneous love for the “pretty” child, rather than a forced conception of his duty (3.3.69-76). The intensity of Antigonus’ instinctive remorse manifests itself in an insistence that he is “accurs’d,” which is arguably what makes him vulnerable to the bear’s attack: even as he flees–without even attempting to defend himself– he cries, “I am gone for ever” (3.3.52-58). Most crucially perhaps, the guilt which he feels for acting in a way that runs so dramatically counter to his wife’s passionate devotion to the queen and her children–a wife who he has always believed would not stumble” (2.3.52)–is so desperate that it intrudes into his dream, in the form of another pious conviction; namely that he will be punished by never seeing her again (3.3.34-36). In reality, this ‘premonition’ may reflect a fear–which is in fact quite misplaced (5.3.132-35)–that the obdurate Paulina could never forgive him. 

Thus, Antigonus’ piety initially leads him to oppose the king’s brutal plan, and although it subsequently allows him to justify abandoning Perdita, in the end it reinforces his sense that he has offended against imperatives dictated by his own deepest needs. These contradictions hint that, although the conventional codes of the day can be used to rationalise offences against these natural imperatives, they tend in the end to be subordinate to the human heart, which is constantly at work, reshaping these codes in its own image: it is thus only to be expected that one of Apollo’s traditional roles is to protect young children. The apparently harmonious marriage between Antigonus and the passionate Paulina points to the broad compatibility between piety and constant attachments, but Paulina’s forthcoming second marriage might remind us of the underlying moral of Antigonus’ story, especially when this story is contrasted with Camillo’s; namely, that prudence may be a better guide for passionate individuals than pious or noble principle.

Overall, therefore, despite the obvious contrasts, there are significant parallels between Autolycus and Antigonus, as the similarity between their names might suggest.[xxvii] Whereas Autolycus is forced to admit his need to protect himself against the harshness of nature and therefore to behave like a loyal friend, Antigonus realises that he cannot live with religious principles which conflict with the loyalties which are his raison d’etre. In other words, although hedonism and piety present themselves as guiding principles, in practise neither can override the need for constant relationships. 

Leontes himself is used to illustrate further the complex relationship between piety and constant attachments. The king’s plan, however abortive, to use the oracle to “give rest” to those who are swayed by “ignorant credulity”–he specifies Antigonus–and the way in which he reinforces the conventional loyalty of his “liegeman” by tricking him into swearing to expose Perdita, certainly demonstrate that piety may be exploited to justify the arbitrary will of an autocratic ruler (2.1.189-93, 2.3.158-83). However, as with Antigonus, Leontes’ underlying fear of the gods moderates his callousness as well as facilitating it: he revokes his order to burn the infant Perdita, for instance, after his courtiers all insist that it is “so horrible, so bloody” that it “must lead on to some foul issue” -although of course exposing her would seem merely to be a less openly barbaric means of execution (2.3.147-63). Not only does Leontes’ involvement of the oracle in the first place imply a superstitious trust on his part that Apollo will take his side, but he is ultimately unable to ignore its unexpected judgement–despite his initial impulse to do just that–after Mamillius’ death catalyses his latent fear of the gods: “Apollo’s angry, and the heavens themselves do strike at my injustice” (3.2.145-47). 

From this point on Leontes’ religious belief consistently reinforces his natural grief and guilt: he reflects–not entirely accurately, as we have seen–that Camillo’s “piety” makes his own “deeds…the blacker,” and vows to visit the chapel where Hermione–as he assumes–and Mamillius are buried “once a day” (3.2.171-72, 3.2.238-42). When Florizel first appears, he sees him as a “bless’d” reward which Polixenes “from heaven merits,” whereas by contrast, the gods, having taken “angry note” of his own “sin,” have “left [him] issueless” (5.1.168-76).[xxviii] Possibly inspired by Leontes’ recently expressed fear that Hermione’s “sainted spirit” might haunt him if he were to marry again, Paulina presents the statue’s animation–which is staged in a chapel–as a “holy…spell,” which “require[es] him to “awake [his] faith,” perhaps in the hope that his pious “amazement” will reinforce his brittle attachment (5.1.56-71, 5.3.86-105).[xxix]

Thus, Leontes’ story, like that of Antigonus, shows that although religion can be exploited in perverse ways, it is ultimately more likely to reinforce the guilt which stems naturally from a failure to live up to the austere imperatives of constant attachment. Elsewhere in the play we can see that piety generally supports passionate fidelity: at her trial Hermione does not doubt that “pow’rs divine” know that she is innocent, and therefore gladly refers her case to Apollo (3.2.28-32, 3.2115-16). She is sustained during her long retreat by the oracle, which “gave hope [Perdita] was…in being,” while her first impulse when she sees her daughter again is to pray that the gods will “pour…graces” from their “sacred vials” upon her head (5.3.121-28). Similarly, the shepherd shows how religion, and presumably the belief in an afterlife, can help to satisfy the innate need to “continue…loves”: he wishes to be buried alongside his father by a “priest shovel[ing] in dust” (4.4.455-58). 

Conversely, however, Florizel responds purely aesthetically to Perdita’s way of praying and giving alms, listing it alongside the grace with which she “buy[s] and sell[s]” simply as a random example of her adorable “present deeds,” for in his eyes she herself is the “queen” of this “meeting of the petty gods” (4.4.138-46, 4.4.1-5). The intransigently passionate prince seems to be as indifferent to conventional beliefs as to the established hierarchy: he has dressed his mistress up “goddess-like,” and blasphemously figures himself as Apollo, transformed through his passion into “a humble swain” (4.4.10, 4.4.27-35). This tableau may be designed to hint that it is love itself which generates, and therefore ultimately regulates, the gods. 

The fact that the need to form constant relationships ultimately determines the behaviour of characters who represent such diametrically opposing principles as Autolycus and Antigonus implies that it exerts a pervasive influence on a wide variety of codes and conventions. Camillo and Leontes’ analysis of friendship in act 1 scene 2 suggests that even the four cardinal virtues themselves are ultimately rooted in intimate attachments: the young lovers show how all four virtues are needed to generate a perfectly just, and therefore perfectly trusting, reciprocal devotion, while the relationships of Camillo with Leontes, Paulina with Hermione and Hermione with Polixenes and Leontes are used to show respectively how wisdom, courage and moderation ultimately derive their value from the role which they play in forging attachments. Paulina’s apparent failure to devote the rest of her life to the memory of her lost beloved, or indeed to cajole the unnamed courtier into doing so, implies that absolute constancy cannot be sustained purely by a noble, or, as we would say, moral determination, once it has been divorced from its roots in intimate interaction. The corollary of this is that there is no higher aim than the pursuit or defence of love which could provide the standard by which Camillo’s deception of Florizel and the young lovers’ unscrupulous disregard for their fathers’ wishes, or even, in the shepherd’s case, his safety, could be condemned. Thus, one could argue that moral principles, like piety, are both derived from, and therefore ultimately limited by, the need for constant attachments.

In a similar way, the Sicilian court’s adoration of Mamillius indicates that patriotism represents a natural obtrusion of this need into the political sphere (1.1.34-46). The prudent Camillo is so desperate to prevent Leontes’ fantasies from endangering his country that he even contemplates murdering Polixenes, and later he has a “woman’s longing” to “re-view Sicilia,” which rivals his desire to see his friend (1.2.296-98, 1.2.333-39, 4.4.511-13, 4.4.666-67). The ruling elite are as likely to be motivated by their love of country as by pride, as Camillo, Dion and Polixenes himself all demonstrate (5.1.24-34, 4.2.10-20).

However, there is no doubt that the tendency towards overbearing self-assertion which both the kings exhibit has been encouraged by their high status (5.1.24-34, 4.2.10-20). Similarly, the shepherds’ sudden urge to make authoritative, but baseless claims about Autolycus and their own social origins is clearly caused by their sudden elevation (5.2.126-68). While Perdita’s lowly upbringing certainly allows Shakespeare to contrast a natural hierarchy of attachment to the conventional social order, the examples of the twelve men of hair on the one side and Hermione on the other imply that pride and the longing for constant attachments both exert a pervasive influence which transcends social class. Thus, sexual desire, piety, hedonistic egotism, moral virtue and political life are all either regulated, or at least radically modified by the desire for constant attachments, but in all of these areas this desire is also liable to be disrupted by pride.

Conclusion

Shakespeare starts from the intuition that the ultimate good is to be gained by lovers, friends and parents aligning their interests with those of a beloved as closely and as constantly as possible. This is the only useful point that can be made about the good itself, for, as the wordlessness of Camillo and Leontes’ reunion indicates, there is no higher standard by which it could be judged; but Shakespeare can conduct an exhaustive analysis of the means by which the good can be achieved, and of the pervasive, if partial influence which it exerts, not only over competing natural drives, such as self-love and sexual desire, but over ideologies ranging from piety to hedonism. He shows that, although it is perhaps as instinctive for passionate lovers to be ruled by their constant attachments as it is for turtle doves (4.4.154-55, 5.3.132-35), this instinct has endless ramifications for rational beings, who have an awareness of death, and, to a greater or lesser degree, a capacity for self-denial and sympathetic care. 

The main argument divides constant attachments into parental affection and mature love, and then in turn subdivides the latter category into friendship and romantic relationships. 

The discussion of the means by which both types of mature attachment are formed and preserved is structured around the virtues of justice, wisdom, courage and moderation. Justice and wisdom are the overarching virtues of the four: passionate lovers understand that they must subordinate all potentially divisive desires and fears to their instinctive yearning for constant love, prioritising sympathetic care for their beloveds in an effort to generate a completely harmonious rapport, based on mutual gratitude and trust. 

The forthcoming marriage of Camillo and Paulina implies that friends and lovers need to balance the virtues of courage and prudence, which have contrasting weaknesses and complementary strengths. Paulina demonstrates that those who are primarily spirited and courageous will defend their attachment against external threats in the most steadfast manner possible, but also often in a manner which is noble and sincere, rather than effective. Not only must staunch loyalty be tempered by pragmatism at times, but it is prudent to recognise that even such loyalty itself cannot be maintained with undiminished intensity after a bereavement, since attachments are ultimately sustained by the interchange of care described above. However, whereas the wily and sceptical Camillo can regulate passion in precisely these ways, being completely unmoved by conventional ideas of nobility, he can also learn from Paulina’s–and indeed Perdita’s–intransigent determination to pursue and defend the ultimate good in the face of “affliction,” for those of his thoughtful temperament are particularly prone to fearfulness.

Hermione and Florizel embody Shakespeare’s paradoxical teaching that the yearning to possess the beloved in the closest possible way is naturally expressed through humble moderation, since the gratitude and trust which go to establish an intimate rapport are gained by showing self-denying, sympathetic concern rather than through a direct assertion of desire. By contrast, the rage with which Leontes responds to his failure to achieve such a rapport, which is in the first place the inevitable consequence of his overbearing approach to relationships, shows how his pride has combined with his passionate yearnings to stunt his ability to provide self-denying care. Self-love must be restrained because, whether in the shape of Leontes’ raw spiritedness, or in the sublimated form of Polixenes’ concern with worldly status, it serves only to lock its adherents into their own narrow existence, thus preventing them from achieving the ultimate good. 

The above points apply equally to romantic or marital love and to friendship, since all truly intimate attachments must be founded on the trust which courageous, prudent, moderate, reciprocal care engenders. Sexual desire, which is the only distinctive element of romantic love, can often serve as a powerful catalyst for a lasting intimacy, merging seamlessly with an ongoing intellectual or spiritual admiration for the beloved. In order to achieve such an intimacy, however, truly passionate romantic lovers must prudently moderate physical desire, delaying consummation until they are sure that it will facilitate a constant attachment, rather than serving as a distraction. By contrast, intemperate lovers focus on gratifying vanity and physical passion in ways that are bound to be fleeting, even though they may perpetuate their pleasures for a while through an artificial stimulation of desire. Women generally lead the effort to avoid such diversions, partly because they suffer more directly from the effects of an unwanted pregnancy, but mainly because they have less to distract them from the summum bonum than men, whose deeper needs are often thwarted by a combination of their more intensely physical libido and a greater proclivity for proud and spirited self-assertion.

The third and most intense mode of constant attachment that Shakespeare explores is parental love. The primal power of parental devotion, which is even stronger than romantic love or friendship, because it offers a more enduring “hope” and “promise,” is shown by Polixenes’ furious reaction to Florizel’s apparent callousness, and by the fact that Leontes’ rage begins with an intense examination of Mamillius’ legitimacy and ends with his death. Although loving parents derive great satisfaction simply from their child’s devotion–as Polixenes’ early relationship with Florizel shows–since any trusting alignment of interests is intrinsically pleasurable, their ultimate aim is not to establish an absolutely equitable, mutual devotion, as in the other two types of attachment, but rather to “continue their loves” beyond their own deaths by merging their interests with those of their children, while modelling the care which will allow future generations to establish constant intimacies. 

As with mature attachments, parenthood requires wisdom, courage and moderation. However, devoted parents must practise a more radical self-denial than true lovers and friends, since they cannot expect their care to be fully reciprocated, for children are at first “parasite[s],” and subsequently are bound to prioritise their friends, lovers and ultimately their own families over filial affection -although one can see from the shepherd’s desire to be buried alongside his father that a well-cared for child is almost bound to feel deep gratitude and a desire to perpetuate their parents’ values. Aware of this intrinsic imbalance of investment in the relationship, prudent parents are also reluctant to intervene directly in their children’s lives, understanding that it is more productive to instruct by example. Their restraint is, however, fully justified in the end: they and their children will both be armed against the depredations of time, since they will experience their own lives as links in an enduring chain of love. By contrast, parents who are primarily self-loving cannot escape a mortifying sense of their own ephemerality, and transmit to their children only the frustration which is the inevitable consequence of an unremitting focus on their own transient existence. 

Overall, the influence of constant attachments is sufficiently powerful either to regulate or radically modify competing natural drives like pride and sexual desire. By contrast with sexual desire, which can be the catalyst for an enduring love, passionate lovers strive to eliminate pride completely, realising that it is absolutely incompatible with the humble care which a trusting intimacy demands. Lower down the erotic hierarchy, however, self-love often continues to conflict with the yearning for constant attachments, with each of these powerful natural drives exerting a strong gravitational pull over the other, although souls which are both proud and passionate may well be forced by loss ultimately to realise that they have exposed themselves to the depredations of time, and consequently begin to moderate their self-love.

Principles as disparate as hedonism and dutiful piety are also regulated by the need for constant relationships. At the basest level, Autolycus’ proud claim to be happy pursuing his own pleasures in isolation is undermined by the recognition that he will be exposed to the harshness of nature, unless he can earn Florizel’s protection by serving him in a manner which is to all intents and purposes loyal. At the other extreme, pious duty is shown to be equally untenable where it clashes with deep attachments: although religion can be used to rationalise and justify actions that run counter to the heart’s own imperatives, in the end the piety of Antigonus and Leontes emphatically reinforces the instinctive guilt which they feel for contravening these imperatives, just as it reinforces the constant devotion of Hermione and the shepherd. Indeed, Shakespeare implies that religion is ultimately derived from, and therefore regulated by, these very imperatives: at the apex of the erotic hierarchy, Florizel and Perdita have no need for the support of piety, since they understand that their passion itself constitutes the highest authority by which human action can be judged. Paulina’s eventual replacement of Antigonus with Camillo suggests that truly passionate lovers need no other guide than a prudent analysis of the most effective means of securing fulfilment. 

The influence of constant attachments is pervasive. Although self-love is more likely to be encouraged and to become engrained among the upper echelons of the social hierarchy, Florizel, Hermione and Camillo are all capable of passionate devotion, and the political elite are as likely to be motivated by patriotism, which is a natural extension of attachment, as by self-love. Even the cardinal virtues may themselves ultimately be derived from the austere imperatives of love, since they represent the only means by which an absolutely trusting, reciprocal care can be established. This means that the unscrupulousness of the young lovers and of Camillo at the end of the play is naturally unlimited, since there is no good greater than deep attachment by which their behaviour might be regulated. Paulina’s putative decision to abort her attempt to devote her life to the memory of Antigonus exposes the corollary of this point, namely, that a completely selfless nobility is beyond the scope of human nature. 

As the title of the play implies, the symbol of winter is central to Shakespeare’s argument. It seems a natural image for the potential of time to “try all,” both through the ageing process and its inevitable conclusion, and through the intrinsic transience of physical desire (4.1.1).[xxx] Perdita is thoroughly aware of the threat which time presents: she knows that the sheep-shearing feast, which, as we have seen, was traditionally held at midsummer, when Phoebus–habitually associated by Shakespeare with sexual desire–reaches his zenith, marks the moment that the world is “growing ancient, not yet on summer’s death, nor on the birth of trembling winter” (4.4.122-25, 4.4.79-81). Unlike Autolycus, she immediately rejects her fantasy that it is still spring and that she could “play on” Florizel forever, “strew[ing] him o’er and o’er” with vernal flowers, as if at a “Whitsun pastoral…” (4.4.130-34). By dismissing Camillo’s desire to spend his time “gazing” at her as part of her flock– “You’ld be so lean, that blasts of January would blow you through and through” (4.4.109-12)–Perdita implies that the true measure of love is not immediate pleasure, but the ability to remain constant in the face of “affliction.”

Those parents who exercise “grace and rememberance” can, like rosemary and rue, “keep seeming and savour all the winter long,” because, unlike the proud and sensual characters, who are bound to find their physical decay and ultimate mortality humiliating and frustrating, their main focus is on perpetuating a great chain of love across the generations (4.4.74-75). On a humbler level, friends and lovers can also satisfy their need to maintain constant attachments through “grace;” a word which is repeatedly used to encapsulate the interaction between self-denying service and heartfelt gratitude that sustains constant attachments. This process is embodied in the sheep-shearing feast, which gracefully  commemorates the diligence of the shepherds who have ensured that the “good flock shall prosper,” often during fierce winter storms, conducted with no little expense and with an effort on the part of the leaders of the community to “serv[e] all,” as “pantler, butler, cook” (4.4.70, 3.3.2-6, 3.3.84-86, 4.3.32-49, 4.4.55-57).[xxxi]

By contrast, Leontes’ hopes of visiting Polixenes “this coming summer” are thwarted by his proud fury, which strips him of all his attachments, and thus, at least from an audience’s point of view, condemns him to a winter that lasts sixteen years (1.1.5-7). Not only this, but, as we have seen, he is in danger of arresting Mamillius’ development in the same way: the boy’s “sad tale…for winter,” set in or near a churchyard, doubtless features a ghostly apparition, which, like the ghost in Hamlet, can be imagined making a melancholy or terrifying attempt to perpetuate its anger (2.1.23-32). Conversely, Shakespeare’s own winter’s tale resembles Hermione’s humble effort to comfort Mamillius: the queen accommodates herself to her son’s “sad tale…for winter,” since the life-negating influences that surround him cannot be ignored, but at the same time “softly” shows him, and indeed anyone else who can eavesdrop on their conversation, how to secure a lasting warmth. Shakespeare himself transmits his passionate love in the least dogmatic manner possible, since he encourages audiences to assume that his own play is nothing more than an inconsequential folk tale.[xxxii]


[i] All references to the play are from The Riverside Shakespeare, ed. G. Blakemore Evans et al. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997).

[ii] For a thoughtful analysis of the “wonder” of this meeting, see Traversi, “The Final Scenes,” in Shakespeare: “The Winter’s Tale”; A Casebook, ed. Kenneth Muir (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1968): 174-75.

[iii] Mrs Inchbald, “British Theatre,” in Shakespeare: “The Winter’s Tale”; A Casebook: 31.

[iv] This parallel is noted by Richard Proudfoot, “Verbal Reminiscence,” in The Winter’s Tale”: Critical Essays, ed. Maurice Hunt (New York and London: Taylor & Francis Group, 1995): 282.

[v] Helen Faucit, “On some of Shakespeare’s Female Characters,” in Shakespeare: “The Winter’s Tale”; A Casebook: 46.

[vi] Anna Jameson “Shakespeare’s Heroines,” in Shakespeare: “The Winter’s Tale”; A Casebook: 33.

[vii] Derek Traversi notes that Paulina “imposes upon Leontes an abstraction from the current world that will be, in the long run, impossible to maintain”: “The Final Scenes,” in Shakespeare: “The Winter’s Tale”; A Casebook: 165.

[viii] This and the subsequent paragraph repeat some of the points made in the essay on Hamlet on this website: “Hamlet: The Limits of Constancy.” The echo of Hamlet in the phrase “Remember mine” and the parallel between the contrasting positions of Camillo and Paulina and those of the Player King and the Player Queen might even suggest that the two plays are companion pieces, which must be read together in order to understand Shakespeare’s overall teaching on constancy. Neither Paulina nor the Player Queen are able to sustain their determination to remain faithful after their bereavement: see “Hamlet” in The Riverside Shakespeare: 1.5.91, 3.2.155-223. 

[ix] Jameson writes that “her passions are not vehement,” but at the same time “unfathomable, and inexhaustible”: “Shakespeare’s Heroines,” in Shakespeare: “The Winter’s Tale”; A Casebook: 33.

[x] Robert G. Hunter, “Shakespeare and the Comedy of Forgiveness in The Winter’s Tale,” in “The Winter’s Tale”; Critical Essays: 159.

[xi] H. N. Hudson, “Introduction to The Winter’s Tale,” in Shakespeare: “The Winter’s Tale; A Casebook: 39.

[xii] Although the argument is very different, Kay Stockholder is, I believe, correct to say that Leontes’ “fantasy allows him to externalize…self-hatred”: “From Matter to Magic: The Winter’s Tale,” in “The Winter’s Tale”; Critical Essays: 323.

[xiii] For the crown symbolism, see Wilson Knight, “Great Creating Nature,” in Shakespeare: “The Winter’s Tale”; A Casebook: 144-45.

[xiv] John Bowlby, Attachment (London: Pimlico, 1997): 180-98.

[xv] L. Strauss and J. Cropsey, The History of Political Philosophy, ed. L. Strauss and J. Cropsey, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Co., 1972): 3-4.

[xvi] Joan Hartwig, “The Tragicomic Perspective of The Winter’s Tale,” in “The Winter’s Tale”; Critical Essays: 192.

[xvii] For an analysis of the way in which Hermione “takes Polixenes to task” in this conversation see Peter Lindenbaum, “The Uses of Pastoral in The Winter’s Tale,” in “The Winter’s Tale”; Critical Essays: 204.

[xviii] The word is in fact consistently associated with Hermione: Northrop Frye, “Recognition in The Winter’s Tale,” in “The Winter’s Tale”; Critical Essays: 110; Peter Lindenbaum, “The Uses of Pastoral in The Winter’s Tale,” in “The Winter’s Tale”; Critical Essays: 208; Patricia Southard Gourlay, “Female Metaphor in The Winter’s Tale,” in “The Winter’s Tale”; Critical Essays: 267.

[xix] Helen Faucit, “On some of Shakespeare’s Female Characters,” in Shakespeare: “The Winter’s Tale”; A Casebook: 47.

[xx] Robert Bridges notes that “the impossibility of reconciliation is passed by in silence,” in “The Influence of the Audience in Shakespeare’s Dramas,” in Shakespeare: “The Winter’s Tale”; A Casebook: 57. For the view that this is “no easy happy ending, see Stanley Wells, “Shakespeare Performances in England, 1987-88,” in “The Winter’s Tale”; Critical Essays: 416.

[xxi] For the parallel between Hermione and Perdita as hostesses see Richard Proudfoot, “Verbal Reminiscence,” in “The Winter’s Tale”; Critical Essays: 282.

[xxii] Ellen Terry, “Four Lectures on Shakespeare,” in Shakespeare: “The Winter’s Tale”; A Casebook:  59.

[xxiii] For Leontes’ lack of deep remorse, see Arthur Sewell, “Character and Society in Shakespeare,” in Shakespeare: “The Winter’s Tale”; A Casebook: 66.

[xxiv] Leontes’ transformation is in some ways similar to that of another Sicilian tyrant, Hiero, who Xenophon portrays as being persuaded that tyranny is not ultimately in his interests: Leo Strauss, On Tyranny. An Interpretation of Xenophon’s “Hiero,” 2nd ed.(Glencoe Illinois: The Free Press, 1963): 59-62.

[xxv] For the parallel between the two rages see Ernest Schanzer, “The Structural Pattern,” in Shakespeare: “The Winter’s Tale”; A Casebook: 92.

[xxvi] Ernest Schanzer, “The Structural Pattern,” in Shakespeare: “The Winter’s Tale”; A Casebook: 89; Peter Lindenbaum, “The Uses of Pastoral in The Winter’s Tale,” in “The Winter’s Tale”; Critical Essays: 210.

[xxvii] Richard Proudfoot notes that both either suffer, or pretend to suffer damage to their shoulders, and suggests that they could easily be played by the same actor: “Verbal Reminiscence,” in “The Winter’s Tale”; Critical Essays: 287-89. 

[xxviii] Traversi, “The Final Scenes,” in Shakespeare: “The Winter’s Tale”; A Casebook: 170-71.

[xxix] Traversi, “The Final Scenes,” in Shakespeare: “The Winter’s Tale”; A Casebook: 182-83.

[xxx] For a general discussion of the importance of time in the play see Inga-Stina Ewbank, “The Triumph of Time in The Winter’s Tale,” in “The Winter’s Tale”; Critical Essays: 139-55.

[xxxi] For the shepherd’s prudence see Joan Hartwig, “The Tragicomic Perspective of The Winter’s Tale,” in “The Winter’s Tale”; Critical Essays: 190.

[xxxii] For the repeated suggestion that the play is merely an “old tale,” see S. L. Bethell, “Antiquated Technique and the Planes of Reality,” in Shakespeare: “The Winter’s Tale”; A Casebook: 121.

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Twelfth Night and the Justice of Love

By setting the play at the end of the festive season Shakespeare reminds us that all “pleasure will be paid, one time or another” (2.4.70-71). The financial transactions which play such an unusually pervasive role in Twelfth Night direct the reader’s attention towards the central question which the play raises; namely, how can one earn what is truly of value (1.2.18, 1.2.52-57, 1.3.22-24, 1.4.38-40, 2.3.31-34, 2.3.182-89, 2.4.67-71, 3.1.43-53, 3.3.38-48, 3.4.2-3, 3.4.340-52, 4.1.19-21, 4.2.118, 5.1.27-49).[i] Clearly, any exploration of this issue must be based on an understanding of what is required for the fulfilment of our deepest needs. It is no coincidence that the play’s subtitle, What You Will, is almost synonymous with that of As You Like It, which, I have argued elsewhere, is entirely focused on the summum bonum.[ii] In Twelfth Night, as in As You Like It, Shakespeare presents deep attachments as an irreducible ultimate good, and argues that they are naturally just, since they offer the reward of lasting intimacy in return for a high level of self-denying, diligent care. The play also evaluates the nature and extent of the effort involved in pursuing prestige and sensual pleasure in relation to the returns which they yield: sensualists attempt to reduce their cares to a minimum, but gain only fleeting and insubstantial pleasures, whereas pride, whether manifesting itself as honour, piety or philosophical detachment, offers entirely illusory rewards, despite frequently demanding a considerable outlay of courage or self-restraint. 

Because the friendship between Sebastian and Antonio develops into the nearest thing to a fully reciprocal attachment in the play, it provides a benchmark by which all the other relationships can be measured. Weighed down both by grief for his twin sister, Viola, whom he presumes drowned in the wreck from which Antonio rescued him, and by an awareness of the extraordinary “trouble” which he has caused the captain, Sebastian declares that the guilt would “kill him” if he allowed his saviour to share any further in the “malignancy of [his] fate,” since this would be “a bad recompense” for his painstaking care (2.1.1-42). Accordingly, although Sebastian eventually feels “charge[d]…in manners” to recount his history and parentage by the very “modesty” which makes Antonio refrain from trying to “extort” these details from him, he still attempts to conceal his destination from his friend for fear that he should insist on following him. However, when Antonio finally abandons his carefully maintained restraint to protest that his beloved’s decision to cut all ties with him is tantamount to “murther[ing] me for my love,” Sebastian feels duty bound to tell him that he is going to Illyria (2.1.12-43). Paradoxically, therefore, Antonio’s apparently self-denying generosity, although from one point of view absolutely noble, turns out to be a prudent investment, since it enables him to set in train the cycle of obligation and requital which Shakespeare presents as the foundation of intimate relationships.

Antonio does indeed follow Sebastian to Illyria, but eventually manages to soothe his friend’s sensitive conscience by insisting that he has been led by an entirely “willing love” to guide him through this “rough and unhospitable land” (3.3.8-13). Just as in the previous scene Antonio was finally driven to reveal the depth of his need for his friend out of pure desperation, when Sebastian seemed to be about to “murther” him by cutting all ties, here he admits to a “desire (more sharp than filed steel) …to see” his friend only in order to reassure him that he “make[s a] pleasure of [his] pains” (3.3.1-5). If Sebastian had responded less sensitively to Antonio’s advances, the captain would undoubtedly have continued to efface his own needs, while foregrounding the display of humble devotion through which he hopes to gain his beloved’s trust and gratitude. The intricate transactions through which Antonio gains Sebastian’s friendship are thus crucial to the thought of the play, since they are designed to expose what the other passionate lovers in the play quite naturally conceal; namely, that they expect in the end to gain a proportionate return for their outlay of humble devotion. 

One might assume that the captain’s open-hearted generosity would be easy to exploit, but, unlike his namesakes in The Merchant of Venice and Antony and Cleopatra, he has always retained a keen sense of what is due to him: we learn, for instance, that he “stood out” robustly against the purely expedient decision of his former comrades in arms to hand back the spoils of what he still sees as a just war with Orsino (3.3.30-37, 5.1.74-76). He pursues his friendship with Sebastian with such diligence because he expects ultimately to gain a rich reward for his efforts, for he sees in his beloved a “promise [of] most venerable worth” (3.4.362-63). Thus, the anger which Antonio feels when Sebastian apparently refuses to return his purse is proportionate to the effort which he now thinks he has wasted:

            Is’t possible that my deserts to you

            Can lack persuasion? Do not tempt my misery

            Lest that it make me so unsound a man

            As to upbraid you with those kindnesses

            That I have done for you.

            (3.4.348-52)

Antonio’s willingness to abandon his display of self-denial when he has lost all hope of being rewarded for his efforts provides the clearest evidence in the play that lovers’ sacrifices are essentially a means of securing their beloveds’ affections. Again, however, his efforts to restrain his “unsound” impulse to call in Sebastian’s debt underscore the point that lovers normally repress or sublimate what we might call the strategic aspect of their erotic transactions, lest too direct an expression of their own needs should undermine the harmonious rapport with their beloved which they have worked so hard to establish.

This view of love as a transaction is not as reductive as it might appear. Antonio’s strategies may not be straightforwardly noble in the way that they seem, but his desperate assertion that it would “murther” him to lose Sebastian and his willingness to follow his friend to a country where he has many mortal enemies–and where in fact he may well in the end be executed (5.1.69-100)–demonstrate that his attachment is strong enough to override even the most instinctive desires and fears (3.3.25-37). Antonio does indeed “make [a] pleasure” of his “pains” in a sense, because he relishes the fact that in supporting Sebastian, he is continually reinforcing his beloved’s trust and gratitude and in so doing, progressively deepening the relationship. 

Antonio’s strategic combination of apparently self-denying care and direct emotional demands ultimately gains the desired effect. Since Sebastian makes his apparently spontaneous proposal that they should go sight-seeing together immediately after apologising for his inability to reward Antonio financially and acknowledging that his repeatedly expressed gratitude is “uncurrent pay,” we may conclude that it is indeed inspired by a new understanding that he can requite his friend’s generosity simply through his affectionate companionship (3.3.13-19).  After tacitly accepting the erotic contract that he has been offered, Sebastian completely abandons his earlier reticence and at last gives free rein to his underlying desire to rely on his friend, even to the extent of accepting his purse without protest (3.3.38-48). 

Almost as soon as Sebastian allows himself to express his need for intimate companionship, he finds that he can hardly bear to be without his friend: 

Antonio, O my dear Antonio!

How the hours have rack’d and tortured me, 

Since I have lost thee.

(5.1.218-20; see also 4.3.8)

This intense exclamation of relief indicates that, once lovers have been drawn into an intimate attachment, they will inevitably experience a compulsive urge to protect the beloved upon whom their happiness now depends. The concern which Sebastian feels for Antonio’s welfare now precisely reciprocates the “fear” that the latter expressed for Sebastian’s own safety in Illyria (3.3.11-13; see also 3.3.35-37). Similarly, as we shall see, Maria strives to protect Sir Toby from being banished by Olivia and the terrified Olivia intervenes in order to prevent Sebastian from fighting a duel (2.3.72-74, 2.3.131-33, 4.1.45-59). The corollary of this point is of course that when passionate characters like Viola, Sebastian and Olivia actually do experience a major loss, they feel it with an intensity which is almost commensurate with the depth of the original attachment.  

Sebastian’s scrupulous sense of justice makes him particularly difficult to court, but it is precisely this quality which gives him the potential to be an unusually loyal and affectionate friend, since his desire not to build up unmanageable emotional debt springs from his sensitive awareness that deep intimacies entail ceaseless, reciprocal care. From this point onwards the friendship between Antonio and Sebastian will cause both men to make a “pleasure of [their] pains,” since they know that each expression of concern not only helps to protect and nurture the beloved upon whom their happiness depends, but deepens an attachment which they have enshrined as their ultimate good. The story of this relationship therefore perfectly illustrates the paradoxical justice of what one might call the erotic contract: in return for his apparently free, painfully pleasurable gifts of generosity, loyalty and restraint, Antonio eventually secures the only recompense he ever desired; namely, a deep intimacy with Sebastian, in which both men gain a trusted, constant companion in return for their sympathetic care. Thus, Shakespeare shows that there is a close link between justice and eroticism, since relationships are fulfilling to the extent that lovers are capable of creating and requiting obligation.

Like Antonio, but unlike Olivia (see below), Viola balances her care for others with a healthy attention to her own needs. She realises from the start that she is grieving for her own loss rather than for Sebastian himself, whom she at first presumes to have been drowned when their ship was wrecked: 

And what should I do in Illyria?

My brother he is in Elysium.

(1.2.3-4)

It is significant both that she has an identical twin and that she subsequently changes her plan to present herself to Orsino as a eunuch: Viola is an intransigently erotic character, who must always be searching for a twin soul. (The description of the twins as “an apple, cleft in two” might well remind us of Aristophanes’ account of love in Plato’s Symposium, 5.1.222-24.[iii]) Viola promises the captain that she will prove herself “worth [Orsino’s] service,” since she can “sing and speak to him in many sorts of music,” but this slightly odd phrase must be a figure of speech, for she never sings for the count, despite having ample opportunity to do so (1.2.57-58). Since music is regularly linked with passion throughout the play and Viola herself is named after a musical instrument, her alleged virtuosity could serve as a metaphor for her innate ability to create harmonious relationships. 

Viola understands that attachments, in however nascent a form, can oil the wheels of even the most mundane transactions, but also that they come at a price. Having picked out one of her rescuers who shows ‘fair behaviour,” she extends herself to reward him freely for disguising her as a man and even promises him further remuneration if she should succeed in making herself useful to Orsino (1.2.52-57). In return for her generosity she gains a loyal and discreet servant, who is motivated by an ongoing cycle of gratitude and requital: “when my tongue blabs, then let my eyes not see” (1.2.63). Her dealings with the captain, which take place in the immediate aftermath of the shipwreck, are evidently much more prosaic and superficial than those which take place between Antonio and Sebastian, who have had “three months” of unbroken companionship in which to develop their relationship, but for this very reason they illustrate with particular clarity the essential process by which attachments are formed (5.1.94-96): Viola achieves her aims because she chooses an open-hearted man to help her, and secures his affection for the future by showing him the enduring benefits of their relationship. 

Viola uses a glorified version of this strategy to endear herself to Orsino once she has fallen in love with him, since she does all she can to show him the advantages of her devoted affection, even to the extent of courting Olivia on his behalf with great dedication and self-restraint (1.5.139-54). The impediments of Orsino’s prior attachment to Olivia and his notorious inconstancy, not to mention her own relatively humble status and assumed gender, matter less to Viola at this point in the relationship than one might have thought, since even under normal circumstances trust and gratitude can only be accumulated through careful, restrained diligence (2.4.73-78). As she herself suggests, her fidelity is as absolute as that of the lover in Feste’s song, who is prepared to die of grief rather than abandon his devotion to his inconstant beloved (2.4.21-22, 2.4.51-66). The significance of this “old and plain” song is underlined both by Orsino and Viola: it is “silly sooth, and dallies with the innocence of love, like the old age,” evoking self-denying constancy with such poignancy as to “give…a very echo to the seat where love is thron’d” (2.4.42-48, 2.4.21-22). Viola recapitulates the theme of the song in her account of her imagined sister, whom she famously represents as “Patience on a monument, smiling at grief” (2.4.110-18). 

Ironically, however, Viola’s evocation of stoical resignation itself has a strategic purpose, since it is designed to attract the duke’s interest in as proactive a manner as her unusual situation allows. Similarly, when she advises Orsino that he might have to resign himself to Olivia’s indifference, she is certainly concerned for Orsino’s well-being, and implicitly for her own, since she is in the same situation, but it is clearly also in her interests that the duke should follow her advice (2.4.87-92). These ambiguities point to Shakespeare’s paradoxical implication that it is precisely Viola’s seemingly self-denying fidelity which ultimately enables her to fulfil her deepest desires. It is not to demean her efforts to point to their strategic purpose, for the strategy can only succeed if it is maintained with an intransigent consistency which is from one point of view absolutely noble. She is so intent on making herself indispensable to Orsino and earning his gratitude that she throws all her considerable resources into her vicarious courtship of Olivia, regardless of the fact that it seems unlikely at this point in the relationship that he would ever be in a position to appreciate the full extent of her sacrifice.

Orsino is as intrigued by Viola’s constant devotion as he is by that of Olivia and the lover in Feste’s song: when her true gender is eventually revealed, he quickly remembers that she has told him “a thousand times [she] never should…love woman like to me” (5.1.267-68). After initially offering simply to pay her for her services, even the self-involved duke eventually feels impelled to reward Viola with his intimate attention, asking her a series of searching and sympathetic questions (1.4.38-40, 2.4.20-29, 2.4.104-19). Eventually, Viola’s efforts are rewarded, in however partial and paradoxical a manner: when the duke vows to “sacrifice the lamb that [he] love[s]” and “tender[s] dearly” in order to spite her rival, Viola submits “willingly” and in a “jocund” spirit, since, even as he is threatening to kill her, he finally acknowledges the depth of an attachment which quite literally matters to her “more than…life” (5.1.125-35). Like Antonio, she is prepared to override her instinct of self-preservation in order to prove her humble devotion, in the hope that her beloved will eventually respond in kind. 

Viola’s love for a character who is prone to such outbursts of childishly tyrannical rage–characteristic, we may infer, of the habitual sensualist–might seem undiscriminating, but the paradoxical tenderness which Orsino also displays at this point is, as we shall see, only the latest in a series of indications that he is beginning to outgrow his fickle hedonism. The justice of love is, it seems, only tangentially related to conventional moral standards, for the only judgement that matters to Viola regarding Orsino’s character is whether he is willing and able to return her affection. The eventual success of her courtship underscores Shakespeare’s paradoxical implication that, in matters of love, utter humility and unstinting, apparently disinterested devotion often constitute the shrewdest investments. Evidently, however, there are risks involved: until Olivia asserts her marital rights, Orsino seems as determined to execute Viola as he is Antonio (5.1.141-69). A more common danger is of course that passionate lovers might simply be ignored or rejected, like Viola’s imagined sister or the lover in Feste’s song.

The parallels between the strategies adopted by Antonio and Viola suggest that a risky initial investment of apparently self-denying benevolence is usually required to set in train the cycle of gratitude and reciprocal generosity by which attachments are established and sustained. Despite her unusual situation, Viola’s courtship of the self-involved Orsino is in a sense more straightforward and conventional than Antonio’s, since she can concentrate purely on stimulating the duke’s gratitude and trust through her devoted, apparently selfless service -although, precisely because the duke lacks Sebastian’s sensitive conscience, it is unlikely that her affection will ever be fully requited. In contrast, the captain is compelled, first by Sebastian’s conscience and subsequently by his apparent ingratitude, to abandon his initial “modesty” and make his own emotional demands more frankly than he might have wished. The complicated transactions between Antonio and Sebastian are designed to expose with more clarity than Viola’s “modesty” allows her to do the integral role that justice plays in determining the depth of an attachment: relationships are fulfilling to the extent that both parties are equally determined to make a strategic investment of apparently self-denying devotion, from which, however, they each ultimately hope to realise a profit that is proportional to their efforts. 

The Main Plot

With the exception of Maria, the other characters are distracted from their deeper needs either by pride or sensuality, although several of them change their priorities as the play goes on. Because Orsino’s “appetite” is primarily for the countess’s body, “that miracle and queen of gems that nature pranks her in,” it is bound to “sicken and so die” immediately after “surfeiting” (1.1.2-4, 2.4.85-86). As the duke contemplates the way in which the “strain” of desire inevitably ends in “a dying fall,” his sadness gives way for a moment to a fully-fledged nihilism: 

O spirit of love, how quick and fresh art thou,

That notwithstanding thy capacity

Receiveth as the sea, nought enters there,

Of what validity and pitch so’er,

But falls into abatement and low price 

Even in a minute.

(1.1.9-14) 

Orsino’s melancholy stems from his recognition that the sensual life to which he is addicted cannot satisfy his innate yearning for constancy. The implication is that he turns to “love-thoughts” at the end of the first scene in order to avoid the “dying fall” which must inevitably follow an orgasm (1.1.39-40).

Orsino hopes to escape these frustrations by battening on Olivia’s intransigent constancy: 

          O, she that hath a heart of that fine frame

          To pay this debt of love but to a brother,

How will she love when the rich golden shaft

Hath kill’d the flock of all affections else

That live in her; when liver, brain, and heart,

Those sovereign thrones, are all supplied and fill’d

Her sweet perfections with one self king! 

(1.1.32-38)

The duke clearly admires the way in which truly passionate lovers sacrifice “all affections else” that might impede their attempts to establish a deep rapport with their beloved, but at the same time he himself has no motive to take such pains–as is implied by the fact that he seems to court Olivia entirely through go-betweens–since his primary goal remains physical pleasure.[iv] Thus, even as he praises Olivia’s constancy, he prioritises her “liver”–that is, her sexual appetite– over her “brain, and heart” in the list of the “perfections” which he hopes to “fill” (no doubt literally as well as metaphorically). Orsino shows the self-absorption of the habitual sensualist when, instead of describing himself as hunting Olivia’s heart, as one might expect, he declares that it is his own heart which is constantly being harried by “fell and cruel” desires (1.1.17-22). Having no reason to practise self-denial himself, he offers the countess no reason to feel that she owes him a “debt of love” in return. Olivia’s rejection of Orsino’s advances implies that she is absolutely aware of his shortcomings, which must seem particularly egregious when contrasted with the loyal affection of the brother whom she is mourning. Thus, Orsino’s courtship is precisely contrasted with those of Antonio and Viola, both in its strategies and in its outcome.

Nevertheless, Orsino’s frustration with the transience of sensual desire and appreciation of Olivia’s fidelity suggest that he may be on the cusp of prioritising loyal attachments over physical stimulation. Not only does he praise the “silly sooth” of Feste’s song about a lover so constant that he resigns himself to dying of grief, but he indirectly criticises his own dedication to sensual pleasure when he tells Viola that a woman should marry an older man in order to “sway…level in her husband’s heart,” since a young man’s “fancies” are likely to be more “giddy and infirm” than her own (2.4.42-46, 2.4.29-35). Characteristically, however, he then contradicts this latter point by declaring that such an inequality of age is also necessary because “women are as roses, whose fair flow’r…doth fall that very hour;” an argument which assumes that even the passion of older men is primarily sexual and therefore inevitably fleeting (2.4.36-39). He also contradicts his admiration for the stoicism of the lover in the song when he insists that his love for Olivia “can give no place, bide no denay” (2.4.124). It is Orsino’s focus on physical passion which confuses him: his boast that male sexual desire is “as hungry as the sea” and therefore more constant than female passion not only contradicts his initial point, but his recognition in the first scene that even a sensual passion which “receiveth as the sea” inevitably “falls into abatement and low price” as soon as it has been consummated (2.4.93-103, 1.1.9-14).

Aided rather than impeded by her masculine disguise, however, Viola has clearly managed to induce her beloved to form an attachment which for once has more to do with gratitude and trusting reliance than physical attraction. By interrogating Viola so searchingly, and in a manner so unlike his long range, generic, but at the same time bullish, courtship of Olivia, Orsino shows that he has finally been distracted from his self-absorption: it is significant that his most intimate conversation with Viola is eventually ended by her own embarrassed reticence, rather than any lack of interest on the duke’s side (2.4.104-22).[v] This extended expression of sympathetic concern is a sign of a new understanding on Orsino’s part that it might pay to apply himself to his friendships -which is not to suggest that he would ever be able to match Viola’s dedication. Later, his sudden decision to abandon his spiteful revenge and marry Viola demonstrates that he has already formed a deeper attachment to “the lamb that I do love” than his habitual absorption in his own physical desires has allowed him to recognise (5.1.266, 5.1.385-88, 5.1.130). The couple’s married relationship will of course be sexual, but it will be sustained in the long run by Viola’s humble devotion, which the duke admits to having found intriguing long before he knew that she was female (5.1.267-68). Orsino’s changing priorities are illustrated by the fact that it is Viola’s passionate avowal of undying loyalty which triggers his desire to see her in her “woman’s weeds” (5.1.269-73).

Orsino’s significantly named servants are used to highlight the contrast between the Duke’s fickle hedonism and the austere constancy of Olivia’s mourning: while Curio’s invitation to “go hunt…the hart” might remind his master that a truly determined courtship would demand a far more careful approach, Valentine implicitly criticises the countess precisely for prioritising her cares over her pleasures (1.1.16, 1.1.25-31). Olivia’s “cloistress”-like withdrawal from the world and determination to “once a day…with eye-offending brine…season a brother’s dead love” suggest that she takes a perverse pride in the constancy of her mourning, which by now has come to overshadow her natural sadness (1.1.27-31). It takes Feste’s wit to induce Olivia to understand that her real emotion is not as nobly self-denying as it seems, since she is mourning for the “dead love” which she used to share with her brother rather than for the man himself, who she is sure is in heaven (1.5.62-74). Feste’s implication is that it must be an affectation on Olivia’s part, rather than a sign of pure constancy as she imagines, to allow her own needs to be side-lined for seven years by cares which are themselves ultimately derived from those needs (1.1.25-26). Thus, Olivia’s display of pious ascetism is shown to be as far removed as Orsino’s narcissistic sensuality from the balanced, equitable love represented by Antonio and Viola, who invest a huge amount of self-denying care in their beloveds, but whose ultimate purpose is, as we have seen, to fulfil their own deepest needs. Just as Antonio’s self-denial has its natural limits, we can see that after three months Sebastian’s intense grief for a lost sibling is, in contrast with Olivia’s, beginning to give way to the restless energy which eventually brings him to Illyria (2.1.39-43). 

Although Olivia’s mourning is indeed, as Orsino realises, a sign of her capacity to love deeply and constantly, her passions are evidently tangled up with her pride, just as her name itself is a tangled version of ‘Viola’ and ‘Malvolio’.[vi] However, with these passions now partially liberated by Feste’s serious joke, the countess is not too haughty to be entranced by Viola’s fervent declaration that she would “make a willow cabin at [her] gate” and sing “loyal cantons of contemned love,” if she herself loved with “such a suff’ring, such a deadly life” as her master does (1.5.264-76). It is above all this vision of patient, determined fidelity–inspired no doubt by Viola’s own deep feelings for Orsino–which attracts the countess, since it seems to offer her the promise of a loyal intimacy to rival or even surpass her “brother’s dead love.” At this point Olivia certainly abandons her contempt for physical beauty, which is, as Viola implies, nothing more than a “proud” affectation, and begins to fish for compliments (1.5.231-51). She is, however, still more attracted to Viola’s “tongue” and “spirit,” which she places first and last respectively in her list of desirable qualities, than her “limbs,” which are of course unimposing by the standards of masculine beauty (1.5.292, 1.5.156-62). Viola endears herself to Olivia for the same reasons as Orsino admires the countess herself: all three characters appreciate that loyalty and self-denial are the measures of true devotion, although Viola is the only one who consistently prioritises love over pride and sensual desire. 

Olivia’s pride manifests itself in her piety, her concern for social status and her maidenly sense of honour. Her pious ascetism is abandoned as abruptly as her “cloistress”-like veil – which is, ironically, briefly redeployed to facilitate her flirtation with Viola before finally being discarded for good (1.5.164-235). Her initial impulse after realising that she is attracted to “the man” rather than “the master” is to reassure herself that Viola’s “state” and “parentage” must be noble (1.5.289-94). She attempts for a while to resist her feelings, reasoning that her “eye [is] too great a flatterer for my mind,” but she is, as we have seen, in the grip of a stronger force than Viola’s assumed masculine appearance could ever exert unaided, while her objections are weaker than she realises, since they actually stem from pride rather than reason, as she imagines (1.5.308-9). After being rejected for the first time, she again strives desperately to restrain herself, attempting to distance herself from her feelings by dwelling on her superior rank: “how apt the poor are to be proud…how much the better to fall before the lion than the wolf” (3.1.126-34). Almost immediately, however, Olivia is again driven to prioritise her intense passion over both her social position and her maidenly virtue: she is unable to restrain herself in the end from swearing “by maidhood, honor, truth, and everything” that she loves Viola (3.1.111-20, 3.1.145-56, 3.4.201-05). Despite her desperate words, Olivia nevertheless still hopes even at this point to preserve her status and reputation for virtue by conducting a secret affair with Cesario: she reminds herself not to “speak too loud” as she wonders what to ‘’bestow of him, since youth is bought more oft than begg’d or borrow’d,” and tells Viola that she will deny her nothing “that honor, sav’d, may upon asking give” (3.4.2-4, 3.4.211-12). 

It is not until Olivia finds herself experiencing abject terror at the thought of her beloved fighting a duel with Sir Toby that she is finally forced to acknowledge the depth of her attachment. She curses Sir Toby at this point, not so much for endangering Cesario’s life as for “start[ing] one poor heart of mine, in thee,” with the result that she can now no longer blind herself to her love, or seek to minimise the price which she will have to pay in terms of loss of status in order to secure her beloved’s affection (4.1.64-59). Having experienced this exasperating epiphany, she abandons her dignity and modesty completely and, after shamelessly shepherding Sebastian back to the house regardless of the presence of five onlookers, marries him with indecorous haste, so that her “most jealous and too doubtful soul may live at peace” (4.1.64, 4.3.22-28). From now on she has no interest in maintaining her social standing, as she shows when she casually leaves it to Sebastian to decide when their marriage will be “celebrat[ed]…according to my birth” (4.3.28-31). Her new found humility and self-restraint are shown at the end of the play, when her response to Viola apparently denying their marriage in the most cowardly and fickle manner possible is simply to plead abjectly with her beloved not to desert her (5.1.146-50, 5.1.170-71). The near silence which the countess maintains after learning that she has in fact married Sebastian illustrates this new restraint perfectly: she is perhaps reflecting that this match is as close as she is likely to come to marrying Viola, and will at least ensure that she can preserve a connection with her beloved. (Unbeknownst to her, however, her humble passion may even reap its full reward, since Sebastian undoubtedly has the same capacity for loyal devotion as his sister.)

Overall, Olivia’s story is designed to show that, unlike sensual desire–which will no doubt play an ongoing role in all three of the play’s romantic relationships–pride is completely incompatible with the humble devotion which deep attachments demand. Olivia’s desperate struggle to secure Cesario’s love contrasts sharply and ironically with the poised solemnity of her mourning in act 1. Over the course of the play she gradually disentangles herself from the pride which has exposed her to the influence of conventional conceptions of piety, social rank and honour, substituting for the artificial restraints that these codes impose a humbler discipline which flows naturally from the recognition that love can deliver far more substantial rewards. Whereas sensualists can begin to fulfil their deeper needs simply by caring for others, the portrayal of Olivia implies that it is often particularly difficult for proud souls to acknowledge and prioritise their passions, because they are so prone to be swayed by these artificial demands. Her story suggests, however, that passionate individuals are in the end unlikely to be ruled by pride because it does not provide the intrinsic satisfactions for which they yearn, however unconsciously.

Comparisons and contrasts between the subplot and the main plot deepen Shakespeare’s analysis of the ways in which pride, sensuality and deep attachment affect relationships. Broadly speaking, Malvolio’s pride parallels Olivia’s, but whereas the countess is progressively humbled by her passion for Viola, her steward is irremediably “sick of self-love” (1.5.90).[vii] Malvolio’s Puritan creed has, however, taught him that he can only achieve his ambitions in this world and the next through disciplined service (2.3.140). The emphasis which he places on moderation and restraint, and particularly his opposition to drinking and bear baiting, are typical of his sect (2.5.7-8). His pious sense of duty runs so deep that even in his–supposedly–private fantasies about becoming “Count Malvolio,” his ambition expresses itself as a desire to quell Sir Toby with “an austere regard of control” (2.5.35-80). It should not be forgotten that he is following his mistress’s orders, sometimes word for word, when he rebukes Sir Toby for his rowdiness, however much he might also relish the opportunity to patronise his social superiors (2.3.86-101, 1.3.3-6, 2.3.72-74). In fact, Olivia relies on Malvolio heavily in her dealings with Viola as well as Sir Toby, since he is “discreet,” “sad and civil” (1.5.95-96, 3.4.5-7, 1.5.139-64, 1.5.299-307, 2.2.1-16). The countess shows her gratitude for the valuable role that he has played in her household at the end of the play, when she makes a serious effort to redress his wrongs (5.1.280, 5.1.345-55, 5.1.379). 

Maria realises that she can fool Malvolio easily by appealing to his vanity, since he “is so cramm’d (as he thinks) with excellencies that it is his grounds of faith that all that look on him love him” (2.3.50-53). By encouraging the steward to “cast off [his] humble slough” and “be proud” in the knowledge that Olivia loves him, Maria’s fake letter exposes the vanity which underlies his dutiful piety (2.5.148-49, 2.5.161). Whereas Olivia has sublimated her desire for praise into pious devotion, Malvolio is vulnerable to Maria’s trick because he pursues secular advancement as avidly as divine grace -indeed his faith seems to draw little distinction between the two. Encouraged by the letter, Malvolio discards all restraint, and becomes convinced that “Jove” is supporting his ambition in an immediate, material way, rather than, as formerly, merely promising rewards in an afterlife in return for punctilious service (2.5.172-73; see also 2.5.178). The letter exposes a Malvolio whose passions are stunted or distorted, as his name implies, since he is unerotic himself, and concerned with Olivia’s alleged love only as a means of advancement. Once he has discarded his piety and pursuit of praise, there is nothing in his nature to restrain his overweening ambition. His assumption that smiles and laughter are conscious performances, to be forced or “quench[ed],” is one of many indications in the play that he is a stranger to the moderating influence of ordinary human companionship (1.5.86-88, 2.5.65-66, 2.5.178-79). He lacks the “generous…and…free…disposition” which ensures that even Viola’s most mundane transactions are regulated by a sort of natural justice, based on the spontaneous flow of mutual trust and gratitude (1.5.91-93). 

Audaciously (but in an understandably indirect fashion), Shakespeare has Feste rehearse the principal tenets of Malvolio’s faith when, disguised as a parson, he attempts to persuade the steward that his “complain[ts]…of obstruction” in the dark cell where he is imprisoned are simply symptoms of his deranged “ignorance,” since his confinement is in fact nothing more than a diabolical delusion (4.2.34-44). This assertion, when combined with the fool’s insistence that Malvolio can only free himself by subscribing to the Pythagorean doctrine that “the soul of our grandam might happily inhabit a bird,” could be seen as a veiled allusion to the doctrine of salvation by faith: just as there is no real suffering apart from that which stems from resistance to God’s will, so the only true emancipation is that granted to the elect in the afterlife as a reward for their determination to remain faithful in the face of the tribulations which they will inevitably endure in a fallen world (4.2.50-60). Malvolio’s angry rejection of Feste’s catechism suggests that he has been radically disillusioned, or, one might say, enlightened by his unjust treatment: his repeated assertion that no hell could be darker than his cell suggests that he is determined from now on to trust only the evidence which the material world provides his own senses, and will never again allow himself to be reconciled to his lot by divine rewards or sanctions (4.2.33-47). His parting thrust– “I’ll be reveng’d on the whole pack of you”–also implies that he has finally cast aside the constraints imposed by his pursuit of worldly advancement (5.1.378). The folly of his worldly ambitions must have been brought home to him by the fact that the mistress whom he has served so loyally has, for a while at least, forgotten about him completely (5.1.279-80). 

Although the play focuses mainly on the role that justice plays in personal relationships, it undoubtedly also has a political dimension. Malvolio’s engrained gracelessness is exposed when he angrily rejects Olivia’s considerate proposal–borne of guilt and a lasting sense of obligation to a loyal servant–that they conduct a formal trial of his persecutors, in which he himself would be “both the plaintif and the judge,” in favour of an indiscriminate revenge (5.1.351-55, 5.1.378). Far from humbling his pride, his suffering seems to have liberated it from the moderating influence which was previously exerted by his piety and desire for praise. Clearly, sensualists are equally prone to be tyrannical: when Orsino’s desire for Olivia, which “can give no place, bide no denay,” is finally thwarted, the duke’s sexual frustration manifests itself in a rage which is at least as boorish as Malvolio’s spiteful outburst (2.4.124, 5.1.117-31). 

In contrast with the outbursts of anger which punctuate much of the final act (see also 5.1.69-72, 5.1.206-07), it is significant that both Viola and Olivia maintain a careful restraint when under even greater stress than Orsino and Malvolio. Ironically, the only such outburst which comes close to being proportional is that which Antonio mistakenly directs at Viola for not returning his purse, for, as her heartfelt reply indicates, “ingratitude” is the worst of all vices, presumably because it “taint[s]” the intimate attachments which Shakespeare presents as the ultimate good (3.4.347-70, 5.1.76-92). Unlike Plato, who argues that all non-philosophers must be driven by physical desire and are therefore inherently unjust–because the body is of course ineluctably private–Shakespeare suggests both here and throughout the play that human nature is generally biased towards justice, since it is innately disposed to form bonds of mutual gratitude.[viii] Shakespeare’s disagreements with Plato arise from his belief that attachment is a distinct behavioural system, which stimulates a powerful desire for harmonious intimacy that is often in tension with the baser bodily drives, which are indeed potentially tyrannical.[ix]

Nevertheless, Olivia needs someone like the loveless, but dutiful Malvolio, who finds it congenial to maintain order by threats, to control sensualists who are restrained neither by an innate sense of obligation nor by conventional piety. Sir Toby is typical of a “rough and inhospitable” country: Illyria, situated in the western part of the Balkan peninsula, was generally associated with piracy and drunkenness in Shakespeare’s day (3.3.8-11, 5.1.51-63).[x] Like Plato’s guardians, however, the steward is only useful as long as he believes in salutary myths which valorise humble service.[xi] A thoroughly enlightened Malvolio not only loses this usefulness, but becomes a dangerous figure, since it is an easy step to convert his ambition into an attack on the whole social order, once he has discarded the beliefs which have previously motivated his dutiful service. The educated and gentlemanly steward, who has previously “con[ned] state without book” and now intends to read “politic authors,” whose demand for a far more radical justice–as he conceives it–than Olivia can offer him, is now restrained neither by convention nor nature, and who is no stranger to legal proceedings, is perfectly capable of turning his world upside down (4.2.82, 2.3.149-50, 2.5.161, 5.1.275-77). Malvolio’s pride is ultimately more dangerous to society that Sir Toby’s sensuality, although it is easier to control through habituation. 

Sir Andrew’s decision to change his “dun” stockings to what he imagines to be a more fetching colour invites particular comparison with Malvolio: both characters are tricked into pursuing Olivia and both are easy to flatter because they are ruled by self-love (1.3.101, 1.3.115-20, 1.3.125-41). Sir Andrew is too competitive to engage passionately in any relationship, and, like Malvolio, is less focused on desiring others than on being “ador’d” himself (1.3.123-24, 2.3.31-34, 2.3.81-83, 2.3.181). His flirtation with Maria is completely unerotic, as she slyly hints, while his courtship of Olivia is an entirely artificial affair (1.3.69-79, 3.1.86-91). His passions, such as they are, seem to be primarily sensual: he “delight[s] in masques and revels,” dances enthusiastically and was born under Taurus, which is ruled by Venus (1.3.113-33). 

Whereas Malvolio has been taught by his religion to take pride in his virtue, Sir Andrew is fashionably scornful of piety, which means that he has only his sense of honour to limit his feckless pursuit of stimulation and kudos (1.3.83-84, 2.3.140-46, 3.2.31-32). As Olivia’s contrasting judgements of Sir Andrew and Malvolio indicate, the code of honour is much less useful to society than Christian virtue, presumably because it is less likely to exert a moderating influence over its adherents (1.3.15-17). There is no doubt, however, that it controls the knight’s behaviour rigidly in a variety of contexts. Not only does Sir Andrew’s sense of honour make him “a great quarreller,” despite his cowardice, and impel him to overcome his reluctance to “accost” Maria romantically, but it also imposes a code of virtue of sorts: he eschews “policy” as shameful and feels that he must win Olivia purely by “valor” (1.3.58-79, 1.3.30, 3.2.28-32). 

The challenge which Sir Andrew pens after being persuaded that he can only earn Olivia’s regard by fighting a duel with Viola reveals with naïve clarity the true cost of honour, rather in the same way as Feste’s “sermon” arguably conveys the essence of Puritan teaching regarding the price of eternal life (3.4.147-70). Although the foolish knight–whose name ironically means ‘manly’–searches for the swaggering tone that Sir Toby recommends, he cannot suppress his underlying anxiety: “if it be thy chance to kill me…thou kill’st me like a rogue and villain” (3.4.160-63). His instinctive fear exposes the artificiality of the insouciance which more sophisticated honour-lovers strive to project: “a swaggering accent…gives manhood more approbation than ever proof itself would have earn’d him” (3.4.280-310, 3.4.180-82). It seems that Sir Andrew must distort his nature almost as much as Malvolio in order to win praise. 

However, despite this quite considerable outlay of effort, the rewards which Sir Andrew gains are insubstantial. The motive for the duel with Cesario is of course to win praise and honour rather than the intrinsic pleasures of a passionate attachment: Sir Andrew informs Viola, quite accurately, that “[Olivia] uses thee kindly. But…that is not the matter I challenge thee for” (3.4.155-57). The responses of the three female characters to the code of honour provide the natural standard by which its conventional demands can be measured: Sir Andrew’s forced gallantry makes as little impact on Olivia as Orsino’s sensuality, while the anxiety which Viola feels when confronted with the foolish knight’s challenge and Maria’s worries about Sir Toby offering to be his second against Malvolio are surpassed only by the sheer terror which the countess feels at the prospect of her beloved risking his life in a duel (1.3.15-17, 3.4.226-72, 2.3.126-33, 4.1.45-51). The fear and mystification which the three women exhibit are a measure of the extent to which honour entices its adherents into a sort of closed, artificial loop, substituting for the virtuous circle of gratitude and requital which could fulfil their deeper needs a diligent and absorbing pursuit of entirely illusory rewards. 

Like Olivia, however, albeit on a much more trivial level, Sir Andrew proves himself to be capable of turning away from his pursuit of prestige. An unobtrusive pun underlines the extent to which the foolish knight’s pride has been deflated by the end of the play: Sir Toby picks out Sir Andrew’s conceit to attack by calling him “a coxcomb” just after the foolish knight has twice lamented the “bloody coxcomb” which Sebastian has given him (5.1.190-207). Significantly, it is precisely at this humiliating moment that Sir Andrew is able to show real concern for Sir Toby for the first time, worrying about his friend’s wound as well as his own and suggesting that they are “dress’d together” (5.1.172-76, 5.1.204-05). Thus we can infer that Sir Andrew, Malvolio and Olivia all ultimately recognise the futility of their diligent, joyless efforts to gain prestige, whether through courage, pious ascetism or dutiful service, although they are clearly not all equally capable of aligning themselves with their deeper passions after achieving this insight. 

Just as Sir Andrew and Malvolio offer a bathetic parallel to Olivia’s pride, so Sir Toby’s sensuality is a grosser version of Orsino’s. Like the music demanded by Orsino in the opening scene, the song which Sir Toby requests highlights the ephemerality of physical desire: “kiss me sweet and twenty; youth’s a stuff will not endure” (2.3.51-52). His alcohol-fuelled attempt to spin out his sensual pleasures indefinitely is cruder than Orsino’s: rather than retreating to “love-thoughts” like the duke, he simply refuses to accept that the Christmas festivities must end (as the play’s title of course reminds us), maintaining against all the evidence that “not to be abed after midnight is to be up betimes” (2.3.4-13).

Ironically, however, Shakespeare shows that the natural desire to perpetuate physical pleasure imposes cares even at the lower, more sensual end of what one might call the erotic hierarchy: just as, on a somewhat higher level, Orsino tries to exploit Olivia’s caring nature as an antidote to the frustrating “sicken[ing]” of his “appetite,” so Sir Toby can only sustain his riotous life style by working hard to convince Sir Andrew that he still has a chance of winning Olivia’s hand (1.3.20-22, 1.3.88-112). He is often, therefore, much more calculating than is immediately apparent, as we can see when he warns Maria cryptically to be on her best behaviour when he sees the foolish knight approaching (1.3.42-43).[xii] Despite his initial bravado, he is increasingly alert to the dangers of alienating Olivia (4.2.66-71).  

Not only is Sir Toby’s life therefore less care-free than he would wish, but his outlay of effort represents a poor investment, for sensual pleasure, however frequently repeated, will always be cancelled out by the pain of a “dying fall.” At the same time, however, he dismisses–initially, at least–more prudent outlays of effort, which would yield more durable returns: whereas Orsino understands enough of love to appreciate that Olivia’s mourning is a sign of her capacity to form deeply rewarding attachments, the drunken knight brands such “care” simply “an enemy to life” (1.3.1-3). Since he is at first exclusively bent on pursuing physical gratification–which is, as we have seen, inevitably a solitary business–he has even less reason than Orsino to engage in the cycle of gratitude and requital which invariably drives intimate attachments: he is, for instance, completely unmoved by Olivia’s request, as conveyed by Maria as well as Malvolio, that he “confine himself within the modest limits of order,” even though he is dependent on the countess for his bed and board (1.3.4-13). Sir Toby’s casual nihilism reflects the fact that in freeing himself from the cares of love, he has forfeited its substantial rewards: thus he shrugs off Maria’s adoration at first–“What o’ that?”–and brusquely dismisses the duke’s concern for his injuries -“That’s all one” (2.3.179-180, 5.1.196-97).[xiii]

However, even Sir Toby realises in the end that he can only secure lasting happiness by working to reciprocate the care of those who love him. He shows even less desire for the diminutive Maria than Orsino does for Viola in her male guise, but eventually marries her to “recompense” her for her gulling of Malvolio and her absolutely consistent loyalty: “she’s a beagle, true-bred, and one that adores me” (2.5.182-85, 5.1.362-64, 2.3.179-80). Perhaps Sir Toby’s anger regarding the unreliability of the doctor who was to have dressed his wounds– “I hate a drunken rogue”–reflects a new understanding that the contracts which supply our needs cannot be fulfilled without self-discipline (5.1.200-01; see also 1.5.26-28). By rejecting Sir Andrew so conclusively at the end of the play, thus ensuring that he can no longer finance his riotous life style, he perhaps signals his readiness to accept the constraints of married life: “Shall I play my freedom at tray-trip, and become thy bond-slave?” (2.5.190-91). Certainly, any care or generosity which Sir Toby is able to display in fulfilling his marital contract would be bound to be more productive than his previous machinations, since he would be working to secure Maria’s witty company and loyal affection rather than an endless repetition of ephemeral pleasure. Indeed, it is significant that none of the four main relationships in the play are primarily sexual, although two of them involve habitual, self-confessed sensualists. This is not to deny that sensuality is more compatible with deep attachments than pride: it is significant that Orsino and Sir Toby are given the space to mature gradually and partially, whereas Olivia has to be forced by her own underlying needs into an abrupt and painful reappraisal of her priorities. 

As befits the subplot, Maria is less obviously heroic than Viola and Antonio–although Sir Toby is only half joking when he calls her Penthesilea (2.3.177)–but there is no doubt that she is equally devoted to her beloved. Her name might suggest that Catholicism is more compatible with deep attachments than Puritanism, at least insofar as the former tends to prioritise loving kindness over faith.[xiv] Her ‘adoration’ of Sir Toby has triggered a determined effort to restrain his behaviour, which is partly motivated by a desperate fear of losing him if he were to be “turn[ed]…out of doors” by Olivia (1.5.27-28, 2.3.179-80, 1.3.4-14, 2.3.72-74). As with Antonio and Olivia, it seems that her desire to possess her beloved has provoked a fierce urge to protect him. As we have seen, she actually agrees with the substance of Malvolio’s rebuke of Sir Toby, and only turns against him when he directly threatens his interests–and therefore hers–by vowing to report her beloved’s “uncivil rule” to Olivia (2.3.72-74, 2.3.85, 2.3.103, 2.3.121-25). Her scheme to dupe Malvolio actually originates as a hasty attempt to distract Sir Toby from his determination to act as Sir Andrew’s second in a duel with the steward: she begs the drunken knight to “be patient for to-night,” warning him that Olivia is “much out of quiet” after her encounter with Viola, and immediately develops a plan which does not require his direct involvement, but which is guaranteed to keep him equally entertained (2.3.126-137). 

Maria’s strategies, like Antonio’s, serve a dual purpose, since they are designed not only to protect her beloved, but to inspire his undying gratitude. Like Viola and Olivia, Maria has to deal with her beloved’s initial indifference: her diminutive stature is the concrete embodiment of her insignificance in Sir Toby’s eyes, and perhaps also its cause, since her physical appearance would have probably been his foremost concern at first (1.5.204-05, 2.5.13). Undaunted, however, she shows herself to be courageous as well as witty in her attempt to captivate her beloved, for, as Malvolio reminds her, she is risking her own position by supporting the drunken knight (2.3.121-24). Through sheer tenacity she gradually gains Sir Toby’s respect: he compares her both to gold–precious of course partly because it is completely unchanging–and to “a beagle true bred,” presumably because she makes up in persistence what she lacks in size (2.5.14, 2.3.179). When her scheme succeeds, Sir Toby vows to “follow” her “to the gates of Tartar” (2.5.204-06). In sum, Maria gives Sir Toby the same loyal, diligent care that Viola and Antonio offer Orsino and Sebastian, although each tailor their devotion in slightly different ways to fit their beloveds’ needs. Essentially, the same erotic contract proves effective in all three cases, which suggests that it is the most natural way for courting lovers to proceed. 

Feste is truly a philosopher by most definitions, since he has a curious mind, well suited to abstract thought. Since his way of explaining his movement between the two households makes “Foolery” resemble philosophy in its universalism–it “does walk about the orb like the sun, it shines everywhere”–it is particularly significant that he sees Viola’s peregrinations as a sign that she is a kindred spirit (3.1.38-41). The two characters certainly display a similar degree of scepticism as they exchange a series of jokes which depend on viewing the Church from a purely material perspective: Feste is connected to churches only in the literal sense of living next door to one, which means that, as Viola seems to suggest, he is in fact being exploited by those who do actually “live by the church” and therefore “stand…by [his] tabor”–for the clown’s music presumably helps him to pay his tithes–but offer him no substantial recompense for his efforts (3.1.1-10). It is Viola who extends the covert satire on the artificiality and injustice of the established order to include the secular hierarchy: “the king lies by a beggar” (3.1.8). She shows, moreover, that she can match Feste’s level of insight–and, as we have also seen throughout the play, the subtlety of his rhetoric–precisely by registering the flexible awareness of “mood…quality of persons, and the time”–“as full of labor as a wise man’s art”–which allows him to “check at every feather” in order to accommodate his wit to his various audiences (3.1.60-68).[xv] Like Shakespeare himself, and Plato and Aristophanes before him, these two philosophical characters both know how to use comedy to conceal controversial opinions.[xvi] Viola differs from Feste, however, in that she invariably uses her capacity for sympathetic insight to endear herself to her interlocutor.

However, there are sharp contrasts between the two characters: Although Viola is as happy to mock the Church as Feste, she draws back from him as soon as he extends his scepticism to loyal attachments, realising that the fool “care[s] for nothing,” since he presents “words [as] very rascals, since bonds disgraced them,” virtue as purely a matter of preserving one’s “name,” and loyal husbands simply as fools (2.3.14-35). The strategies by which Viola endears herself to Olivia are as intelligent and unconventional as Feste’s, but her passionate evocation of absolute fidelity is in every other respect the polar opposite of the fool’s coolly cynical attitude towards his mistress’s devout constancy (1.5.64-74, 1.5.139-49, 1.5.264-76). Whereas Feste questions any attempt to transcend the mutability of the world, whether inspired by natural passion or conventional beliefs, Viola, who is “sick” for love, focuses all her intelligence on the task of establishing an enduring friendship with Orsino (3.1.46-53). Ironically, however, it is precisely Feste’s prioritisation of truth over friendship which cuts him off from understanding the most important truths: he leaves the joys of love completely out of account when he claims that he is “the better for [his] foes and the worse for [his] friends,” since only the former tell him his faults bluntly (5.1.12-26).

There are signs, however, that Feste’s cynicism is not primarily philosophical, but springs from a fear of being deceived: “He that is well hang’d in this world needs to fear no colors” (1.5.3-6). His underlying nature is passionate, as perhaps must be true of those who are of a genuinely philosophical disposition: his uncharacteristic reluctance to receive payment for the song he performs for Orsino on the grounds that he “take[s] pleasure in singing,” implies that he is as deeply affected as the duke by the idea of a loyal, but rejected lover, dying of grief, and furthermore that he has for once actually enjoyed sharing this feeling with his audience (2.4.51-71). This unique display of passion–which contrasts sharply with his earlier acceptance of a double payment for the song celebrating “present mirth”–could suggest that he is drawing on his own experience of “bonds disgrac[ing]” the “words” which purported to seal them forever (2.3.31-38, 3.1.20-21). 

Feste protects himself from loss and betrayal by withdrawing from deep attachments, while using his sceptical philosophy to justify this retreat on the grounds that absolute constancy is beyond the scope of human nature: “virtue that transgresses is but patch’d with sin, and sin that amends is but patch’d with virtue” (1.5.47-52). His continual oscillation between the two households, his repulsion of Maria’s and Viola’s friendly advances and his surly treatment of Sebastian are all indicative of this habitual and deliberate detachment (1.5.1-6, 3.1.28-30, 4.1.1-23).[xvii] Having consciously disengaged himself both from conventional moral codes and from the natural graciousness which encourages passionate individuals to fulfil their obligations, whether personal or professional, Feste is no more diligent in attending to Orsino than he is to Olivia -or even to Sir Toby and Maria, who expect him to be present when Malvolio reads the planted letter (2.4.8-14, 2.3.173-75). Thus, although his opening admonition of Olivia undoubtedly helps her to understand that constancy has its natural limits, it turns out also to be symptomatic of his own more radical rejection of all pretensions to fidelity.

In the light of his reductive conclusion that human nature is inherently fickle, Feste has scaled down his erotic needs to focus purely on physical pleasure: “As there is no true cuckold but calamity, so beauty’s a flower” (1.5.51-52). Consequently, he keeps a mistress, although like Sir Toby and Orsino, he has discovered that even the most reductively sensual “pleasure will be paid, one time or another”: “My lady has a white hand, and the Mermidons are no bottle-ale houses” (2.4.70-71, 2.3.27-28). Thus, although he avoids both the risks and the effort involved in deep emotional investment, he still needs to extend himself even to earn fleeting and nugatory rewards. Feste’s ambiguous name associates his continual pursuit of diversion with decay, which underscores the point that his cynical acceptance of impermanence is no more likely to fulfil his deeper needs than Olivia’s idealistic determination to remain devoted to her brother’s memory forever.

However, Feste’s philosophy does offer him an enticing–if ultimately illusory–substitute for the substantial and lasting satisfactions of intimacy which it has encouraged him to forfeit, since it continually bolsters his sense of superiority to those who strive to achieve some degree of constancy in their lives. His underlying pride is exposed most clearly when he casually punishes Malvolio for belittling him earlier at the start of the play by delaying the delivery of the letter that would have secured the steward’s release (5.1.370-77). (Unlike Sir Toby, he is sufficiently detached from prudential considerations to run the risk of incurring Olivia’s wrath in order to extend Malvolio’s torment -4.2.66-71). It is typical of Feste that, notwithstanding the fact that he has clearly been harbouring a lasting grudge, he manages to present his gloating over Malvolio’s humiliation as an expression of serene resignation to an all-pervading mutability: “thus the whirligig of time brings in his revenges” (5.1.376-77). Thus, far from restraining his vanity, Feste’s philosophising enables him to justify and rationalise it in a way that further bolsters his sense of his own superiority.

Although Feste and Sir Toby both use the phrase “that’s all one,” as a sort of verbal shrug to express their casual cynicism (5.1.196, 5.1.373), the fool’s philosophical resignation to a mutability which he sees as all-encompassing has fostered a much more radical nihilism than the sensualists of the play could ever countenance: “many a good hanging prevents a bad marriage” (1.5.19-20). Feste’s response to Maria’s warning that Olivia will hang or banish him for his prolonged absence–”for turning away, let summer bear it out”–undoubtedly shows that he is less attached to life than those who have more reason to live, but again he seems to be using his sceptical philosophy to repress his real feelings, for he prays that his “wit…put [him] into good fooling” as soon as he is left on his own, and then delivers a performance which seems carefully calculated to regain his mistress’s approval (1.5.20, 1.5.32-33). Similarly, he gives Viola the impression that his wanderings are entirely free-spirited, but he is clearly more intent on earning tips than he admits, and there are signs that he has resorted to Orsino’s court partly because he has found the grieving Olivia to be less generous than her more frivolous father (3.1.31-39, 2.4.11-12, 3.1.49-55, 2.3.25-28, 3.1.43-55, 5.1.29-49).[xviii] Although he is indeed largely disengaged, we can infer from these contradictions that Feste exaggerates his indifference to his instinctive need to make a living, presumably in order to impress his listeners, or perhaps to convince himself of his superiority to those who are more prudently attached to life because they are less radically resigned to their own fleetingness and insignificance. 

Ironically, therefore–for he is undoubtedly indifferent to honour and status as they are conventionally conceived–Feste’s philosophy functions in the same way as Malvolio’s piety, since it enables him to repress his true needs, while bolstering his proud sense of superiority to an ephemeral world. This parallel is underscored by the fact that Feste and Malvolio are the only characters who show absolutely no signs of passionate attachment at any point in the play.[xix] The contrasts between the fool and Viola on the other hand seem designed to indicate that, far from constituting a ruling passion in its own right, as in the Platonic tradition, philosophy tends to be simply an expression of pride when it is not regulated by love. Indeed, of the various forms of pride which Shakespeare explores–Protestant piety, honour, whether maidenly or macho, the hauteur born of high social rank–philosophical pride is perhaps the most insidious. Feste is as unjust in his dealings with others as he is unfulfilled in his personal life: he is as proud as Malvolio, Olivia and Sir Andrew, but, unlike them, is a “corrupter of words,” who sees virtue purely as a conventional matter of preserving one’s “name,” and as sensual as Orsino and Sir Toby, but, unlike them, deliberately eschews loyalty (3.1.14-36). 

Feste’s final song goes well beyond the fool’s own perspective to provide a covert overview of the play’s themes: whereas in what might be called the first phase of desire, one instinctively pursues sensual pleasures–“A foolish thing was but a toy”–in the second, one naturally seeks to secure a more lasting contentment, taking care to “shut [the] gate” of one’s “estate,” thus creating a small enclave of justice in a world of “knaves and thieves” (5.1.389-96). Marriage, described earlier by the priest with unexpected solemnity as “a contract of eternal bond of love,” is the typical expression of this urge, but marriages only succeed when both parties are prepared to prioritise their mutual devotion over their pride: “when I came, alas, to wive…by swaggering could I never thrive” (5.1.156-61, 5.1.397-99). The reward for those who protect their “estate” and avoid “swaggering” is lasting contentment: they “still [have] drunken heads,” even when old age restricts them to their “beds” (5.1.401-03). The last verse concludes the argument with unobtrusive precision: actors illustrate the balance which lovers strike between pleasure and care in a committed relationship, as they “strive to please…every day” (5.1.408). 

Of course, these little enclaves of justice cannot resist the inevitable depredations of nature forever, for “the rain it raineth every day,” but this larger philosophical perspective is irrelevant to lovers: “A great while ago the world begun…but that’s all one” (5.1.392 and passim, 5.1.405-07). The force of this latter phrase, previously expressive of Feste’s and Sir Toby’s nihilism, is completely reversed at this point, since it is now used precisely to reject philosophical perspectives which adduce the ultimate ephemerality of lovers’ efforts to protect their “estate” as proof of their insignificance (compare 5.1.196, 5.1.373). This reversal of meaning provides a hint that Feste’s enigmatic song conveys Shakespeare’s own overview of the play rather than the fool’s: the second and fourth verse remind us of the diligence of the constant lover and how it is rewarded, while the first, third and fifth focus respectively on the ways in which sensual pleasure, pride and philosophical detachment can obstruct this process. 

Feste’s final song reminds us that time is central to the theme of the play. The problem with sensual desire is its ephemerality, whereas ‘swaggerers’ are frequently deluded into thinking that they can transcend their own mortality, whether through faith in divine providence, or through sceptical philosophy, which drains humanity of its significance by viewing all actions sub specie aeternitatis. Between these two extremes erotic contracts represent a humble, but determined effort on the part of lovers to secure their substantial pleasures against “the wind and the rain” for as long as possible.  

Antonio, Viola and Maria are the characters who protect their “estate” most effectively, since they prioritise their love over all other desires and fears, working hard to safeguard the welfare of the beloved on whom their happiness depends, and above all to inspire their gratitude and trusting reliance through a noble display of courage and generosity. Although lovers usually strive to present this display as entirely altruistic, lest they introduce a divisive note in a relationship which they wish to portray as absolutely harmonious, their apparent self-denial is in fact strategically designed to secure the ultimate good of a lasting attachment, even if they also relish the sacrifices which are the necessary means to this end. The Antonio/Sebastian relationship reveals the nature of erotic transactions with relative clarity: the ultimate aim is to secure a deep intimacy, but this is only available in perfectly just relationships, where both lovers appreciate that happiness needs to be earnt through diligent investments of care and acknowledge fully the binding nature of the obligations which these investments create. 

In contrast, Orsino and Sir Toby embody the initial, sensual phase of passion, which seems to offer immediate, carefree satisfaction– “a foolish thing was but a toy”–although in fact even sensual pleasures usually need to be “paid” for, in however minimal a way (2.4.70-71). As Shakespeare’s metaphor implies, however, these pleasures represent an immature stage in the natural development of desire, since they are always shadowed by a painful awareness of their brevity. Orsino and Sir Toby both show a nascent understanding that the rewards of a loyal, intimate attachment are more substantial than their habitual pleasures. To gain this ultimate good, however, sensual lovers have to moderate their physical appetites, which are of course ineluctably private, and strive to unite with their beloveds as far as is possible by diligently reciprocating their sympathetic care. 

Unlike sexual desire, pride has no place at all in deep attachments: Sir Andrew, Malvolio, Feste and–at least in the first half of the play–Olivia herself all fail to “thrive” in their relationships because of their penchant for various types of “swaggering.” Shakespeare constantly teaches that the rewards of pride are not only illusory, but actually form an obstacle to true fulfilment, since the trust and gratitude on which deep attachments are founded can only be earnt through humility and self-denial. Pride exposes one to the distracting influence of the various codes and conventions which offer an all-absorbing alternative to deep attachments, granting insubstantial rewards in a sort of closed loop to those who fulfil their rigorous, joyless demands through their demonstrations of bravado, ascetism, or dutiful service. Whereas Olivia is close enough to her deeper needs to sacrifice piety, honour and social status in order to pursue a constant attachment, those, like Malvolio, who are more proud than passionate have no reason to reject these conventions apart from their own intrinsic futility. 

Of the two great systems which control the behaviour of these less erotic characters­, namely Protestant piety and the code of honour, the former is more useful to society, since it channels pride into dutiful care, reinforcing the natural desire to win praise with the promise of eternal life. However, although the pious man’s disciplined service may outwardly resemble the lover’s, it can only be sustained through systematic indoctrination, since its rewards lack intrinsic satisfaction. Although Shakespeare acknowledges that pride and sensuality are naturally tyrannical when not restrained by conventional codes of behaviour, he also implies that human society has an innate bias towards justice, since attachments constantly create obligations which exert a pervasive influence over even quite humdrum social transactions.

Shakespeare portrays philosophy as regulated either by love or pride, rather than as a ruling passion in its own right. Philosophers are well placed to become successful lovers, since they can understand the nature of their beloved and ignore social convention when pursuing them. Philosophical pride, on the other hand, originates in a self-protective impulse to retreat from deep attachments, which is justified by interpreting inconstancy as a manifestation of an all-encompassing mutability. This apparent insight encourages proud philosophers to scale down their desires and their investment of effort to focus narrowly on sensual gratification. In return for forfeiting the intrinsic satisfactions of passionate constancy, such philosophers gain a pervasive, if unacknowledged, sense of their own superiority to the attachments and dogmas which claim to offer a more lasting alternative to their transient pleasures. They are in fact nihilists, however, for the rewards of pride and sensuality are too insubstantial to provide them with a sustaining purpose -although they are nevertheless still instinctively attached to life, and therefore constrained to make a living in ways which conflict with their stance of carefree resignation to an all-pervading mutability. Philosophers of this sort are unjust in their dealings with others as well as unfulfilled in themselves, since their scepticism regarding any form of constancy, whether natural or conventional, allows them to deny their obligations, while not preventing them from harbouring spiteful grudges when their pride has been wounded. 

In sum, truly passionate lovers are naturally just, since they recognise that they need to make a humble and determined effort to serve their beloved in order to experience the substantial benefits of a loyal, intimate relationship. Although their investments are likely to be presented as disinterested gifts, the value of their returns tends to be directly proportional to the amount of care which they devote to developing an intimate attachment. In contrast, the rewards gained by sensual hedonists are fleeting and insubstantial, while the efforts of ‘swaggerers’–whether status-conscious, pious, honour-loving or philosophical–are radically misdirected, since they yield only illusory returns, while preventing them from ever acquiring the humility of the true lover. 


[i] W. H. Auden, Lectures on Shakespeare, ed. Arthur C. Kirsch (Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000): 152-58; Valerie Forman, Tragicomic Redemptions: Global Economics and the Early Modern English Stage (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008): 53. All references to the play are from The Riverside Shakespeare, ed. G. Blakemore Evans et al. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997).

[ii] Richard Burrow, “Fulfilment in As You Like It,” Interpretation: a Journal of Political Philosophy 41/2, Fall (2014): 91-122.

[iii] A. S. Leggatt, “Twelfth Night,” in “Twelfth Night”: Critical Essays, ed. Stanley Wells (London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1986): 251; Barbara Everett, “Or What You Will,” in “Twelfth Night”; New Casebooks ed. R. S. White (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996): 211-12

[iv] Dympna Callaghan, “Body Politics and Twelfth Night,” in “Twelfth Night”; New Casebooks: 146-47.

[v] Harold Jenkins, “Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night,” in “Twelfth Night”: Critical Essays: 178-80.

[vi] Christina Malcolmson, “Social Mobility and Gender in Twelfth Night,” in “Twelfth Night”; New Casebooks: 171; Barbara Everett: 198.

[vii] Harold Jenkins: 187.

[viii] For the Platonic view see: Leo Strauss, The City and the Man (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1964): 109-15; Leo Strauss, “Plato,” in History of Political Philosophy, ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Co., 1963): 24.

[ix] For the view that attachment is a behavioural system with its own imperatives, which are as powerful as those of sex or self-preservation, see John Bowlby, A Secure Base: Clinical Applications of Attachment Theory (London: Routledge, 1998): 26. 

[x] Leslie Hotson, “Illyria for Whitehall,” in “Twelfth Night”: Critical Essays: 89

[xi] This is of course close to Plato’s view: Leo Strauss, “Plato” in History of Political Philosophy: 21.

[xii] J. B. Priestley, “The Illyrians,” in “Twelfth Night”: Critical Essays: 4.

[xiii] Elliot Krieger, “Twelfth Night, ‘The morality of indulgence,’” in “Twelfth Night”; New Casebooks: 42.

[xiv] For Shakespeare’s indirect allusions to Catholicism see: Paul Dean, “’Nothing That is So is So’: “Twelfth Night” and Transubstantiation,” in Literature and Theology 17 (2003): 281-97; Maurice Hunt, Shakespeare’s Religious Allusiveness: Its Play and Tolerance (Burlington: Ashgate, 2004): 105.

[xv] A. S. Leggatt: 235

[xvi] See Leo Strauss, Socrates and Aristophanes (New York: Basic Bks., 1966): 6.

[xvii] A. C. Bradley, “Feste the Jester,” in “Twelfth Night”: Critical Essays: 20; Barbara Everett: 208.

[xviii] Michael D. Bristol, Carnival and Theater: Plebeian Culture and the Structure of Authority in Renaissance England (London: Methuen, 1985): 126.

[xix] Elliot Krieger: 38 

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Fulfilment in As You Like It

Introduction

Since Bloom and Jaffa’s seminal work most political philosophers who have engaged with Shakespeare have placed him firmly in the classical tradition.[1] Few have directly challenged this view, but occasionally it has been acknowledged that there are elements in his thinking which are impossible to reconcile with classical philosophy. David Lowenthal notes of Prospero that it is his “three year daughter’s smile. . . and not his philosophy that bore him through the ordeal at sea,” and argues elsewhere that in Romeo and Juliet Shakespeare goes “beyond the value placed on sexual love by classical philosophers. . . celebrating a higher form of love in a new way.”[2] Scott Crider even argues that Shakespeare “enacts a modern love” in the way he celebrates “the lyric will to constancy in love” in his sonnets.[3] If these critics are correct, Shakespeare would clearly be diverging from the classical tendency to value friendship only insofar as it facilitates philosophy.[4] The comedies are not often studied by political philosophers—perhaps precisely because they seem to be concerned principally with love and friendship—but I would argue that they contain the heart of Shakespeare’s thought about the ways in which love can fulfill us. The events of As You Like It can easily be summarized: the hero, Orlando, and the heroine, Rosalind, are both forced to flee to the Forest of Arden, where they encounter Rosalind’s father, Duke Senior, who has also been exiled. All three are followed into exile by loyal friends: Rosalind by her cousin Celia and Touchstone, her fool; Orlando by Adam, the faithful family retainer; and Duke Senior by a number of lords, including Jaques, a quirky melancholic. Once in the forest, Rosalind tests out Orlando as a potential lover under the cover of her male disguise, and various pastoral characters are encountered, one of whom Touchstone marries. I will argue that Shakespeare uses these apparently trivial events to smuggle in a carefully developed and logically ordered argument.[5]

The play opens with the hero, Orlando, bitterly complaining about the tyrannical behavior of his elder brother Oliver since his father’s death. He admits that mere “growth” is a “gain” and that he is given enough to eat, but complains bitterly that his brother “mines his gentility with his education” (1.1.10–14, 1.1.21).[6] The intensity of Orlando’s rage suggests that his hunger to advance himself is as deep-seated as his need to eat, even though he recognizes dimly even at this point that social status, or “the courtesy of nations” as he calls it, is insubstantial compared to his innate “blood” (1.1.44–48). It is a similar desire for honor that seems to underlie his brother’s jealous conviction that Orlando is more “enchantingly belov’d” by the people than himself (1.1.163–71). Both here and elsewhere in the play such ambitions are presented as either fruitless or actively painful—in that they lead us to compare ourselves continually with others, while diverting us from what is intrinsically satisfying—but at the same time as deeply embedded in our nature. It should be noted, however, that Orlando’s bold assault on his elder brother seems to be provoked primarily by his attachment to his father’s memory, although here, as is typical of his character in the early part of the play, pride and love merge in a rather confused way: “he is thrice a villain that says such a father begot villains” (1.1.57–59).

Shakespeare chooses this moment to emphasize his key theme through insistent references to the power of loyal devotion. We see Adam’s brave and defiant devotion to his dead master’s memory, even though he is now officially attached to the tyrannical Oliver, and we learn the latest news from court: that the old duke, Rosalind’s father, has been banished by his younger brother Frederick, but followed into exile by “three or four loving lords,” who endure the confiscation of their property as punishment for their loyalty; while Frederick’s daughter Celia has developed such a lasting attachment to Rosalind, “being ever from their cradles bred together, that [she] would have follow’d her exile, or have died to stay behind her” (1.1.63–64, 1.1.82–88, 1.1.99–110). This bunching of parallel instances is one of the ways in which Shakespeare guides his readers and audiences to the philosophical interior of his plays. All the key issues of the play have, I will argue, been introduced in this opening scene: “gentility,” “education,” and even “feeding” are all explored at length later, while love and its relationship to spiritedness and self-sacrifice are Shakespeare’s central concern. 

Shakespeare develops this theme in the next scene by focusing on Rosalind’s tremendous effort to restrain her grief over her exiled father: “Well, I will forget the condition of my estate, to rejoice in yours” (1.2.15–16). All other passions are subordinated to the deep empathy which springs from her devotion to her cousin. Celia feels exactly the same way:

If my uncle, thy banished father, 

had banish’d thy uncle, the duke my father, so thou 

hadst been still with me, I could have taught my 

love to take thy father for mine; so wouldst thou, 

if the truth of thy love to me were so righteously 

temper’d as mine is to thee. 

   (1.2.9–14)

There is no reason for this reprimand, however, for Rosalind has already declared that she is “show[ing] more mirth than [she is] mistress of,” for Celia’s sake (1.2.3–4). An early critic came close to the heart of the play when he noticed that the two friends possess “the gift of self-renunciation, which renders them strangers to all egotism,” adding that Rosalind’s friendship with Celia “lightened” her situation, since she “constrained herself from love to her, to be more cheerful than became her position.”[7] Both women have a strong sense that their happiness depends on their mutual intimacy, so both strive constantly to restrain any passion which threatens to disrupt the friendship. This is the alchemy of love, Shakespeare suggests, by which the most intense desires are so “temper’d” as to point towards their own transcendence. Both women accept that their deepest needs are best fulfilled by turning away from all other needs, however pressing they may seem at the time, in order to focus on the happiness of their friend. This section of the dialogue culminates in a great oath of loyalty by Celia, which is aimed at reinforcing Rosalind’s determination to devote herself fully to the friendship, since it should leave her completely confident that this effort will be mutual (1.2.19–22). The trust that Rosalind feels in Celia because of her deeds and vows fosters a lightness of heart which quickly allows her to become distracted from her grief and “devise sports” (1.2.24–25). 

Thus a close analysis of the love between Celia and Rosalind reveals that it has an importance that is not usually recognized, since, despite occupying only two brief scenes, it represents Shakespeare’s most fully extended portrayal of a thoroughly equal, loyal, and mutually sympathetic attachment. He aims to remind us of both the overwhelming power and the paradoxical effects of our yearning for such attachments, substantiating his intuitive grasp of human nature, as always, through a presentation of human relationships which is so meticulously realistic as to be utterly convincing to harmonious souls among the audience.

Touchstone, who is the court’s clown and a close friend of Celia, is introduced as “Nature’s natural” and as an aid or “whetstone” in reasoning about nature and fortune (1.2.54–55). He arrives just as Rosalind is arguing that beauty and honesty could be classed as natural qualities (1.2.40–42). In reply, Celia stresses the ephemeral character of beauty, showing that the real question here is not which qualities are natural, but which of our natural qualities can help us to fulfill our nature: “when Nature hath made a fair creature, may she not by Fortune fall into the fire?” (1.2.43–44). Pleasures associated with our bodily appetites are fleeting, but Celia’s comment that “Nature hath given us wit to flout at Fortune” reminds us that we have been given one natural quality at least which allows us to distinguish the transient from the durable and substantial (1.2.45). This is exactly what the fool proceeds to do, showing the vanity of “honor” through his story of the knight who “never had any; or if he had, he had sworn it away,” and yet still retained his reputation (1.2.78–79). Beauty is ephemeral and honor is insubstantial, but at least it seems that those with “wit” are able to restrain their desire for such hollow prizes. Touchstone himself remains in control of “Fortune” as far as is possible, since he pursues neither beauty nor honor, and so, as his name implies, becomes a sort of benchmark for what is naturally fulfilling. Nevertheless, although wit is clearly valued by all three characters and appears to play a habitual part in their intimate friendship, it is important to note that Rosalind seems to see it merely as a substitute for the more practical discussion of “falling in love” in which she had attempted to engage her more conventionally modest friend (1.2.25–33). She enjoys philosophy, but it is not by any means her deepest concern. 

In a typically subterranean way Shakespeare has used this bantering conversation to suggest that wit, honor, and the physical appetites will all feature in the argument, and, further, that the main purpose of the play will be to judge the extent to which each of these passions is conducive to a lasting and substantial fulfillment. In other words, as the title of As You Like It itself hints, this is Shakespeare’s play about The Good Life.

Honor

Orlando’s decision to divert himself from his troubles by entering a wrestling match at the court with the burly Charles is used by Shakespeare to draw a series of sharp contrasts between the desire for honor and the deep attachments that are formed by lovers and friends. First, he invites us to compare the way Orlando falls in love with Rosalind during the match with Duke Frederick’s hostility to her, which is based entirely on the fact that “the people praise her for her virtues” (1.2.278–80). As with Orlando’s brother Oliver, the duke’s desire to be popular leaves him vulnerable to terrible pangs of envy. (Shakespeare seems to have completely changed the motives of both of his villains in comparison to his source, so that the first quarter of the play becomes in part a critique of the striving for honor that appears to characterize political life.)[8] In contrast, Orlando’s final comment in the scene implies that Rosalind’s “heavenly” nature makes it worth his while to endure the “tyrant Duke” humbly, even though he resembles his own “tyrant brother” (1.2.287– 89). Here for the second time Orlando exhibits the sort of courageous loyalty that has already been shown to be an underlying factor in the deepest friendships.

Nevertheless, although he is mainly contrasted to Duke Frederick, Orlando is presented as being caught between a humble attachment to Rosalind and a proud self-assertiveness, just as he was swayed almost equally by pride and love for his father when he attacked his brother in the first scene. He feels his low status as intensely as ever, and one can see that it is this that is at the root of his despair when he maintains that, if he loses to Charles in the wrestling match, “there is but one sham’d that was never gracious” (1.2.187–88). Here, despite his apparent humility, Orlando shows that he cares deeply about his lowly position, and, further, that he sees the wrestling as a way of regaining some of his pride, since the honor of victory is clearly the unspoken corollary to the potential shame of defeat. The contest serves as an apt image for the way in which a spirited pursuit of honor involves surrendering oneself to the vagaries of “Fortune” for no substantial reward, since victory leaves Orlando no better off and defeat would probably have led to his death if Charles had followed Oliver’s hints (1.1.141–62).

During the wrestling scene Shakespeare continues to explore the tension between pride and love. It is typical that Rosalind urges Orlando to withdraw from the fight and to pay no more than lip service to “reputation” (1.2.180–82). Rosalind’s love for Orlando is not impeded by her poverty: as she gives him her chain she says, “Wear this for me: one out of suits with Fortune, that could give more, but that her hand lacks means” (1.2.246–47). She is not affected by “Fortune” in the way that Orlando is, because her lowly status is irrelevant to her deepest concerns. Her earlier, frustrated wish to discuss falling in love has already shown that she is even less likely to be motivated by conventional standards of honor than Celia (1.2.24–29; see also 1.3.13–25), and now the speed with which she abandons any pretense of maidenly modesty in order to show her interest in Orlando underlines the extent to which she feels free to follow her natural desires: “My pride fell with my fortunes. . . . Sir, you have wrestled well, and overthrown more than your enemies” (1.2.252–55). Rosalind clearly realizes that love can bring far more substantial rewards than reputation. Less typically, however, Orlando is also in his turn suddenly overwhelmed by a passion which seems to proceed from a deeper level of his personality than we have previously seen:

My better parts

Are all thrown down, and that which here stands up

Is but a quintain, a mere liveless block. 

      (1.2.249–51)

Shakespeare uses the image of the quintain—a wooden figure employed as a target for tilting—to suggest that Orlando has suddenly become at least partially aware of the insubstantiality and artificiality of the code of honor by which he has previously lived. This radical, if implicit, self-criticism, combined with his speechlessness and his confused realization that he has perhaps been “overthrown” by “something weaker” than Charles, all imply that he is beginning to plumb unfamiliar depths within his own nature (1.2.259–60).

At the start of act 1, scene 3 Shakespeare gives us another brief glimpse into Rosalind and Celia’s friendship, once again examining their mutual self-restraint. Again Celia remarks on the way Rosalind has withdrawn from her, but this time she invites her to “lame [her] with reasons” for her sadness; a process which she implicitly likens to throwing stones at a dog (1.3.3–6). She alludes here to the blind loyalty which is leading her to brace herself for confidences that she knows are going to hurt her as if Rosalind’s pain were her own; no doubt partly because they may reveal that her friend is not perfectly fulfilled by their mutual attachment. Celia has clearly come to regret her earlier demand for Rosalind to restrain her grief, showing once again how both women strive to overcome any feeling which threatens to take precedence over their mutual sympathy and so frustrate their desire for absolute unity. In response, Rosalind expresses a typically compassionate reluctance to burden her friend with complaints, since they would then both be “laid up,” or equally crippled. Nevertheless, when Celia demands for a third time to be allowed to share her friend’s feelings by asking whether she is missing her father, Rosalind seems to decide that it would hurt her cousin even more to exclude her than to protect her from the truth and finally tells her that she loves Orlando (1.3.1–12). In other words, she is driven to confide in Celia, not by her own misery, but by a feeling that she owes it to their friendship to be honest, since she realizes that her friend has detected a potentially divisive emotion. Thus she allows herself the relief of venting her feelings only when the self-imposed restraints which are the price of this almost perfect harmony allow it. We can see that this harmony is preserved, and indeed advanced, through both friends’ consistent willingness to prioritize each other’s needs over their own, which binds them ever more closely together with ties of gratitude and trust. With a characteristic mixture of warmth and precise analysis Shakespeare has explored a friendship that seems to come as near as possible to being perfectly harmonious. 

Celia is hurt in more ways than one by Rosalind’s confession of her love for Orlando, if one can judge by the number of times she suggests, apparently semiseriously, that her friend should try to restrain her passion. In the end, however, she declares that she “hate[s] not Orlando” (1.3.13–34). In fact she resigns herself to Rosalind’s love for Orlando relatively quickly, given that it is likely to drive the first major wedge between two friends who have been “coupled and inseparable” from their infancy (1.3.73–76). She clearly realizes that she must submit willingly to the partial loss of her friend in order to remain close to her. Rosalind’s response shows both her awareness that the situation is painful for Celia and a confident conviction that she will be able to control this pain: “do you love him because I do” (1.3.38–39). Like mirrors arranged in an endless sequence, the two women strive to reflect each other’s concerns and desires at every turn, and to moderate or release their own passions according to the response which they anticipate in their friend. One feels that only a romantic attachment could have caused Rosalind to introduce such a discordant note. She has evidently decided in the end that Orlando brings the promise of an even deeper intimacy than she currently has with Celia, and is therefore unwilling to restrain her love in the way that she has previously controlled her grief over her father’s exile. This is the first of several indications that love can be ruthless as well as humble under certain circumstances.

Nevertheless the friendship between the two cousins is the clearest example of constancy in the play: an initial attachment is reinforced by an explicit declaration of loyalty and a consistent attempt to put the needs of one’s friend before one’s own, which creates successive layers of trust and gratitude, so that, as far as is humanly possible, unity is achieved. In a typically succinct and indirect way Shakespeare has outlined a vision of The Good Life which establishes friendship as fulfilling in itself; something to be desired immoderately for its own sake and secured only by moderating all other desires.

Again the contrast is drawn through Duke Frederick, whose intense concern with reputation gives rise to a sort of vicarious jealousy which leads him to warn Celia vehemently against Rosalind:

Her very silence, and her patience 

Speak to the people and they pity her.

Thou art a fool; she robs thee of thy name,

And thou wilt show more bright and seem more virtuous

When she is gone. 

      (1.3.78–82)

Rosalind’s complete lack of pride is what makes her loveable. It would appear that even in political life—the main motive of which is honor, if one can judge by the examples of Oliver and the duke—ambition has to be disguised and restrained in order to achieve its objectives. To realize this is perhaps to start to ascend Shakespeare’s own version of the ladder of love that Plato outlines in the Symposium. Rosalind’s “silence, and her patience,” however, imply a far more radical indifference to honor itself than would ever be comprehensible to the duke, and this complete indifference to worldly status is clearly shared by Celia, since her only reply to her father is to declare that she must follow Rosalind into exile. As their earlier conversation with Touchstone implied, the two women understand fully the insubstantiality of honor from the vantage point of their own deep sense of intimacy and realize that constancy consists of a continual struggle to master thoroughly the tyrannical elements in their own souls. One can infer that self-restraint becomes ever more important as one ascends what might be called the erotic hierarchy. Celia’s great sympathy with her friend is quickly evident after her father’s speech: “O my poor Rosalind, whither wilt thou go?” She recognizes that Rosalind’s grief may drive them apart, declaring, “I charge thee be not thou more griev’d than I am,” and quickly reminds her “that thou and I am one” (1.3.90, 1.3.92, 1.3.97). Her decision to follow Rosalind into exile is only the most concrete of the many sacrifices she makes as she strives for a relationship of complete harmony. 

The contrast between Celia and her father implies that the desire for honor which characterizes political life represents a more or less disguised expression of precisely that tyrannical longing to dominate and possess which the true lover realizes must be carefully restrained in order to be fulfilled. Thus, in an irony that Plato and Xenophon would have appreciated in some ways, the immoderate duke is in fact less deeply erotic than his apparently much more temperate daughter.[9] Ultimately Celia sacrifices her status in the world to achieve a greater good, whereas Duke Frederick, like Oliver, is constantly tormented by a fruitless envy. One may therefore conclude from the first act of the play that, whatever its political usefulness, the desire for honor represents a pervasive and dangerous distraction for the true lover.

Self-Love and the Bodily Appetites

Whereas we have seen that act 1 is concerned centrally with the desire for honor understood in relation to The Good Life, act 2 mainly deals with common self-love and the appetites that are rooted in the body; a subject first introduced by Orlando when he grudgingly admitted that his one “gain” under his brother’s regime had been “growth” (1.1.14). The shift to the forest world of Rosalind’s outlawed father, the ousted Duke Senior, represents a truly decisive break in the play (the stock division of the plays into five acts is a modern addition). The implication is that we have left the artificial world of the court, in which Oliver, Frederick, and even Orlando are constantly comparing themselves to others, in order to consider a more intrinsically fulfilling way of life. It is worth noting that the forest scenes in As You Like It, which form the backdrop to the explorations of self-love, “wit,” moderation, and spiritedness that follow, are unique in Shakespeare’s work in being set in a stylized version of an area close to his own birthplace, namely the Forest of Arden, where several of his forebears had lived, as is suggested by the fact that his mother’s surname was itself Arden.[10] This seems to suggest that this is Shakespeare’s most directly personal play, perhaps because it deals with intuitions regarding The Good Life which can only be derived from our most intimate relationships.

The need to hunt for food in his exile “irks” Duke Senior because he feels that the deer have as much a right to occupy the forest as he does (2.1.22–25). His dilemma allows Shakespeare to explore the proper scope of self-love. The fact that the duke does nevertheless hunt despite his qualms constitutes the one small exception in a life which otherwise seems to be entirely compassionate. The duke’s naturally loving nature has been reinforced by his Christian beliefs: he uses the “sermons” of nature to contemplate his own vulnerability and responds later to Orlando’s plight with “sacred pity,” recalling his own “better days” when he had “with holy bell been knoll’d to church” (2.1.17, 2.7.121–23). Nevertheless, the fact that he must give precedence at times to the pressing and incorrigibly private needs of the body is used to reveal that there are limits even to “sacred pity.” 

One has to examine Jaques’s critique of Duke Senior and his followers to understand fully the implications of this point. Jaques—who is one of the duke’s attendant lords though very much his own man—declares even more radically than the duke that the outlaws are “mere usurpers, tyrants” in hunting animals in their “native dwelling place” (2.1.61–63). His effort at universal sympathy is, however, even more flawed than the duke’s, since he is not only perfectly willing to eat venison in the end, but is even the only one of the company to react at all greedily and aggressively to Orlando’s desperate request for food later on in the play (2.7.88–90). These inconsistencies show that both the duke and Jaques are demanding something of themselves which is beyond human nature, albeit for different reasons. Jaques’s constant “melancholy” and “sullen fits” are a sign of an inner disharmony which hints at the failure of his idealistic attempt to transcend self-love completely (2.1.26, 2.1.67). Similarly, the universal charity that Christianity encourages is reduced to absurdity by the duke’s worries about prioritizing his own species. Although the duke is a far more harmonious character than Jaques, gaining solid secular rewards for his warm-heartedness in the loyalty and love of his followers, he resembles the latter in his failure to understand that the truly fulfilled life, even at its most nobly self-denying, is founded on self-love. In contrast, both Rosalind’s partial desertion of Celia in order to pursue Orlando and the prolonged testing of her potential lover which follows show how a deep understanding of one’s own needs leads one to make careful discriminations in the search for fulfilling friendships. 

This is not to deny that the open and warm compassion exhibited both by Duke Senior and the two women is deeply endearing. One may infer from Rosalind’s first meeting with Orlando that our pervasive longing for intimate attachments leads any harmonious soul to approach the world initially in a spirit of general benevolence and compassion, but to become more discriminating when the possibility of a fulfilling friendship arises (1.2.173–82, 1.2.194–98). The broadly contemporary setting of the play seems to suggest that Christianity is more conducive to The Good Life than classical philosophy, no doubt because it encourages this broadly loving approach. On a more fundamental level, however, Shakespeare agrees with the classical view that the truly fulfilled life involves following one’s own deepest interests, even as he defines these interests in a way that differs radically from Plato and Aristotle. 

In contrast with the duke, the philosophical Jaques is subject to a deep melancholia which seems to stem from his determination to isolate himself. Despite his talk of justice he is an unconscious tyrant in his dealings with his fellow men, as we see when he rides roughshod over Amiens’s repeated wish not to sing again, as the two lords while away the time “under the greenwood tree” (2.5.1–18). He sees gratitude—presented as the foundation of all loyal friendships elsewhere in the play—simply as a ruse which obscures the fact that life is a matter of gratifying base appetites: “and when a man thanks me heartily, methinks I have given him a penny, and he renders me the beggarly thanks” (2.5.27–29). The contrast with Amiens shows how far Jaques is from true fulfillment. Amiens’s initial refusal to sing is motivated partly by a worry that music would increase Jaques’s melancholy and partly by a wish not to aggravate his own sore throat (2.5.10–24). Amiens is, in other words, concerned both about himself and his companion: the song he sings celebrates companionship and his music making itself functions as a fitting metaphor for the harmonious interchanges that occur between friends, in which one can simultaneously create joy for oneself and others (2.5.1–8). Jaques, on the other hand, sees himself as indulging his appetite for music with a purely private relish, “suck[ing] melancholy out of a song, as a weasel sucks eggs” (2.5.12–14). He sings his own song in a typically mocking spirit, reducing Amiens’s vision of pastoral harmony to “a Greek invocation, to call fools into a circle” (2.5.59–60). 

Nevertheless, in demanding so insistently that Amiens continue his song, his deeper nature is asserting itself, for he is normally notoriously unmusical (2.7.5–6). He clearly finds both the music and Amiens’s celebration of friendship deeply attractive, but the fact that these moods are quickly followed by bouts of melancholy and mockery suggests that his radical attempt to detach himself from the world is constantly obstructing this natural response. Ironically, Jaques’s selfishness seems to stem from this effort to focus exclusively on contemplation, since his desire for companionship is always asserting itself in opposition to his conscious principles in an uncontrolled and ungracious way. In contrast, harmonious souls accept that they have needs which may lead them to tyrannize over deer—or even potential lovers, as we will see later—but, once embarked on a close friendship, quickly realize that it requires enormous restraint, precisely because it has become so central to their lives.

One implication of the contrast between Jaques and Amiens is that deep attachments give us a purpose and focus that allow us to thrive even under adverse circumstances. For Amiens, the joys of companionship outweigh the “winter and rough weather,” but Jaques merely mocks him for “leaving his wealth and ease” (2.5.1–8, 2.5.51–53). These points are further reinforced through the story of Orlando’s journey to the forest. When Orlando is entreated to leave home by Adam, his loyal servant, who warns him that Oliver means to burn him alive, he angrily rejects the idea of making a “thievish living” on the roads at first, but his willingness to die at the hands of his brother rather than turn to theft seems merely proud rather than noble: he scornfully asks the benevolent Adam whether he would have him beg (2.3.19–34). Orlando’s dismissive response to Adam’s pleas may remind us of Jaques’s desire not to hunt and of his own desperate decision to wrestle Charles, since in all three cases pride seems to lie at the root of a sort of self-destructiveness. Orlando, like Jaques, is reliant for his survival on his friends, who are more vigorously attached to life than he because they are more fulfilled. 

Adam, whose name evokes a state of natural, prelapsarian contentment, illustrates the link between love and vigor (2.3.46–62): although old, he is healthy because his life has been lived moderately, probably because its main focus has been his immoderate devotion to Orlando and his father. It is this that leads him now to give his master all his savings and to follow him as he flees from his murderous brother (2.3.45–46). His temperate way of living, avoiding “hot and rebellious liquors,” has made a “lusty winter” of his age and allowed him to become a wealthy man through “the thrifty hire [he] saved” as a servant of Duke Senior, but these are incidental benefits, stemming from an inner harmony which leads him to sacrifice them all for love of Orlando (2.3.38–39, 2.3.49, 2.3.52). Shakespeare shows that self-love is transmuted into courageous loyalty in a truly rewarding life: Adam prioritizes his devotion to the family not only over any physical appetites which might have caused “weakness and debility” if given free rein, but even at this point over his sense of self-preservation itself (2.3.51). Paradoxically, a thoroughly temperate and vigorous life turns out to be dependent on a willingness to sacrifice that life at any point. As with the portrayal of Duke Senior, Shakespeare also touches here on the way in which Christianity can support us in overcoming our baser nature: Adam trusts to Him “that doth the ravens feed [and] providently caters for the sparrow” (2.3.43–44). It is a measure of the gulf between Shakespeare and the classical philosophers that Adam and the duke seem to be as close to finding genuine fulfillment as the more philosophical Touchstone. 

Although, as we have seen, Orlando’s pride is initially contrasted with Adam’s humble devotion, it is his gratitude to Adam rather than the thought of the five hundred crowns that sustains him as he is eventually persuaded to make good his escape: he praises Adam for his “constant service” with no thought of reward (2.3.57). It is striking, however, that Adam does feel he has been thoroughly recompensed, in that he has been given a chance to express his gratitude and so to “die well, and not [his] master’s debtor” (2.3.76). The financial metaphor which he uses here suggests that the rewards he hopes to gain from returning his master’s love and thus consolidating their friendship are absolutely as real as the five hundred crowns. 

Adam and Orlando’s relationship does indeed develop from now on into a fulfilling friendship between equals, which, like Celia and Rosalind’s, is based on gratitude and mutual sympathy. When they too have inevitably made their way to the forest, Orlando refuses to take food until, “like a doe,” he “go[es] to find [his] faun,” recognizing that Adam has “limp’d” after him in “pure love” (2.7.128–31). Paradoxically, Orlando’s drive to preserve his own life is strengthened by his new focus on preserving Adam’s rather than his own. His gratitude leads him to reject his earlier proud squeamishness and resolve to find food by violent means if necessary, and he initially attempts to steal food from the exiled duke (2.6.6–8, 2.7.88–99). One can see again the role that suffering plays in strengthening the bonds of friendship, but here gratitude, which, contra Jaques, is shown to lie at the heart of our impulse to transcend the baser forms of self-love in friendship, proves also to be absolutely central to our attachment to life itself, since it leads to that sense of complete trust and harmony upon which a truly fulfilling life is founded. Adam’s humble devotion also seems to make Orlando question his own pride, an important stage in his development, which perhaps enables him to reach a point where he is worthy of Rosalind’s love. He hopes now to “light upon some settled low content” and seems to have lost his urge to distinguish himself (2.3.68).

The second part of Shakespeare’s argument is therefore that The Good Life is rooted in self-love, but a self-love which has been radically transformed. Suffering comes to be seen as the inevitable price of true fulfillment once one has experienced the robust and temperate joy which is to be found in those friendships where both the parties involved are willing to sacrifice their own pride and pleasures in order to achieve a greater intimacy. The forest setting which forms the backdrop to much of the play seems designed to show that the true test of love is loyalty in the face of suffering. As Amiens’s song states, “Most friendship is feigning, most loving mere folly” when seen from the perspective of the “winter wind” and the “green holly,” which is alone truly “jolly,” presumably because hardship binds men together with ties of gratitude and trust such as those we have seen form between Adam and Orlando (2.7.180–83). In contrast, “the envious court” seems to encourage flattery and ingratitude, reminding us again that honor has no place in The Good Life (2.1.1–11, 2.7.175–76, 2.7.185–89).

The introduction of the shepherds Silvius and Corin enables Shakespeare to extend his meditation on the proper role and status of self-love and the bodily appetites to encompass sexual desire. Silvius feels that his older friend, Corin, cannot have been a true lover if he has forgotten any of the little romantic gestures that characterize the start of a love affair. Touchstone, however, knows that “as all is mortal in nature, so is all nature in love mortal in folly” (2.4.55–56). His claim to be a “true lover” despite the fact that his passion “grows something stale” suggests that love is not in its essence the fierce desire that drives Silvius to run frantically about the forest (2.4.54, 2.4.62). Touchstone’s first love, Jane Smile, no doubt possessed the superficial beauty that her name implies, but he has clearly come to value sturdier qualities, as his courtship of Audrey is soon to reveal (2.4.46–48). We have already seen in the earlier conversation between Rosalind and Celia that the main problem with beauty is its fleeting quality, its exposure to “Fortune,” as well as the fact that it rarely coincides with constancy (1.2.37–39, 1.2.43–44). Touchstone later echoes this point in his comment on the court ladies, reported by Jaques, that if they “be but young and fair, they have the gift to know it” (2.7.37–38). The hallmark of Rosalind’s love is fidelity rather than intense desire, as is implied by her prolonged testing of Orlando, although the fact that she identifies with Silvius’s desperation reminds us that it is physical passion which gives romantic love its initial impetus (2.4.60–61). 

Thought

As the conversation between Touchstone and the two women in act 1, scene 2 might have led us to anticipate, the third issue that Shakespeare raises is the crucial one of the relationship between “wit” and The Good Life. Jaques’s account of the ages of man is triggered by Duke Senior’s typically compassionate reflections on Orlando’s plight:

We are not all alone unhappy:

The wide and universal theatre

Presents more useful pageants than the scene

Wherein we play in.

(2.7.136–39)

Whereas the duke uses the theatrical image to reflect sympathetically on the suffering of others, Jaques hijacks it to express a radical detachment. The experience of a lover, for instance, is reduced to a series of clichéd, external symptoms (2.7.147–49). The famous speech is undermined, as many critics have realized, by the entrance of Adam, whose fierce loyalty makes him so much more vividly alive than the senile, decrepit relic who represents old age in Jaques’s account. One is not surprised to see Jaques begging to become the duke’s fool, since this position would allow him to remain a detached spectator; he would be in the company, but not of it, and would comment generally on pride without concerning himself with any specific individual (2.7.42–87). When he overhears the fool philosophizing, he merely begins to “crow” with laughter “that fools should be so deep contemplative,” managing to maintain his superiority even as he relishes Touchstone’s meditations on the insignificance and ephemerality of human life (2.7.28–33). 

The difference between Touchstone’s speech and Jaques’s reflections on the ages of man is that the fool sees human life as a process of “ripening” as well as “rotting” (2.7.24–27). Shakespeare hints that Touchstone is not exploring the brevity of human life for its own sake, but as part of a larger desire to lead a thoroughly mature life, which possibly culminates in his humble marriage with Audrey. In contrast, in his purely negative view of human society, in which pride is seen as universal, “flow[ing] hugely as the sea,” Jaques is perhaps merely seeing the world in his own image and showing his lack of understanding of the ordinary human attachments by which Touchstone takes his bearings (2.7.72). He does not realize that his single-minded pursuit of the contemplative life is driving a wedge between himself and his friends, rendering him not only incapable of reciprocating the keen relish which the duke takes in their friendship, but also even incapable as a philosopher of understanding the ways in which such friendships can be fulfilling. From the philosophical perspective, as Plato perhaps implies at the end of the Symposium, most human affairs may be comic, but here Shakespeare seems to mock this detached standpoint itself by indicating that the attempt to lead a purely contemplative life is likely to be in part itself merely an expression of pride. Jaques does occasionally seek philosophical conversations, but the philosopher as he is understood in the classical tradition must always be isolated in a sense, since he must constantly be checking whether any particular friendship is conducive to the pursuit of his enquiries. Thus Jaques rejects Orlando until he shows his “nimble wit” (3.2.253–57, 3.2.276–77).

All of this is by no means to deny, however, that Jaques is genuinely curious and “full of matter,” as the duke realizes (2.1.68). Ironically, many of his remarks, but particularly his response to Touchstone and the ages-of-man speech, show clearly that he has meditated deeply on human insignificance and the folly of pride. Moreover, there is no doubt that he is motivated in these meditations by the intense curiosity which is the primary characteristic of the true philosopher: his gleeful, hour-long fit of laughter is only partly at Touchstone’s expense, for his abrupt decision to imitate the fool shows how much he relishes a “deep contemplative” approach to life.

The duke’s own curiosity is, by contrast, bound up with his open and sociable approach to life. He eagerly seeks Jaques out even though the latter avoids him, saying that he is ‘too disputable’ (2.5.35). This is not, however, a purely philosophical friendship in the classical sense, even from the duke’s point of view. The passionate nature of his attachment is evident in the way he describes himself as one of Jaques’s “poor friends who must woo [his] company” when reproaching him for his solitary life (2.7.10). He clearly takes delight in Jaques’s character for its own sake as well as relishing his wit, frequently teasing him affectionately, as when alluding to his tone-deaf approach to music or his sinful past (2.7.5–6, 2.7.64–69). He notices Jaques’s uncharacteristic happiness immediately, even before the latter mentions overhearing Touchstone’s entertaining speech, showing a sympathy which is clearly born of deep affection (2.7.11). By contrasting Jaques’s melancholy detachment with the way in which the duke’s understanding is always regulated by his loving nature, Shakespeare suggests that thought must serve something beyond itself in order to be truly useful. This is not of course to deny that philosophical conversation forms an enjoyable element of the Duke’s friendship with Jaques, just as it does in Celia’s relationships with Touchstone and Rosalind.

In contrast to Jaques, as we have seen, Touchstone aims to benefit from his recurrent musings. He says to Corin of the shepherd’s life that, “in respect of itself it is a good life; but in respect that it is a shepherd’s life, it is naught” (3.2.12–14). This seeming nonsense in fact points to the difficulty of arriving at a firm sense of what is good in itself, regardless of social status. Touchstone goes on to say that the shepherd’s life is good in that it is “solitary” and “in the fields,” but adds that it seems merely “private” or “not in the court” when contrasted with his previous existence (3.2.15–20). The shepherd’s life certainly involves paring down one’s physical needs, but again it is the contrast with the “plenty” of the court which causes discontent, rather than the abstemious diet itself (3.2.19–21). Touchstone sees that we involve ourselves in ceaseless comparisons, which distract us from life’s intrinsic joys. This is clearly an internal dialogue that he is rehearsing, which suggests that he is constantly employing philosophy—to which he refers twice in this scene for the first time (3.2.21, 3.2.32)—to restrain both his ambitions and his physical desires. Touchstone’s attempt to be fully aware of the demands of his own nature at all times means that he remains remarkably unaffected by religious and moral traditions, as is shown by his initial willingness to be married under a tree (3.3.65–66). Similarly Rosalind sees inconstancy as a sign of weakness rather than immorality; the mark of a “sheep’s heart” (3.2.423–24). She does refer to religion at one point, but only in order to convey the intensity of Orlando’s kisses, which are “as full of sanctity as the touch of holy bread” (3.4.13–14). 

On a superficial level we are clearly invited to laugh at Touchstone’s low standards when he decides to court Audrey, a poor and ugly farm labourer, but one of the most intelligent critics of the play realises that Touchstone has genuinely been “thrown down” by “love’s order” with all its “duties of service in just the same way as Orlando and Rosalind.”[11] Another uses the compliment Celia pays Touchstone when she declares emphatically that he will follow her “o’er the wide world” to show that “he is a man to be depended on,” and, unlike many critics, takes absolutely seriously the possibility that his marriage with Audrey will be successful.[12] Touchstone’s desire to marry Audrey is rooted in a cool understanding of his own deep longing for a loyal friend. His concern lest he be cuckolded is clear, despite being expressed flippantly (3.3.51–63). It leads him to scorn convention and seek out a partner of low status, whom he considers more likely to be virtuous than the ladies of the court. Touchstone’s anxiety on this point is indicated by the fact that he has made her swear to him that she is strictly “honest,” even though she seems extraordinarily chaste anyway (3.3.18, 3.3.25– 26, 3.3.33–34). One may be reminded here of Rosalind’s indifference to the conventional code of maidenly modesty and indeed to Orlando’s lowly status when she first met him. Like Touchstone, the main thing that concerns her is loyalty. Touchstone shows all the desire to serve Audrey—by “fetch[ing] up” her goats—and the anxiety as to whether he is “the man” for her that we might see in more romantic lovers (3.3.1–4), but perhaps goes further even than Rosalind in understanding the very core of the fulfilled life: his relationship with Audrey abstracts constancy from all the other elements that could help to make up a happy marriage, such as wit, status and sexual attraction (a tripartite division which again echoes the earlier discussion of beauty, honour and wit— [1.2.37–80]), because he is aware that it is the one quality which is absolutely essential. He certainly responds to the “sugar” of beauty, for he “hath his desires,” but he comments approvingly on Audrey’s “foulness,” since he realizes, not only that constancy is a greater good, but also that it is actually aided by ugliness (3.3.30–1, 3.3.40–41, 3.3.80–81). 

Touchstone’s recognition that his verses “cannot be understood” by Audrey, nor his “good wit seconded with the forward child, understanding,” reveals that he is even prepared to sacrifice his philosophy in his attempt to establish a thoroughly trusting and loyal relationship. He does, however, regret Audrey’s lack of education much more than her ugliness or low status, declaring that “he would the gods had made [her] poetical” (3.3.12–16). This suggests that “wit” could easily play its part in a deep friendship, as it does in his relationship with Celia, even though it is not absolutely integral to The Good Life. Touchstone is very much a philosopher in the classical mold in his detachment from the conventions of the day and in the way he subordinates certain aspects of his own nature to his ruling passion, but his evident enjoyment of philosophy does not prevent him from valuing thought primarily as a means to guide himself towards “ripeness” through a thorough understanding of his own need for love. 

Nevertheless, Touchstone’s very decision to marry, in however unorthodox a fashion, shows a belief that even the philosophically inclined need social conventions to reinforce their determination to remain constant (3.3.90–94). He is aware that “as the ox hath his bow. . . , the horse his curb, and the falcon his bells, so man hath his desires: and as pigeons bill, so wedlock would be nibbling” (3.3.79–82). His metaphors point to the paradox that it is marriage rather than unbridled passion which liberates our nature, since it helps us to fulfill our deep yearning for constancy. Touchstone almost “stagger[s]” in his project, with a “fearful heart,” since he is fully aware of the chaotic power of physical desires: “as horns are odious, they are necessary” (3.3.51–52). It seems that he is resisting fiercely the despairing thought that must occur to anyone philosophically inclined—especially in modern and early modern times—that our nature is inescapably bestial. He has already expressed doubts about his paradoxical project of a “natural” marriage, and quickly agrees with Jaques that it is best not to be “married under a bush” (3.3.49–51, 3.3.83–84). He acknowledges the role that conventional religious traditions play in restraining aspects of our nature when he reflects that it would be better to be married in a church by a proper priest, lest, “not being well married, it will be a good excuse for me hereafter to leave my wife” (3.3.92–4). He is aware that fickleness is part of our nature, which means that our higher impulses need every available support from society. 

It is significant that Jaques’s most useful and least typical action in the whole play is to advise Touchstone to marry in church rather than following his natural bent, for, if he were to be married “under a bush” rather than in church, his original nature might reassert itself and, “like green timber warp, warp” (3.3.83–89). Here once again Jaques contradicts his habitual pessimism, perhaps revealing a vicarious longing for an enduring love, as well as an uncharacteristic faith in the power of sacred traditions to reinforce our rational decisions and harmonize the potentially chaotic elements within human nature. 

Touchstone’s partial reliance on convention might make us wonder whether the radical disillusionment of the philosopher is the best way of achieving The Good Life. One could infer from Jaques’s and Touchstone’s worries about marriage conducted “under a bush” that the latter’s extreme scepticism could have endangered his chances of happiness were it not for his clear understanding of his own ultimate goal. This is especially true because, as we have seen, he is prone to define himself as an animal and so to see adultery as natural. The fact that Audrey has come to set the same value on absolute loyalty as Touchstone by a very different route seems to suggest that a thorough habituation in a moral and religious tradition can guide and restrain our passions at least as effectively as a clear understanding of human nature. Audrey refers to the gods four times in act 3, scene 3 (23–24, 33–34, 38–39, 47), even thanking them for making her “foul” and therefore “honest” (3.3.33–39). Similarly, Corin the shepherd has been given a moral code which enables him to “envy no man’s happiness, [be] glad of other men’s good, content with [his own] harm,” so that the “greatest of [his] pride is to see [his] ewes graze” (3.2.74–77). 

The contrast between the philosopher and the nonphilosopher is hinted at when Corin’s simple feeling of fatherly affection for his ewes is brought into question by Touchstone’s blunt reminder that he gets “his living by the copulation of cattle.” This is merely the culmination of a series of remarks in which the fool attempts in a semiserious way to enlighten Corin as to his own bestial nature by pointing out that the “grease of a mutton [is] as wholesome as the sweat of a man” and that the civet which is used in perfumes at court is derived from animals (3.2.55–69). Corin can in the end do no more than change the subject without answering Touchstone’s accusation that he is a “bawd” in the way he “brings[s] the ewes and the rams together” in a very ungodly way, even though he has defended his position sturdily up to this point (3.2.78–87). Luckily for him, Touchstone, like his creator, is flippant enough to avoid ruffling any deeply held beliefs by these remarks. As with the duke and Jaques, Corin’s treatment of animals has been used to show that his life is in one sense inevitably rooted in self-love rather than compassion, but in his case it is important that he does not realize this, lest he come to question the integrity of the principles by which he lives. Similarly, although the partly philosophical duke understands that eating meat is incompatible with his Christian compassion, this insight causes him some discomfort. Touchstone’s thoroughly philosophical insight into his own partly bestial nature is, on the other hand, clearly useful to him, because it spurs him on to marry Audrey. Shakespeare’s recognition that there are two mutually incompatible paths to virtue perhaps explains his characteristic strategy of expressing his most serious points in apparently trivial scenes. 

The underlying argument in the last few scenes has been that philosophy can help some people to pursue a fulfilling life, but is not essential to The Good Life itself. Audrey perhaps asks the most important question regarding Touchstone’s poetry: “Is it honest in word and deed? Is it a true thing?” (3.3.17–18). Fulfillment is to be found mainly in an active life of love rather than purely in contemplation, so it is more important to ask whether a poet is honest in his life than whether his poetry is beautiful or profound. Conversely, when Jaques wishes to absent himself from the party at the end of the play in order to enter a monastery, where he hopes that “there is much matter to be heard and learned,” he may remind us of the fictional lover whom Rosalind tells Orlando she “cured” by inducing in him “a living humor of madness, which was, to forswear the full stream of the world, and to live in a nook merely monastic” (5.4.184–85; 3.2.418–21). Rosalind’s covertly scornful implication is that to follow a purely contemplative life is to enter a backwater which cuts us off from the current of our deepest desires.

Orlando, having made his way to Arden with the faithful Adam, has taken to pinning love poems to Rosalind on trees, unaware that she too is living in the forest. Touchstone mocks the way in which he equates Rosalind’s “worth” with her beauty in his first poem, implying through his scornful references to harts, hinds, cats, and pricks that it is merely an expression of animal attraction (3.2.88–114). He is silent, however, about the second one, which contrasts Rosalind’s chastity and Orlando’s own constancy with the brevity of life and the tragedy of “violated vows,” thus implicitly agreeing with the high value that Orlando sets on a thoroughly enduring love (3.2.125–54). The suggestion is that, although it may be beyond human nature to focus exclusively on the immutable realm of ideas, we nevertheless still find our fulfillment through resisting the mutability of our own passions as far as is possible. As with the earlier contrast between Silvius and Corin, the implied progression of Orlando’s love shows that the intense physical desire which characterizes romantic love in its early stages can in some cases trigger a more enduring loyalty. In the second poem Orlando praises Rosalind for having

Helen’s cheek, but not her heart,

Cleopatra’s majesty,

Atalanta’s better part,

Sad Lucretia’s modesty.

Thus Rosalind of many parts

By heavenly synod was devis’d. 

       (3.2.145–50)

Here again Shakespeare employs a tripartite division of the soul, but once more he adds a fourth ingredient: Orlando’s list implies that beauty, a Cleopatra-like power or spiritedness, and wit (“Atalanta’s better part”) can all play their part in romantic love, but by ending with “sad Lucretia’s modesty” he shows a new understanding that Rosalind’s most important quality is her chastity; the crucial requisite for a lasting marriage. 

Unlike Touchstone, Jaques mocks Orlando’s love itself (3.2.259–60, 3.2.270–72, 3.2.282, 3.2.291–92). Typically, as we have seen, his only interest seems to be in Orlando’s intelligence: “You have a nimble wit; I think ’twas made of Atalanta’s heels. Will you sit down with me? And we two will rail against our mistress the world, and all our misery” (3.2.276–79). Jaques is as eager to talk to Orlando as he was to avoid the duke, as we have seen, showing that he is as ambivalent in his attitude to dialogue as he is to music and venison. He would perhaps claim that conversation is only to be valued insofar as it facilitates philosophy, but the audience may again feel that he is more sociable than he realizes, since he later tries to engage Rosalind in conversation (4.1.1–2). In any case, Orlando rejects his invitation with some scorn, declaring that he will use his wit to criticize his own faults (3.2.280–94). This self-criticism is useful, for Orlando’s aim will presumably be to overcome the pride which has been one of his chief characteristics, so that he can “live and die [Rosalind’s] slave,” whereas Jaques’s detached analysis of society will, as we have seen, only serve to bolster his sense of superiority (3.2.154). The contrast between Jaques and Orlando is sharpened by their references to the Atalanta legend in the lines quoted above: whereas Orlando uses it to show that he appreciates Rosalind’s wit as one ingredient of her charm, but balances this with praise for her constancy, Jaques focuses on the intellect to the exclusion of all else and has no notion of finding fulfillment through love. Orlando clearly has the intelligence to engage in philosophical dialogue, as Jaques recognizes, but, like Rosalind, his priorities are elsewhere. The audience may well agree with him when he pugnaciously defends his love against Jaques’s attack, declaring that if it is a fault, it is superior to Jaques’s “best virtue” (3.2.282–84). 

Like Touchstone, Rosalind employs great ingenuity in order to secure a constant love in a fickle world. Her initial excitement when she learns that Orlando is in the forest is almost immediately matched by a contrasting prudence: “O ominous! He comes to kill my heart” (3.2.246). She is worried that Orlando shows none of the signs of suffering that are the usual characteristic of the serious lover, so she decides to test his love in an extremely cautious and restrained way, while preserving her male disguise; presumably with a view to suppressing her feelings if Orlando should be found to be untrustworthy (3.2.369–84). For some time the outcome is uncertain, as Rosalind carefully balances Orlando’s apparent loyalty against his occasional unreliability, using his punctuality to measure his capacity for self-control and consideration (3.4.4–26). She affects to deny that anyone ever died for love and accuses herself of infidelity in order to test his response, worrying that “men are April when they woo, December when they are wed” (4.1.94–108, 4.1.116–19, 4.1.147–48, 4.1.160–69). The strength of her determination to conceal her love is shown by her repeated insistence that she is “counterfeiting” even though she has just fainted out of intense sympathy with Orlando’s wounds (4.3.165–82). Rosalind cannot help her passionate attachment to Orlando, but she can prudently protect herself from excessive suffering by selecting only loyal friends. Thus Rosalind’s conversations with Orlando again show that the main use of “wit” is extremely practical. 

The Good Life

Having concluded his tripartite analysis of desire, Shakepeare moves on to measure the value of The Good Life more directly, using Rosalind’s relationship with Orlando to explore the balance between pleasure and pain that the true lover experiences. Rosalind is clearly hurt when Orlando is late, whereas Jaques’s sadness always seems slightly affected, even though he himself criticizes scholars whose “melancholy. . . is emulation” (4.1.10–11). In reality, Jaques too takes pride in his melancholy, claiming self-consciously that it stems from “the sundry contemplation of [his] travels, in which [his] often rumination wraps [him] in a most humorous sadness” (4.1.17–20). The fact that he does not truly suffer is a sign that he is only half alive; Rosalind thinks of him as little better than a “post” (4.1.9). Conversely, the young lovers are nothing if not vividly alive; Rosalind comments that time “trots hard” with a young maid about to be married—“If the interim be but a se’nnight, Time’s pace is so hard that it seems the length of seven year”—whereas for scholars, who carry the “burthen of lean and wasteful learning,” and for lawyers, who “sleep between term and term,” the implication is that time drags slowly (3.2.312–33). The potent mixture of pleasure and pain that characterizes intense love is illustrated by the way in which Rosalind breaks off abruptly from her scolding of Orlando for his tardiness to deliver a passionate plea: “Come, woo me, woo me; for now I am in a holiday humour” (4.1.68–69). Like the maid who “trots hard,” her “thought runs before her actions,” showing that she is in an agony of excitement as she anticipates her marriage to Orlando (4.1.141). As with the maid, it is Rosalind’s intense physical attraction to Orlando that would inevitably create this mixed experience, even if she were not worried about his loyalty. In this early stage of their courtship Rosalind is tempted to see language as merely useful for “entreaty” and love as culminating in the wordless intensity of a kiss (4.1.72–80).   

Nevertheless, Rosalind is ultimately far more aware than Jaques that none of our actions can be truly thoughtful unless they help us to fulfill ourselves, as we can see when she tells him curtly that she would “rather have a fool to make [her] merry than experience to make [her] sad” (4.1.28–29). Thus it is surprising at first glance that she allows herself to suffer at first much more intensely than Jaques. Her superior awareness makes it unlikely that she is simply being blinded by sexual desire; rather, her behavior implies a belief that, if one is prudent, the inevitable pains of love need never come close to overshadowing its joys. This means that love must ultimately be more than the intense mixture of pleasure and pain that she is currently experiencing. For Rosalind, constancy is, as we have seen, not primarily a matter of following moral and religious codes, but a natural consequence of deep love, while, conversely, unreliability is a sign that one is “heart-whole” (4.1.49). This suggests that the intense early stages of love may provide the initial impetus for a loyal relationship. Passionate love will not last in its initial form, but will, as the earlier argument between Silvius and Corin implies, eventually settle down, if properly managed, into a much more moderate way of life, where the calm joys of intimacy will outweigh—and indeed be reinforced by—the sacrifices which any mature friendship must entail. The fact that the attachments which come closest to illustrating The Good Life—Celia’s with Rosalind and Adam’s with Orlando—are nonsexual suggests that romantic love is only one of the ways of developing fulfilling friendships. In the end the lovers’ courtship culminates, not in a kiss, but in a mock wedding—one of many references to marriage in the play (4.1.124–41). The mature phase of love is illustrated most vividly in the attachment between the two women—which also culminated in Celia’s formal vow of loyalty—but thoughtful members of the audience might also respect Touchstone’s attempt to move directly to this phase, even though his cool decision to sidestep the earlier and, from his point of view, irrelevant, stages is in one sense comic. 

This is not to deny that romantic love may in some cases constitute the most powerful catalyst to a life of loyal devotion; indeed, it should be remembered that Rosalind almost immediately allowed her love for Orlando to overshadow not only her grief regarding her father’s exile, but even her friendship with Celia. Rosalind is already, however, shrewdly aware of the middle ground between the maid who “trots hard” and the living death of the scholars and sleeping lawyers, which is occupied by the “rich man” who “lives merrily because he feels no pain” and so might be said to “amble” through life (3.2.313–33). Such a man is fully alert to the demands of his own nature; more lively than the scholars who pursue “wasteful learning”—who may well remind us of Jaques—but less impatient than the trotting maid, who might remind us of Silvius in the way that she is at the mercy of “love’s keen arrows” (3.5.31). It is likely that Rosalind is coyly anticipating life with Orlando here, for the rich man is implicitly contrasted with the maid impatient to be married. This contrast may remind us of the moment when Rosalind goes to “sigh” until Orlando comes, while Celia, still content with the old friendship, is ready to sleep (4.1.216–18). One may conclude that the joy to be gained from a deep attachment ultimately outweighs its pains by some way, since suffering is greatly reduced in a mature marriage, where loyalty is assured and sexual desire no longer dominates, although the constant need to maintain sympathy will still mean that one frequently has to sacrifice one’s own pleasures, as we have seen.

The last part of the play is used for a more detailed examination of the ways in which moderation and spiritedness can contribute to The Good Life. In the short scene in which Jaques accompanies his fellow lords as they make their triumphant return to the duke after a successful deer hunt, the hunters’ song seems to endorse Touchstone and Jaques’s suspicion that cuckoldry is an inevitable byproduct of our animal nature:

Take thou no sin to wear the horn,

It was a crest ere thou wast born;

Thy father’s father wore it

And thy father bore it. 

     (4.2.13–16)

There is clearly some truth in this sentiment, but it was Jaques who suggested that this song be sung, and Shakespeare chooses this moment to remind us that the latter is extremely unmusical through his comment that it need not matter whether the song “be in tune, so it makes noise enough” (4.2.8–9). Here, as elsewhere, Jaques seems unaware of the power of self-restraint to create harmonious relationships. As ever, Touchstone is contrasted to Jaques in the way he controls his ambition, his sexual desire, and even his wit in order to become a loyal and humble lover, but it is the shepherd Silvius who comes to the fore towards the end of the play, declaring that to love

is to be all made of fantasy,

All made of passion, and all made of wishes,

All adoration, duty, and observance,

All humbleness, all patience and impatience, 

All purity, all trial, all observance.

(5.2.94–98)

Silvius’s apparently contradictory list shows how the immoderate lover must progress towards moderation in order to achieve his goals. His idea of love is contrasted with that expressed in the song of the two pages in the next scene, which advises us merely to “take the present time” (5.3.30). Touchstone comments scathingly on the vapidity of this song, as he did on Orlando’s first poem: “though there was no great matter in the ditty, yet the note was very untuneable” (5.3.34–36). Again the musical metaphor is used to suggest that passion must be controlled in order to be pleasing to one’s audience (or lover). This praise of moderation is absolutely central to the whole work, as we have seen in the portrayal of Celia’s great self-restraint with Rosalind. The story of Silvius’s love for Phebe, a haughty shepherdess, brings out the utter humility of a deep love. Silvius is completely at Phebe’s mercy, anticipating her repeated scorn as the criminal waits for the axe with “humbl’d neck” (3.5.5). When Phebe employs him as a messenger to Rosalind he reflects that his love is “so holy and perfect” that he will

think it a most plenteous crop

To glean the broken ears after the man

That the main harvest reaps.

(3.5.101–03)

Later he runs another errand for Phebe, like a “tame snake” (4.3.70). Moreover Phebe herself falls in love with Rosalind and writes her a humble love letter, even though the latter treats her with extraordinary rudeness (3.5.37–71, 4.3.40–63).

Phebe’s humiliation is typical of the way in which proud spiritedness is contrasted with the true lover’s willingness to sacrifice himself throughout the play. Nevertheless, Shakespeare has implied all along that love brings with it a particular sort of spiritedness, notably in Orlando’s fierce defense of his father’s honor in the opening scene and in his later willingness to steal venison from the banished duke in order to feed Adam; not to mention the reference to “Cleopatra’s majesty” in his song. When Orlando sees his brother being attacked by a lioness,

Twice did he turn his back, and purpos’d so;

But kindness, nobler ever than revenge,

And nature, stronger than his just occasion,

Made him give battle. 

  (4.3.127–30)

Clearly Orlando is still angry with his brother—and his wounded pride is shown to conflict with his deeper ties just in the way that a close reading of the play might lead us to expect—but we have seen that his conventional sense of honor has been gradually weakening throughout the play, and in the end compassion proves to be stronger, creating what one might call a gentle and moderate courage, which stems, not from pride, but from the “stronger nature” of a harmonious soul. The corollary of this is the relative ineffectuality of conventional spiritedness, which is famously demonstrated by Touchstone when he mocks the way in which courtiers twist and turn in elaborate ways in order to avoid direct confrontation, because they “durst not give. . . the Lie Direct” (5.4.86). The courtiers’ code of honor is not underpinned by any deep feeling and so creates a mere show of anger, but love creates a uniquely powerful form of spiritedness, leading us to risk our lives to protect those of our friends.

Spiritedness also plays a very different role in love, however: when Touchstone says to William, his rival for Audrey’s hand, “I will kill thee a hundred and fifty ways: therefore tremble and depart,” his aim is to establish his relationship with Audrey in the first place rather than to protect it (5.1.56–57). His assertiveness reveals that love should at times encompass behavior that is completely opposite to the humble sympathy by which it is more usually characterized. Touchstone explains that in some areas naked self-love must be given its head: “the heathen philosopher, when he had a desire to eat a grape, would open his lips when he put it into his mouth, meaning thereby that grapes were made to eat and lips to open” (5.1.32–36). Touchstone’s second major reference to philosophy acknowledges directly that his thinking on love is firmly based on “heathen” rather than Christian principles. He does not care that William loves Audrey, since “to have is to have”; for “drink, being pour’d out of a cup into a glass, by filling the one doth empty the other” (5.1.40–43). We are reminded that it is the desire to possess that forms the foundation of love: the lover is restrained when with his beloved, but in his behavior towards his rivals shows clearly his healthy love of self. In contrast to Viola in Twelfth Night, Touchstone does not question whether Audrey would be happier with William than with himself, any more than he would worry about the fate of the deer while eating venison. Unlike Jaques and the duke, he understands that it is neither possible nor desirable to transcend self-love completely. 

When Celia and Oliver fall in love at the end of the play, both the comparison of their mutual attraction to “the fight of two rams,” or Caesar’s “thrasonical brag” when he conquered Britain, and its portrayal as “the very wrath of love,” where “clubs cannot part them,” are used to suggest that the theme of this section of the play is the proper spiritedness and “majesty” of love (5.2.30–31, 5.2.40–41). Rosalind’s project of disguising herself as a man, which she approaches with such relish as it allows her to conceal “woman’s fear,” could also be seen as symbolizing her great spiritedness (1.3.119–22). Her immoderate determination to possess Orlando is by no means disguised by the prudence of the methods that she uses to win him. It should be remembered again that Rosalind forgot her grief for her father and disrupted her precious friendship with Celia without a second thought as soon as she met Orlando. The suggestion is that we are all tyrants at the start of a love affair.

At the end of the play Shakespeare sums up on The Good Life. Hymen says that Touchstone and Audrey are as “sure together as winter and foul weather” (5.4.135–36). We may contrast the pageboys’ song, referred to above, where the “sweet lovers love the spring,” focusing only on enjoying “the present time” (5.3.21, 5.3.30). A careful study of the whole play would suggest that these lovers are, despite appearances, less erotic than Touchstone and Audrey, since they fail to realize that it is precisely the endurance of “foul weather” which binds us ever more closely together with ties of sympathy and gratitude. Hymen’s song answers the pageboys’ “ditty” by reminding us of the pervasive appeal of marriage:

O blessed bond of board and bed!

’Tis Hymen peoples every town,

High wedlock then be honored.

Honor, high honor, and renown

To Hymen, god of every town! 

     (5.4.142–46)

Jaques’s belief that Touchstone and Audrey will soon separate shows how he overlooks the nobility of many ordinary marriages, characterized as they are by a sturdy loyalty (5.4.191–92). Surprisingly, however, he does not dismiss out of hand the duke’s anxious plea for him to stay, but for the first time in the play responds to his friendly advances, agreeing to meet him in his cave before retiring to a monastery (5.4.194–96). Jaques’s descent from the contemplative life to the cave reverses the image of the philosopher who leaves the cave in the Republic. Inconsistent to the last, he may in the end, like the characters in Love’s Labour’s Lost, give way to a deep yearning for human companionship and turn away from the contemplative life which he thinks he desires towards the rewards that human society traditionally has to offer. Foremost among these are the ordinary marriages in “every town,” which are given “high honor, and renown” in Hymen’s song, suggesting how crucial Shakespeare considers marriage to be in supporting our real needs (5.4.143–46). The core of The Good Life is thus seen to be available to anyone who can follow their deeper nature. Its attainment therefore depends on a choice between two widely available alternatives rather than on any more rarefied ability to ascend a hierarchy of love. One could, however, overemphasize this egalitarian perspective, for the thorough, mutual understanding that characterizes Rosalind’s relationship with Celia, and the potential depth of her intimacy with Orlando—who, as we have seen, values her wit, beauty, and “majesty” as well as her “modesty” (3.2.144–48)—would be beyond the reach of many happily married couples. 

The traditions, laws, and poetry of particular regimes can clearly be instrumental in confirming the ordinary citizen’s respect for marriage and thus in improving his chances of pursuing a fulfilling life. One critic comments that the “exceptional elaboration” of the play’s conclusion is a sign that it is “informed to an exceptional degree by Shakespeare’s ideal of love’s order,” and notes further the importance of the injunction, addressed in the epilogue to the men in the audience, “that between you and the women the play may please” (line 17), arguing that the play should be seen as a “conjuration,” inviting us to celebrate “love’s harmony.”[13] The slightly unusual preposition “between” in the above quotation indicates Shakespeare’s determination that this play should reinforce the reciprocity of married life for his audience. He wants them to feel the power of Hymen, “god of every town,” as something larger than their own desires—even though the deepest part of their nature yearns for a lasting union anyway—which is why he has the god interrupt authoritatively to “bar confusion” and “make conclusion,” in order to set an official stamp on Rosalind and Orlando’s passion (5.4.125–26). This should be seen as the culmination of his attempt throughout the play to present loyal devotion as admirable.

Conclusion

Friendship, according to Shakespeare, is not for something higher than itself, but is our natural goal whether we know it or not, and one, therefore, that should be pursued without moderation. Rosalind, echoing Bottom in Twelfth Night, says that her “affection hath an unknown bottom, like the bay of Portugal” (4.1.207–08). All other passions should be subordinated to our desire for deep attachments, and the slow build up of gratitude and trust which is the mark of true friendship requires great self-restraint and a radical humility. Even one’s “wit” is best employed in thoroughly understanding one’s need for such attachments, and attempting to transcend the elements in one’s own soul that obstruct one’s search for a true friend. Whereas the philosopher sees himself as harnessing or channelling his self-love, the same ends can be achieved through a thorough habituation in a religious and moral tradition which teaches humility and chastity. Romantic and sexual love can act as a strong catalyst for deep friendships, but in the end The Good Life is characterized by a moderate, continuous joy which outweighs any pains, although painful sacrifices are an inevitable and even ultimately a positive part of any trusting and loyal relationship. The spiritedness of the lover is shown not only in his absolute willingness to risk his life for his friend, but also in the courageous and completely self-assertive way in which he will fight to secure that friend in the first place.

Shakespeare thus rejects both positions in the battle between the ancients and the moderns, because he disagrees with the low value which both sides place on ordinary, intimate attachments. For the modern such attachments can never be noble because under the influence of science everything is seen in terms of our animal drives for sex and self-advancement. Ironically, Allan Bloom—a political philosopher in the Platonic tradition and therefore in one sense a celebrator of Eros—is not far from the modern position when he speaks of “the bourgeois myth of reciprocity,” adding that the “Socratic teaching means from the outset, in spite of the passion, pleasure, and excitement of Eros, it is something of a hopeless business.” Only in philosophy, Bloom maintains, following Plato, can “selfishness and selflessness become for a moment the same.”[14] Thus love between individuals in the Platonic tradition may acquire nobility, but only insofar as it points towards something beyond itself. Shakespeare’s account of what I have called the alchemy of love, on the other hand, aims to defend ordinary, loyal attachments both from Bloom’s bleak high ground and from the reductionism of the moderns by showing how such attachments ultimately require those who are able to live in a way that is thoroughly in accord with their nature to turn away completely from the baser or more tyrannical aspects of that nature. To paraphrase Strauss’s remark in his Preface to Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, Shakespeare does not lose sight of the high, but shows it to partake of the low, in the sense that he takes his bearings by individual attachments in all their transience and imperfection rather than by the immutable realm of ideas.[15]

Perhaps Shakespeare’s use of a setting which has such strong personal significance represents an acknowledgement that a philosopher must base his reasoning about The Good Life upon a prior, intuitive grasp of its excellence which can only be derived from an awareness of his own deepest longings.[16] It is not to descend into relativism, however, to say that one’s idea of what is ultimately fulfilling may be partly influenced or distorted by one’s experiences. Modern attachment theory postulates a system of “attachment behaviour with its own dynamics distinct from the behaviour and dynamics of either feeding or sex, the two sources of human motivation for long widely regarded as the most fundamental.”[17] Here science has been led to a conception of human nature which is at odds with the main tradition of modernism itself, in that the longing for close attachments just for their own sake is seen as being so strong that it often overshadows the baser impulses so much emphasized by the fathers of modernism. 

When thwarted or stunted, it is argued, this yearning can distort our whole way of thinking and feeling. Thus, although Jaques thinks that he has reformed, he still often behaves tyrannically, as we have seen. The duke feels his friend has only superficially shed the “embossed sores” which he acquired in his former life as a “brutish” libertine, so that even though nowadays he undoubtedly wants to “do but good” there is a danger that without meaning to he will still “disgorge” his “evils” even as he is trying to benefit society (2.7.63–69). Shakespeare’s suggestion is that if we are, as it were, reading the world off from our own souls, we must first make sure that they are wholesome and harmonious—by which he means rooted in strong attachments—lest our intuitions regarding human nature be hopelessly skewed. Perhaps one can see clearly that Hymen is the “god of every town” only if able oneself to sense his divinity, at least dimly and intuitively, in the first place. It is significant that Shakespeare draws heavily on the traditional link between deep thought and melancholia in presenting the only purely contemplative character in any of his plays. 

All of this is not to forget Touchstone’s regret at Audrey’s lack of education or the evident enjoyment of philosophical conversations shown by all the more intelligent characters in the play, which clearly suggests that philosophy can become an enjoyable ingredient of The Good Life, even if it is not absolutely essential to it. Indeed, Shakespeare could not have meditated so deeply on these matters were he not himself intensely curious. Nevertheless, as we see even more clearly in Love’s Labour’s Lost, he directly argues against what he sees as an immoderate pursuit of philosophy. Indeed, since Shakespeare’s own name is possibly a corruption of the French name, Jaques Pierre, one could wonder whether the character of Jaques might represent the playwright’s extended reflection on the dangers of one aspect of his own temperament; if so this would again show the uniquely personal nature of this play. One may contrast Shakespeare’s other alter ego, Prospero, who seems to philosophize only a third of the time (see The Tempest, 5.1.312). Living The Good Life is rather more important to Shakespeare than analyzing it, and for him, in contrast to the classical tradition, these two things are not identical, although they can exist in harmony.  


[1] See Allan Bloom with Harry V. Jaffa, Shakespeare’s Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). This approach informs such work as Paul A. Cantor, “Prospero’s Republic: The Politics of Shakespeare’s The Tempest,” in Shakespeare as Political Thinker, ed. John E. Alvis and Thomas G. West (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2000), 241–59; and John E. Alvis, “Shakespeare’s Understanding of Honor,” in Souls with Longing, ed. Bernard J. Dobski and Dustin A. Gish (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011), 3–38.

[2] David Lowenthal, Shakespeare and the Good Life (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 56; and Lowenthal, “Love, Sex and Shakespeare’s Intention in Romeo and Juliet,” in Souls with Longing, 181.

[3] Scott F. Crider, “Love’s Book of Honour and Shame,” in Souls with Longing, 300.

[4] David Bolotin, Plato’s Dialogue on Friendship (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 170.

[5] For precedents see the work of Leo Strauss, especially Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); but see also Michael Murrin, The Veil of Allegory: Some Notes toward a Theory of Allegorical Rhetoric in the English Renaissance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).

[6] All references to the acts, scenes, and lines of the play and to other plays by Shakespeare are to The Riverside Shakespeare, ed. G. Blakemore Evans et al. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997).

[7] G. G. Gervinus, “Shakespeare Commentaries,” in “As You Like It” from 1600 to the Present, ed. Edward Tomarken (London: Routledge, 1997), 294.

[8] Sylvan Barnet, “‘Strange Events’: Improbability in As You Like It,” in Shakespeare: Much Ado About Nothing and As You Like It, ed. John Russell Brown (London: Macmillan, 1979), 171–74.

[9] Similarly, Plato thought that the tyrant would become a philosopher if he properly understood his own desires: see Allan Bloom, Giants and Dwarfs: Essays 1960–1990 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 168.

[10] James Shapiro, 1599: A Year in the Life of William Shakespeare (London: Faber and Faber, 2005), 270–71.

[11] John Russell Brown, “Love’s Order and the Judgment of As You Like It,” in Twentieth Century Interpretations of “As You Like It,” ed. Jay L. Halio (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1968), 81–82.

[12] J. B. Priestley, “The English Comic Actors,” in “As You Like It” from 1600 to the Present, 448, 452–53.

[13] Brown, “Love’s Order and the Judgment of As You Like It,” 74, 87.

[14] Allan Bloom, Love and Friendship (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 410, 500.

[15] Leo Strauss, Preface to Spinoza’s Critique of Religion (New York: Schocken Books, 1965).

[16] Stanley Rosen, Plato’s Statesman: The Web of Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 187.

[17] John Bowlby, A Secure Base: Clinical Applications of Attachment Theory (London: Routledge, 1998), 26.

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Hamlet: The Limits of Constancy

Introduction

If, as I have maintained elsewhere, Shakespeare takes friendship as his summum bonum, then fickleness, bereavement and the various responses to loss become important subjects for philosophical consideration.[i] I will argue that Shakespeare presents a structured exploration of the limits of constancy in Hamlet, in which even minor details may be highly significant. Thus it is the humble Horatio who models the way in which the passionate man should devote himself constantly to his friends, while responding prudently to a mutable world. At first Horatio seems primarily thoughtful: he is generally known to be a “scholar,” and Hamlet sees him as a sceptical materialist who denies that there are any “things in heaven and earth” beyond those which are amenable to “philosophy” (1.1.42, 1.5.166-67).[ii] He writes off Marcellus’s initial reports of a ghost as “fantasy,” saying that he will believe them only when they have received “the sensible and true avouch of [his] own eyes,” and even when he has actually seen the ghost he still addresses it as an “illusion” which is “usurp[ing]” the king’s form (1.1.23, 1.1.127, 1.56-58, 1.1.46-47). When Marcellus associates the ghost with certain Christian superstitions, Horatio drily remarks that he does “in part believe it” (1.1.157-65). Later Horatio’s precise and measured description of the apparition is contrasted with Barnardo’s and Marcellus’s exaggerations (1.2.237-39). 

Horatio is not moved by the proud and spirited sense of honour which drives many of the other characters in the play: he tells Marcellus to attack the ghost only “if it will not stand” and admits freely that the apparition fills him with “fear and wonder,” while unashamedly “trembl[ing] and look[ing] pale” (1.1.140-41, 1.1.44, 1.1.53). In contrast, the elder Fortinbras, then the king of Norway, was “prick’d on by a most emulate pride” to challenge the old King Hamlet to a duel, while the latter, whose ghost has a “martial stalk,” once interrupted “an angry parle” to attack “the sledded Polacks on the ice” (1.1.83, 1.1.62-66). The old kings’ spirited desire for honour has merely initiated a cycle of violence, for we are told that Fortinbras’s son has just “shark’d up a list of lawless resolutes” in a bold attempt to avenge his father’s defeat (1.1.95-104). Horatio, on the other hand, is simply concerned to stabilize the political situation: he attempts to counter Barnardo’s tendency to see the ghost as a “portentous” warning from a dead king, who “was and is the question of these wars,” by presenting the ghost as a mere “mote” in “the mind’s eye” compared to the far more dramatic “harbingers” that foreshadowed the death of Caesar, and reduces the “majestical” and “invulnerable” figure which Marcellus describes to the status of a “guilty thing,” cravenly obedient to the “fearful summons” of “the god of day” (1.1.108-25, 1.1.143-56). Thus, although it seems that Horatio is himself neither honour-loving nor pious, he is prepared to manipulate those who are more prone to feel awe and piety than himself: when Marcellus worries that “something is rotten in the state of Denmark,” he immediately assures him that “Heaven will direct it” (1.4.90-91).

Given Horatio’s prudent concern for political stability, it is particularly surprising that he immediately decides to tell Hamlet about the ghost, since the prince’s volatile reaction might easily have been predicted by such an old friend. In explaining that it is “needful in our loves, fitting our duty” to keep Hamlet informed, he implicitly prioritises the obligations that flow naturally from an intimate relationship over more conventional moral imperatives (1.1.172-73; see also 1.2.222-23). After Hamlet has rushed off in pursuit of the ghost, Marcellus focuses on the “rotten” state of Danish politics, but Horatio is left to fret anxiously about the prince’s state of mind as he “waxes desperate with imagination” (1.4.62-91). Hamlet seems to have invested almost as much as his friend in this unusually trusting and loyal relationship, for when Horatio declares himself to be his “poor servant,” he immediately expresses a wish to “change that name with [him]” (1.2.162-3). Hamlet’s delight in meeting his friend, whom he almost immediately invites to “drink deep,” contrasts sharply with the casual greetings that he offers Barnardo and Marcellus (1.2.165-67, 1.2.175). The prince’s admiration for his “fellow student[‘s]” reliability and commitment to his studies is evident as soon as they meet, while his later reference to his friend’s materialist “philosophy” suggests that he has been admitted fully into Horatio’s intellectual confidence (1.2.169-73, 1.5.166-67). 

Thus in the opening section of the play Shakespeare shows that Horatio discriminates carefully between two spheres: he is benevolent and coolly pragmatic in promoting political stability, but prioritizes his deep attachment to Hamlet above all other concerns. 

Claudius is more purely pragmatic than Horatio, adopting coolly prudent means in order to achieve intensely ambitious ends. Although he claims in his initial speech that his calm reaction to his brother’s death is the result of “discretion [fighting] with nature,” he is of course in reality a cool murderer who is largely unaffected by the intimate attachments which might otherwise interfere with a prudent “remembrance of ourselves” (1.2.5-7). Thus in his opening speech he focuses on the public display of grief rather than the emotional experience, describing the kingdom as “contracted in one brow of woe” (1.2.4). In an elective monarchy the “better wisdoms” of the court have “freely gone with” Claudius’s accession to the throne when Hamlet would have been the more natural choice, probably because they consider him to be better equipped than the prince to deal with the threat of young Fortinbras’s invasion at a time when the state seems “disjoint and out of frame” (1.2.15-21). The wisdom of their decision is immediately underlined as Claudius manages to avoid a war, simply by informing the Norwegian king of the situation and waiting for him to restrain his rash nephew (1.2.26-33, 2.2.60-71). The success of this plan reveals the parallels between the royal families of Norway and Denmark, for in both cases a war-like king has been succeeded by a brother who is prudent rather than passionately or honourably vengeful, but who has to exert himself to control a more hot-headed nephew. While Hamlet’s barely suppressed grief and anger threaten to disrupt the fragile political order, albeit less violently than young Fortinbras’s projected invasion, Claudius’s indifference to his brother’s death and to the code of honour that drove the old king to perpetuate the feud with Norway are precisely what allow him to protect the national interest in a more effective way than either Hamlet himself or his father might have done, perhaps saving hundreds of lives in the process. Without the ghost’s and Hamlet’s interventions it is quite probable that Claudius would have stabilised the fragile political situation in Denmark.

We can see Claudius’s limitations, however, when he attempts to persuade his nephew that “to persever in obstinate condolement is a course… to reason most absurd” because “death of fathers” is a “common theme” of nature (1.2.88-106). Claudius cannot experience the deep joys of true intimacy or feel the commensurate pains of loss, which means that he is unable to comprehend Hamlet’s shocked reaction to his mother’s early remarriage. Whereas the king and his court are ruled by prudent ambition and so have only “the trappings and…suits of woe,” Hamlet’s desperate grief “passeth show” (1.2.85-86). In his fragmented and incoherent opening soliloquy the prince only refers to Claudius and his father in order to highlight his mother’s fickleness (1.2.139-42, 1.2.151-53). His desolation is of course a measure of the strength of his previous attachment to Gertrude: all his life he has been sustained by the simple and natural belief that his mother is as loyally affectionate as he knows himself to be (1.2.143-45). Many in the audience will understand immediately that to lose trust in those whom one loves may be to lose one’s very raison d’etre, so that the whole world will inevitably seem “weary, stale, flat and unprofitable” (1.2.133-34).[iii] Nevertheless, Claudius’s arguments for resigning oneself to a mutable world raise one of the central questions of the play: it would surely be unhealthy for Hamlet to devote himself to his memories of harmonious family life forever, but at what point is it natural to move on and can reason play any role in limiting grief in the way Claudius assumes?

Hamlet is capable of “hold[ing his] tongue,” but it “break[s his] heart” to do so. The brooding sarcasm of his responses to Claudius shows that he is as far from being a pragmatic and restrained politician as the king is from being a loyal and open-hearted lover (1.2.159, 1.2.65-67, 1.2.74). Hamlet’s passionate loyalties frequently lead him to push against the restrictions imposed by his public role, as Laertes implicitly acknowledges when he warns Ophelia to distance herself from him on the grounds that, regardless of the possible sincerity of his current attentions, the prince himself is ultimately “subject to his birth” and only able to marry “with the main voice of Denmark” (1.3.10-44). Laertes’s advice –that romantic attachments fade as “the inward service of the mind and soul grows wide withal”– might have been well judged if applied to a less passionate man, but here it merely highlights Hamlet’s obdurate fidelity and his lack of political ambition (1.3.10-14). It is noticeable that the prince seems completely indifferent to Claudius’s public nomination of him as his heir, and is not prevented by any concern for his political status or responsibilities from directly opposing his uncle’s wish that he should not return to university, but only by his continuing loyalty to his mother (1.2.108-20). Mindful perhaps of the constraints to which Laertes has alluded, Hamlet has stopped short of proposing marriage to Ophelia, but he has made her “almost all the holy vows of heaven” (1.3.113-14). It is likely, however, that he would have seen these private pledges as completely binding had they had been fully reciprocated, for he loves his mistress more than “forty thousand brothers” and has assured her in an ardent poem that his love is as reliable as the sun and the stars (5.1.269-71, 2.2.116-19). 

Ophelia protests only three times when Polonius orders her to end her relationship with Hamlet and thereafter obeys her father completely, but later on in the play she sings as much about jilted love as the death of her father, implying that the loss of “the honey of [Hamlet’s] music vows” is a major factor in her subsequent madness (1.3.99-136, 4.5.23-66, 3.1.155-56). Polonius does not acknowledge her sacrifice, however, or indeed show her any sort of affection. In fact even his request that she should see no more of Hamlet is delivered only as a result of a chance encounter —   as is his famous advice to Laertes, which is given quite casually after the latter has formally taken leave (1.3.52-57, 1.3.88-90). Unlike Laertes, who shows a heartfelt desire to protect his sister’s reputation for her own sake, Polonius is simply worried lest Ophelia will “tender [him] a fool” by allowing herself to be seduced (1.3.33-44, 1.3.109). Whereas Laertes and Ophelia are driven by love and a sense of mutual obligation to correspond regularly, Polonius’s disapproval of borrowing and lending –“for loan oft loses both itself and friend”– shows a complete failure to understand the ways in which gratitude can cement a close friendship (1.3.2-4, 1.3.75-77). As the play unfolds Polonius’s cool concern with his own status is shown to be typical of the political world.

It is significant that the spirited ghost and the chaste Ophelia both conform perfectly to the conventional code of honor as it relates to their respective genders. In both cases their virtue is disruptive, but in almost opposite ways, since the demands of the political and personal worlds are themselves opposite: whereas Ophelia allows her sense of duty to destroy her chance to find fulfilment in a loyal relationship, the noble and spirited insistence of the ghost that Hamlet “remember” his murder threatens to destabilize the reign of a king who has already proved himself to be prudent and efficient. One may infer that, whereas the conventional code of honor seems shallow when compared to a lover’s devotion, it is at the same time too loyally constant to be compatible with the fickle world of politics.

The ghost is, however, passionate as well as honourable: his opening condemnation of Claudius turns out to be no more than a brief preamble to his sad reflections on Gertrude’s inconstancy and her preference for his brother’s “wit and gifts” (1.5.42-57). Although he appears in “complete steel” and “warlike form,” has a “martial stalk” and insists initially that his object is revenge, his central demand is not in fact that Hamlet should kill Claudius, and indeed not necessarily that he should take any sort of violent action at all; rather, he is to prevent the “royal bed” from becoming “a couch for luxury and damned incest…howsomever [he] pursues this act” (1.4.52, 1.1.47, 1.1.66, 1.5.7, 1.5.25, 1.5.82-84). Although he may have been driven from purgatory by the pain of Gertrude’s beyrayal, it is ironic that time and the ghost’s underlying attachment to the queen seem to have moderated any urge he may originally have felt to punish her: his “countenance is more in sorrow than in anger” according to the observant Horatio, and he orders Hamlet not to “contrive against [his] mother aught” (1.2.231-32, 1.5.85-86). His attitude to Gertrude shows that in the long run calm sadness or pity is the natural response to the loss of a beloved, but one can infer from his threatening appearance and initial emphasis on vengeance that he would rather see himself as driven mainly by a fierce desire to punish Claudius than resign himself to such humiliating passivity. Shakespeare draws on the traditional view of unquiet and unpurged spirits to suggest that the ghost’s behavior is unnatural and perverse: not only is his noble anger likely to be politically disruptive, but it conflicts with his own concern for Gertrude’s welfare in the end, since his desire to purify “the royal bed” seems likely hurt the queen as much as the king. In reality, however, the gentle sympathy which he feels for Gertrude constitutes a deeper form of constancy than his spirited determination to remember and punish injustice.

Shakespeare is concerned in act 1 to portray Hamlet as passionate, noble and thoughtful in equal measure. He resembles the ghost himself in that his intense bitterness regarding Gertrude’s behavior overshadows his honourable desire to punish Claudius for usurpation and murder, even though it is the latter motive which officially drives his revenge.[iv] Thus it is no surprise that Hamlet’s first instinct after hearing the ghost’s revelation is to ignore the injunction not to “taint” his mind against the “pernicious” Gertrude, whom the ghost has now exposed as an adulteress (1.5.85-86, 1.5.105).[v] Nevertheless, Hamlet’s austere criticism of the annual revels, which, he maintains, lead Denmark to be “traduc’d and tax’d of other nations,” demonstrates that he too is noble as well as passionate (1.4.18, 1.4.23-38). In this aristocratic society of Christianized Vikings the prince has clearly been brought up to respect proud spiritedness as the key male virtue. Shakespeare uses Hamlet’s critique of the revels to hint for the first time at the artificiality of this noble code, which may condemn “some vicious mole of nature” even though “nature cannot choose his origin” (1.4.24-26). In an effort to conform to the fierce imperatives of this code Hamlet initially attempts to force himself into a violent hatred of Claudius by repeatedly calling him a “villain,” but when the crisis has passed he reveals that his real state of mind is much less spirited, as he broods resentfully on the “cursed spite” that he “was born to set…right” a “time [which] is out of joint” (1.5.106-08, 1.5.188-89). Thus the ghost’s appeal to Hamlet’s sense of shame –he would prove himself to be “duller than the fat weed that roots itself in ease on Lethe wharf” should he “not stir in this”– falls on fertile ground, since the prince’s noble virtue will lead him to feel that he must attempt to punish and reform corruption, regardless of his own natural inclinations (1.5.91-111, 1.5.32-34). Hamlet’s nobility should therefore be seen as a second driving force in his character, completely separate from his passionate reaction to his mother’s disloyalty. 

The third element in Hamlet’s soul is revealed by his request to “go back to school,” which is contrasted with Laertes’s wish to return to France to live the life of a fashionable young gentleman (1.2.112-13, 1.2.50-56; see also 2.1.53-59). Hamlet’s unexpected and bathetic recourse to his “tables” after the ghost has vanished seems more likely to calm him down than psyche him up, while the similes which he uses to express his apparently fierce determination to “with wings as swift as meditation or the thoughts of love…sweep to [his] revenge” remind us of his innate thoughtfulness even as he is consciously determining to act (1.5.107, 1.5.29-31). It is Hamlet’s calculating side which takes over after seeing the ghost with a characteristically dizzying abruptness, as he prudently swears his companions to secrecy while planning to adopt an “antic disposition,” or pretence of madness (1.5.119-80). Whereas Ophelia capitulated to paternal authority and conventional conceptions of honour and duty, Hamlet’s behavior suggests a much more thoughtful, and indeed Horatio-like, determination to mull over his father’s demands.

Overall in act 1 the unusually obtrusive back story that is one of the play’s most distinctive elements invites an audience to wonder whether it would be better to resist change or surrender to it. The ghost’s and Hamlet’s insistence that they will “remember” is imprudent, since such obdurate constancy seems likely to disrupt the reign of an efficient king, but on the other hand Horatio, and indeed Hamlet himself, show a capacity for loyalty that seems deeply endearing, especially when contrasted with the fickle court (1.5.91-104). This contrast implies that the priorities of the political and the personal spheres are absolutely opposed; whereas efficient statesmen seem to be prudently fickle, true lovers are distinguished by their passionate loyalty. Codes of honor or virtue can confuse the two worlds, however, encouraging spirited constancy in politics while discouraging the fidelity of lovers. Horatio, who has no noble principles, models an effective balance between the two spheres, coolly manipulating his acquaintances in order to promote civic order, but in the end prioritizing his relationship with Hamlet even over his political prudence. Polonius of all people summarizes this discriminating approach, albeit in simplistic form, when he advises Laertes not to utter or act on “unproportion’d thought,” but to “grapple” his few “tried” friends to his “soul with hoops of steel,” while remaining merely “familiar, but by no means vulgar” with “each new-hatch’d, unfledged courage” (1.3.59-65). 

In act 1 Shakespeare also introduces an important exception to the lover’s passionate loyalty: one would not have to agree fully with Claudius’s arguments for controlling grief through reason to feel that it might be natural for the “hoops” of friendship to loosen in the course of time after the loss of a beloved through death or inconstancy. The calm pity which the ghost feels for Gertrude represents his natural response, but his insistence that the “royal bed of Denmark” be purified illustrates the tendency of the noble man to override such humiliatingly passive feelings. Not only could the ghost disrupt the state through his noble obduracy, but he tortures himself needlessly when he could have aligned himself with the deeper, gentler constancy of the true lover. All these points are also true of Hamlet’s relationship with Gertrude and so are developed further as the play goes on. Shakespeare presents Hamlet as epitomizing the human capacity for thought, nobility and passion –a “courtier’s, soldier’s, scholar’s eye, tongue, sword”– in order to explore how each of these qualities contributes to, or obstructs, loyal friendship on the one hand and, on the other, the inconstant prudence of the politician (3.1.151). He structures the play around these three qualities, concentrating on passion in act 2, nobility or virtue in act 3 and thought in acts 4 and 5.

Passion

At the start of act 2 Shakespeare expands on the contrasts between the political and the personal spheres, juxtaposing Hamlet’s method of gauging Ophelia’s loyalty, which is to burst indecorously into her room and simply scrutinise her face closely, as if he “would draw it,” with Polonius’s devious plan to assess Laertes’s behaviour in France (2.1.6-65, 2.1.84-88). Whereas Hamlet’s yearning for passionate constancy dictates his direct methods –typically, his disguise, or “antic disposition,” in contrast to the “trappings and the suits” of the court, serves precisely to liberate him from the demands of convention– Polonius’s concern for the status of his family is shown to be compatible with the most unscrupulous strategies. The latter’s habitual, cool detachment is evident in his dispassionate analysis of Hamlet’s fervent love letters, which he reads aloud to the king in order to prove that his daughter is the cause of the prince’s madness (2.2.110-51). He comments only on the style of Hamlet’s love poems, which certainly show more passion than art, and seems unable to speak without using some elaborate rhetorical device. We can see Polonius’s limitations when he dismisses the tragic climax of the Trojan play as “too long” and is merely embarrassed by the way in which the actor has “turn’d his color and has tears in’s eyes” (2.2.498, 2.2.519-20). 

Because of his innate coolness, the fickle world of politics is Polonius’s natural element, as it is Claudius’s. Polonius is dominated by his immoderate ambition, which is both concealed and promoted by a prudent self-restraint that leaves no room for intimate attachments. The mask almost drops at one point, when he becomes obdurately intent on promoting the very match which he earlier forbade Ophelia to contemplate, as soon as he realizes that he might be able to use what he now sees as the prince’s desperate devotion to his daughter to advance his own status (2.1.98-16, 3.1.176-78). His typically disingenuous claim to have forbidden Ophelia to consort with a “prince out of thy star” actually serves to highlight his ambition, for it was in fact Laertes who made this point –and in the process wisely acknowledged that Hamlet could be a serious lover– while Polonius took the prince’s inconstancy for granted and could never bring himself to admit that his daughter’s social inferiority was a factor in the situation (compare 2.2.141-42, 1.3.14-28, 1.3.117-23). 

The differing motives which drive Claudius and Gertrude to employ Rosencrantz and Guildenstern to spy on Hamlet highlight the fundamental disjunction between the personal and the political world. It is clear that the Queen loves Hamlet: she “beseech[es]” these old school friends “instantly to visit [her] too much changed son,” whom she refers to as a “poor wretch,” and shows a sympathetic and guilty understanding that the cause of his madness is “his father’s death and [their] overhasty marriage” (2.2.19-26, 2.2.56-57, 2.2.168). In contrast, the king clearly primes Rosencrantz and Guildenstern to draw the prince out on the issue of thwarted ambition (2.2.252-62). Later the queen’s simple sincerity is contrasted with the machinations of Claudius and Polonius, as she expresses a heartfelt hope that marriage to Ophelia might cure her son’s madness (3.1.37-41). Both Polonius and Claudius use the same pragmatic strategies in their personal relationships as they do in their public life. Polonius’s tactics of tricking his son’s acquaintances into informing against him and using his daughter to expose the causes of the prince’s agitation are echoed in Claudius’s employment of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern to spy on Hamlet and his cunning decision to involve Gertrude in the plan to find a “remedy” for his affliction, while the way in which Claudius disguises his self-protective intentions may remind us of Polonius’s pretense that his matchmaking is motivated by a concern to cure the madness that “all we mourn for” (2.2.17-18, 2.2.146-51). The intense ambition which drives these two characters finds its fulfillment in the political sphere, whereas the prince’s yearning for loyalty and intimacy constantly leads him to behave in a way that clashes with his public role. 

The King’s misreading of Hamlet’s motives may remind us of Polonius’s tendency to “cast beyond” the truth in an overly cautious way, which causes him to ignore the signs that the prince is sincerely attached to his daughter (2.1.110-14). Claudius and Polonius both assume that Hamlet shares their own desire for power and status, whereas in reality it is only in characters like themselves that pride floats free of any moderating codes and attachments, limited only by cautious calculation as to the best means of self-advancement. In fact all three of Hamlet’s main characteristics play a part in rendering him unusually unambitious: his pride manifests itself purely as virtuous nobility and he treats the prestige of high office with witty and increasingly philosophical scepticism; but above all he is too full of an erotic yearning for loyal intimacy to be at all interested in politics (2.2.263-64).

The pious Hamlet, who is himself intransigently constant as we have seen, can only make sense of the fickleness of the court by considering it “more than natural,” perhaps even diabolic, but the truth seems to be that he has simply underrated the extent to which hearts less passionate than his own are swayed by shallower considerations (2.2.366-68). Significantly –and in fact highly unusually for Shakespeare– both of the play’s female characters are relatively passive, while Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are so colourless as to be practically interchangeable (2.2.33-34). One of the elements which gives the play its distinctive character is the large group of well-meaning, yet weak characters who form sincere attachments, but lack true constancy. All three of the key motives that drive the action of the play –namely, honor, passion and prudence– are shown to play a role in distracting such characters from their own deeper loyalties. As we have seen, it is Ophelia’s sense of honor and deference to her father which lead her to break off her affair with Hamlet, while Gertrude is driven to infidelity primarily by the sensual intensity of her attachment to Claudius (1.4.53-57, 3.4.82-95). Most intriguingly, when Rosencrantz cites as his motive for spying on Hamlet his worry that “ten thousand lesser things” would be drawn into “the boist’rous ruin” if the king were to be killed, he is making an entirely prudent point, which I will argue even echoes Shakespeare’s own political teaching as reflected in the Trojan speech, but nevertheless, he too appears abjectly fickle when measured against the standards set by Horatio, who finds himself in exactly the same situation as Hamlet’s old school friends, but remains scrupulously loyal to the prince, regardless of his disruptive behavior (3.3.11-23).

Whatever their individual priorities, Ophelia, Gertrude and Rosencrantz and Guildenstern resemble each other in their passive compliance with the demands of the conventional hierarchies. Rosencrantz’s rueful remark that Claudius and Gertrude could have “put [their] dread pleasures more into command than to entreaty” when asking them to spy on their old school friend suggests that he sees himself –or wishes to see himself– as forced to accede to the royal request, and Guildenstern agrees that they are bound to “obey” an implicit order, although he almost immediately conceals this thought, blandly assuring Claudius that they are throwing themselves wholeheartedly and “freely” into the project (2.2.26-32). In the same way, Ophelia probably sees herself as compelled to obey her father’s orders in full, while Gertrude slides easily into a second marriage, once the “better wisdoms” of the court have approved its political expediency (1.2.15-16). Even though these characters are more complex than the Player King’s cynical analysis of an endemic inconstancy will later suggest, their actions nevertheless support his view that “fortune [leads] love” rather than the reverse: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern “shall receive such thanks as fits a king’s remembrance;” Gertrude’s relationship with Claudius clearly allows her to retain her status as queen; while it would normally be very much in Ophelia’s interest to preserve her reputation for chastity, as Laertes points out (3.2.203, 2.2.25-26, 1.3.29-44). Rather than being abjectly bent on self-advancement, however, these characters simply lack the depth of passion to maintain truly constant relationships and so allow society’s demands and compensations to override their personal attachments in a more or less passive manner. 

Nevertheless, these shallower characters are still swayed by their deeper feelings, even though they attempt to override them: in the end Ophelia regrets bitterly her decision to reject her lover, comparing herself to the “baker’s daughter” who was turned into an owl for spurning Christ’s offer of bread, while Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are shamed into “a kind of confession in [their] looks” when Hamlet discovers their duplicity and appeals to the “obligation of our ever-preserv’d love” (4.5.42-43, 2.2.278-92). Gertrude “lives almost by [Hamlet’s] looks” and has probably been plagued by guilt regarding the “black and grained spots” of her adulterous affair and “o’erhasty marriage” right from the start of the play, when the ghost astutely urged the prince to leave her to the “thorns that in her bosom lodge,” which “prick and sting her” (4.7.11-12, 3.4.89-91, 2.2.56-57, 1.5.87-88). Even Claudius himself shows in the end that he is unable to ignore his deeper ties completely, as he rushes from the play in order to pray for forgiveness for having committed an act which he acknowledges is instinctively repulsive or “rank,” since it has “the primal eldest curse upon’t” (3.2.265-70, 3.3.36-38). All these characters pay a heavy emotional price for turning away from their deeper sympathies and attachments. If one contrasts them with Horatio, who, as we shall see, is ultimately rewarded for his loyalty by gaining Hamlet’s complete trust, one can find the radical implication that sensual passion, honourable virtue and even prudent thought are only truly valuable insofar as they can regulated by, and subordinated to, an intransigent determination to remain constant to one’s intimate friends in the face of all dangers and temptations. 

Hamlet confronts Rosencrantz and Guildenstern directly and, once they have confessed to spying, he rewards them with an honest, if incomplete, account of his depression (2.2.293-308). Hamlet is not naïve, but his priorities are simply not political: his measured account of his own sadness allows the audience to contrast the prince’s world of deep and enduring feeling with the fickleness of the court, who “would make mouths at [Claudius] while [Hamlet’s] father liv’d,” but who now “give twenty, forty, fifty, a hundred ducats a-piece for his picture in little” (2.2.363-66). At the same time the calm coherence of this speech suggests that his initial shock and grief have by now naturally subsided into a more distanced sadness, where he is no longer yearning for “self-slaughter,” but has merely “lost all…mirth, forgone all custom of exercises” (2.2.295-97; compare 1.2.129-32). This relative calmness is more to do with the passage of time than any deliberate attempt at self-restraint along the lines advocated by Claudius: Hamlet is aware that “there is nothing good or bad, but thinking makes it so,” and that man is in reality “noble in reason…infinite in faculties,” but these insights do nothing to lessen his current conviction that humanity is a mere “quintessence of dust” (2.2.249-51, 2.2.303-08). 

Not only Hamlet would have to fire himself up artificially to keep his promise to the ghost, but such noble constancy would seem deeply incongruous with a political world which is ruled by ambition and prudence (1.5.95-104). As the act progresses, there are growing signs that the young prince himself is reflecting on the impracticality of his vow to take revenge: the odd phrasing of his prediction that the popular young actors who are threatening to supersede the older group who have just arrived in Elsinore “exclaim against their own succession,” because their own voices will eventually also break, seems to hint at the risks involved in killing Claudius, since revenge would be seen as usurpation and so would be likely to destabilize the monarchy (2.2.338-44). 

The speech that Hamlet now asks to hear addresses the same themes, but in a particularly oblique way, for the prince’s comment that it was only valued by the few with real judgement, and was “set down with as much modesty as cunning” –so much so in fact that “it was never acted, or if it was, not above once”– may be taken as a hint that there are strong reasons at this point for proceeding with the argument indirectly (2.2.434-40). The lines which Hamlet has the actor recite deal with the siege of Troy; surely the most famous example of a military action inspired purely by passion and honor. The play portrays Pyrrhus as a villain rampaging around Troy with his “black complexion smear’d …with blood of fathers, mothers, daughters, sons,” even though his determination to seek vengeance is entirely honourable (2.2.450-64). He finds Priam, the Trojan king, but “in rage strikes wide,” at which point the city topples to the ground, “seeming to feel this blow,” thus distracting Pyrrhus with the “hideous crash” from his assault on the old king, so that his sword “seem’d i’ th’ air to stick,” and he himself, “as a painted tyrant,” or, “like a neutral to his will and matter, did nothing” (2.2.468-82). If, as appears likely, Hamlet is implicitly comparing himself to Pyrrhus as he hesitates before avenging an act of adultery, the image of a ruined Troy must surely hint at a very natural reluctance on his part to cause a civil war in Denmark for the sake of a personal vendetta. 

Hamlet has good cause to worry about the fragility of the political situation, for we learn later that Claudius himself has been forced to refrain from punishing his nephew for Polonius’s murder because he is so “lov’d of the distracted multitude” that they would blame “th’offender’s scourge” and “never the offense” (4.3.3-7). This implies that those who see the prince as “the glass of fashion and the mould of form” still resent the way in which he has been denied the throne (3.1.153). One may infer from Fortinbras’s assumption that the state is “weak…disjoint and out of frame” because of old Hamlet’s death, not to mention from the ease with which even Laertes is able to drum up support for a “rebellion [that] looks so giant-like” in order to avenge Polonius’s death, that Denmark is in danger of splitting into a number of factions (1.2.20, 4.5.122). As we have seen, when Rosencrantz compares the king to a “massy wheel” with “huge spokes…which when it falls, each small annexment, petty consequence, attends the boist’rous ruin,” concluding that “never alone did the King sigh, but with a general groan,” he is making precisely the same point as the Trojan speech, as interpreted above, and indeed using almost the same metaphor of a general “ruin” to portray the political repercussions of regicide (3.3.17-23). 

The Trojan speech also hints at another argument for restraint, which has nothing to do with politics. If the above interpretation of the Trojan play is correct, then the moving description of Hecuba mourning her husband –sufficiently pitiful to make “milch the burning eyes of heaven”– suggests that Hamlet’s real attitude to Gertrude is by now as moderate and sympathetic as that of the ghost (2.2.513-18). In the first two acts, in direct contrast to the rest of the play, Hamlet treats inconstancy gently. Even early on in the play, when there is no doubt that he is shocked and revolted by his mother’s fickleness, he promises that he will “in all [his] best obey” her when she asks him not to go back to university, and he merely sighs sadly in his silent visit to Ophelia’s chamber, rather than blaming her for her infidelity (1.2.120, 2.1.91-93). He makes a typically direct, emotional appeal to Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, “conjur[ing]” his old friends –to whom there is no-one “he more adheres”– “by the rights of our fellowship, by the consonancy of our youth, by the obligation of our ever-preserv’d love” to be honest with him and admit that they “were sent for,” and, after he has forced them to confess their mission, even feeds them just enough information to ensure that they stay in Claudius’s favor (2.2.20-21, 2.2.283-86, 2.2.293-95). 

In act 2 Shakespeare concentrates on the gulf between the passionate man and a fickle, political world. Whereas politicians and weaker or cooler characters who surrender themselves to inconstancy thrive in this world, albeit at the expense of their own “heart’s core,” the passionate man prioritizes his deep attachments, but may therefore approach politics in an imprudently direct and open manner. Hamlet’s interest in the play shows, however, that he has sympathies which run deeper than his spirited concern for justice: he requests the Trojan play not only because it is “passionate,” but also because it is “set down with as much modesty as cunning” (2.2.432-45). Deep attachments contain their own moderating principle, while the considered response of the passionate soul to a fickle political world is compassionate.

Nobility

Shakespeare uses the two major soliloquies which follow the Trojan speeches to shift the focus of his argument from passionate to noble constancy. Although Hamlet’s assertion that the player would “drown the stage with tears,…cleave the general ear with horrid speech” and “appall the free, confound the ignorant,” if he had his own “motive…for passion,” does come close for the first and last time in the play to acknowledging openly the potentially explosive repercussions of any direct action against Claudius, this insight is almost completely overshadowed by the prince’s explicit aim in the soliloquy, which is to shame himself into taking revenge by contrasting his own “dull and muddy-mettled” behaviour with the noble eloquence of the actor (2.2.560-87). On this overt level he presents the situation to himself as a simple test of his manly honor, equivalent to being called a “villain,” or being “tweak[ed] by the nose,” even though he must know that Claudius would never respond to a direct challenge (2.2.571-75). Again he attempts to work himself up artificially into a state of mind in which he can take decisive action, as he did immediately after seeing the ghost: “remorseless, treacherous, lecherous, kindless villain” (2.2.581). The baffled and exasperated way in which he wonders whether he is “pigeon-livered and lack[ing] gall” shows the power of the gentlemanly code to alienate Hamlet from his own real feelings, rendering his prudent compassion too shameful to be acknowledged (2.2.576-77). Nevertheless, the fact that he uses an actor’s speech to illustrate honourable conduct seems to imply an acknowledgement on his part that a noble man might have to “force his soul” to create an artificial “dream of passion” and “all for nothing” (2.2.550-60). Whereas we have seen that the deepest passions are innately moderate, honor prides itself on its intransigent spiritedness.

Towards the end of the soliloquy Hamlet abandons his extravagant self-castigation with characteristic abruptness and develops a thoughtful plan to use the players to prove, or even flush out, Claudius’s guilt (2.2.588-605). He gives no reason here for not having already “fatted all the region kites with this slave’s offal,” but by changing the subject makes a silent admission that the situation cannot be resolved by the simple duel for which his upbringing has prepared him (2.2.579-80). Since he has shown no previous sign of doubting the ghost, it seems likely that Hamlet’s plan is mainly designed to allow him to procrastinate with a good conscience, while at the back of his mind he is clearly hoping that it might even enable him to avoid taking any sort of direct action, since Claudius might become one of those who “have proclaim’d their malefactions” when they have seen them represented in a “cunning…scene” (2.2.588-94). Again, however, the prince’s shame at his own inaction leads him to keep this possibility in the background and present the plan primarily as a way of testing the ghost’s story before taking revenge in the most straightforwardly noble manner: “if ‘a do blench, I know my course” (2.2.597-98). These ambiguities, which characterize all of Hamlet’s remaining soliloquies, show how his code of honor leads him to censor his real thoughts.

In the “to be or not to be” speech Hamlet treats the subject of suicide in a much more measured way than in his first soliloquy, where he expressed a truly desperate yearning for “self-slaughter” (1.2.129-32). As with the previous soliloquy, he focuses on virtuous rather than passionate motives for action: his question is whether it would be “noblerto take arms” [my italics] against his own life than simply “to suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune” (3.1.55-59). In the end the prince chooses prudent passivity over spirited virtue, but at the same time, with characteristic deference to his noble code, blames himself for allowing “enterprises of great pitch and moment [to] turn awry and lose the name of action” through being “sicklied o’er by the pale cast of thought” (3.1.82-87). Here Hamlet’s portrayal of self-destruction as an example of ‘healthy,’ virtuous action opposing the ills of the world seems odd to say the least, since suicide would of course only “end” Hamlet’s feeling that he is shamefully inactive, while the “sea of troubles” itself would continue unabated. The soliloquy implies, however, that this might also be true of more conventionally noble attempts to oppose corruption, since “the oppressor’s wrong, the proud man’s contumely, the pangs of despis’d love…the spurns that patient merit of th’unworthy take” clearly constitute an overwhelming “sea” of corruption and inconstancy, which would be unaffected by the actions of any individual, however virtuous (3.1.70-73). On the deepest level of the play I would therefore argue that Hamlet’s putative revenge is used to illustrate what one might call the narcissism of virtue: for the noble man any action, however futile or destructive, which makes him feel that he is “tak[ing] arms” against injustice is preferable to shameful passivity.[vi]

The indirectness of this soliloquy is typical of the moments when the prince comes closest to analysing his own inaction: Hamlet distances both himself and the audience from the issues raised in the Trojan speech, not only by using the classical analogy, but literally, by inviting the player to recite it, while in the “rogue and peasant slave” soliloquy we have seen that the prince’s scornful attitude to his own prudent thoughts leads him to relegate them to a subversive undercurrent, running directly counter to the stream of self-criticism that dominates the soliloquy (2.2.550-87). The ambiguous analogies of suicide and acting help Shakespeare to conceal his thought. The fact that revenge is not the explicit subject of the third soliloquy at all means that the arguments against “taking arms” to punish Claudius which presumably parallel Hamlet’s fear of the afterlife are never clarified. Although unusually direct –albeit under the cover of the suicide analogy– in favoring cautious inaction, this soliloquy resembles the previous one in that “the native hue of resolution” is made to seem much more attractive than “the pale cast of thought” even as it is rejected in the argument (3.1.56-59, 3.1.82-87). Shakespeare’s underlying implication that it would be wiser simply to “suffer” the murder of one’s father is bound to offend against any standard of justice, whether modern or Elizabethan. Reluctant, no doubt, to provoke his audience, or to criticize in any explicit way codes which in many contexts help to promote social stability, Shakespeare uses Hamlet’s attempts to repress his prudent thoughts to conceal his own deeper meaning.

Whereas we have seen that time and compassion have moderated the passionate grief which oppressed Hamlet most intensely at the start of the play, his noble code almost defines itself by its obdurate rigidity and explicitly opposes “the pale cast of thought” as unhealthily timorous (3.1.82-84). Since Hamlet presents suicide as just one example of noble action, the implication is that he might eventually feel duty bound to “take arms” against corruption in a more conventional manner, as he becomes progressively more ashamed of his inaction. This would be constancy writ large as a moral or political end, since it would involve not only punishing “th’oppressor’s wrong” but presumably even avenging “the pangs of despis’d love…and the spurns that patient merit of th’unworthy takes” (3.1.70-73). Taken together, the second and third soliloquies suggest that Hamlet’s noble principles are too deeply instilled to be easily resisted. In act 3 Shakespeare goes on to show the disruptive effects of the prince’s virtue.

Hamlet’s response to Ophelia, whom he encounters immediately after his soliloquy, should be divided into three stages. He greets her gently at first, asking to be remembered in her prayers; then responds with understandable anger when she attempts to return his gifts; and finally, almost certainly after realizing that Polonius and the king are eavesdropping, curses her with a startling vehemence (3.1.88-89, 3.1.102-14, 3.1.129-46). I would suggest that his first two responses are sincerely passionate, but that the third is deliberately manufactured as part of his “antic disposition.” The cruelty of Hamlet’s curse, which clearly hurts Ophelia deeply, represents a radical change of approach, indicating that the prince is prepared to prioritize his noble mission over his real feelings (3.1.150-61). His nobility is highly imprudent as well as inhumane, since it is his decision to goad Claudius by predicting that “all but one” of those currently married “shall live” which prompts the king to develop a typically cool and efficient plan to have him sent to England to be killed (3.1.148-49, 3.1.167-70).[vii]

Although Hamlet is driven to attack Ophelia so vehemently, his real state of mind is implied by his advice to the actor: “in the very…whirlwind of your passion, you must acquire and beget a temperance that may give it smoothness” (3.2.5-8). In a long and important eulogy of Horatio, he praises the way in which his friend’s “blood and judgment are so well co-meddled, that [he is] not a pipe for Fortune’s finger to sound what stop she please,” which means that “in suff’ring all [he] suffers nothing,” and so avoids becoming “passion’s slave” (3.2.66-72). “Suff’ring” is now redefined as deliberate stoicism; an attitude adopted by the wise man to preserve his equanimity in a corrupt and inconstant world. Horatio is not, however, coolly fickle like Polonius or Claudius: his “judgment” does not rule his “blood,” but is “so well co-meddl’d” with it as to enable him to distinguish and cultivate potential friends, even as he holds himself aloof from his more superficial acquaintances (3.2.68-69). Hamlet’s intimacy with Horatio, which grows steadily in a world where almost every other passion seems to fade, shows friendship to be a solid and lasting good, capable of fulfilling our deepest longings. His decision, made when his soul could first “distinguish her election,” to “wear” Horatio “in [his] heart’s core, ay, in [his] heart of heart” is based on a careful –and indeed accurate– judgement of his friend’s character as exceptionally “just” (3.2.63-65, 3.2.73, 3.2.54-5). It is in the context of such a friendship, and in this context alone, that complete fidelity is not only natural but essential. The true tragedy of the play is that Hamlet could have found fulfilment in this enclave of constancy, but is driven instead to engage with a fickle world.

The dialogue between the Player King and the Player Queen allows Shakespeare to focus directly on the discussion of the limits of constancy which underlies the play. The Player King tells his wife that, despite her vows to the contrary, she will disengage from him easily when he dies, since society is ruled by prudent self-interest rather than passion, while such genuine attachments as do exist are intrinsically fleeting; the “passion ending doth the purpose lose,” just as “mellow” fruit “fall[s] unshaken” from the tree (3.2.188-209). One cannot dismiss the Player King’s meditations: not only does he describe the fickle world of the court accurately, but there are similarities between his position and that of Horatio, who “suffers all,” and indeed that of Hamlet himself, who has, as we have seen, more than half a mind simply to endure an overwhelming “sea” of injustice and ingratitude rather than attempting to reform society. The king may be right about society in general, but he surely underrates the constancy of true lovers, for, unlike Gertrude, the dumb show queen makes “passionate action” when she “finds the king dead” and responds in a “harsh and unwilling” manner to the blandishments of his poisoner (see the stage directions which follow 3.2.135). Although the Player Queen is also faithful, it appears that she is overrating her own ability to remain constant after her husband’s death when she makes her great oath of loyalty, since she does eventually accept the murderer as her lover (3.2.175-85, 3.2.216-233, 3.2.263-64). The idealistic queen has, I would suggest, failed to reckon with the fact that her fidelity has always been rooted in the actual experience of love. This does not demonstrate that all passions are fleeting or that “fortune [leads] love” in the play as a whole, for not only is Horatio as faithful as the Player Queen, but Hamlet’s own loyalty to his lowly friend is, as he points out, completely unaffected by considerations of “pomp” or “thrift” (3.2.203, 3.2.56-62). Rather, the suggestion is that after the death of a beloved the intensity of even the truest lover’s loyal attachment will eventually fade in some measure, however deeply he mourns his loss. 

Shakespeare presents attempts to perpetuate loyalty beyond this natural limit as motivated by honourable virtue rather than passion: Hamlet’s own determination to use the play within the play to trigger his mother’s guilt is a case in point, since he seems to have decided that the noblest option is to remain loyal to a memory of close knit family life and to attempt to force Gertrude to do the same, even though there is evidence, not just in the Hecuba speech but, I will argue, throughout act 3, that his original grief and anger are now giving way to a calm pity (3.2.181, 3.2.224, 3.2.229-31). The implication is that the passionate and thoughtful man should steer a course between the Player King’s cynical resignation to a pervasive fickleness and his queen’s noble protestations of enduring love, allowing his own innate qualities of “blood and judgment” to determine the extent of his constancy. Thus Horatio combines absolute loyalty to his friend with a cool, pragmatic approach to an inconstant world and, as I shall argue later, an unsentimental recognition that Hamlet’s death brings all his obligations to the prince to an abrupt end. In act 3, in contrast with Horatio, Hamlet nobly refuses to resign himself either to personal loss or to society’s pervasive fickleness, although the fact that he requests –and indeed helps to write– a play in which the arguments for thoughtful “suff’ring” are given their full weight suggests that a part of him still doubts the value of his own virtuous constancy (2.2.540-45). 

As one might expect, Horatio does not share his friend’s exultation when the play within the play has proved Claudius’s guilt; in fact his only responses are to point out that the plan has been no more than “half” a success (perhaps because Claudius stopped short of revealing his guilt publicly, thus obviating the need for direct action on Hamlet’s part) and that he has failed to complete the rhyme in his impromptu poem comparing the king to a peacock –a traditional emblem of pride and lust (3.2.275-85). The latter criticism is implicitly directed at Hamlet’s moralizing approach, since the expected rhyme-word, which is clearly “ass” rather than “peacock,” would have implied that Claudius should be mocked as a fool rather than condemned as a knave.[viii]

When Hamlet refrains from killing Claudius as he prays, the pretext he offers for rejecting the opportunity –that murdering him at this point might represent “hire and salary, not revenge” since it might lead to his “salvation” in Heaven– seems designed to appear honourably vengeful rather than prudent, but in fact the savage vindictiveness of the thought serves to reduce the revenge ethic to absurdity (3.3.89-95). Although the moral stance which Hamlet adopts contrasts sharply with Horatio’s detachment, it is significant that his actual behavior is fairly restrained. His deeply ambivalent attitude to revenge is implied in his presentation of himself as a Pyrrhus-like warrior, who strikes at “witching time,” and “drinks hot blood,” and in his insistence during the performance of the play within a play that the poisoner is the king’s nephew, rather than his brother as one might have expected (3.2.388-92, 3.2.244).[ix]  

Hamlet is less passionate than he seems when he confronts his mother: he has hesitated for months before speaking to her and, in contrast with his abrupt appearance in Ophelia’s chamber earlier in the play, he allows himself to be passively summoned to the queen’s closet (3.2.128, 3.1.180-83, 3.2.311-12). Just before launching his verbal assault on his mother, Hamlet prays that his “heart” should not “lose [its] nature,” so that he is “cruel, [but] not unnatural” (3.2.393-95). What follows is typically ambiguous:

            I will speak daggers to her, but use none.

            My tongue and soul in this be hypocrites—

            How in my words somever she be shent,

            To give them seals never my soul consent. (3.2.396-99)

At first one assumes that Hamlet’s “soul” is possessed by a real desire to “use” the daggers and therefore that his hypocrisy stems from an unnatural self-restraint, but this is to ignore the fact that he has twice spoken of his nature as a moderating influence. Moreover, if this initial assumption is correct, then Hamlet would be employing “soul” in two opposite senses in the same sentence, for when the word recurs in such a curiously awkward manner it seems to refer to his moderate nature. As is usual in Hamlet’s soliloquies the less spirited meaning is the one that should be pursued: rather than seeing the prince as finally venting his intense pain in the closet scene and only just stopping short of a physical assault on Gertrude, I will argue that we should think of him as deliberately reinvigorating his residual grief and anger, while ignoring his sympathetic “nature.” His actions could be seen as prudently honourable, since, if he manages to shame Gertrude into avoiding his “uncle’s bed,” he will have kept his promise not to let “the royal bed of Denmark be a couch for luxury,” while avoiding the disruptive consequences of a violent revenge (1.5.82-83, 3.4.157-70). 

It is Hamlet’s reaction to the sudden reappearance of the ghost which provides the crucial evidence that his motives in this scene are primarily noble rather than passionate. When the ghost appears, now wearing a night-gown rather than armor, he announces that his “visitation is but to whet [Hamlet’s] almost blunted purpose” –presumably to exact a violent revenge– but in reality it is clear that he has chosen to intervene at this moment to protect Gertrude, for after this vague opening remark he focuses in detail on the queen’s confusion, begging the prince to show compassion for her “fighting soul” (3.4.103-14). Ironically, it is the ghost who prioritizes his love for Gertrude over his proud indignation at this point in the play, even at the expense of interfering with Hamlet’s attempt to fulfil his promise, while the prince himself clings obdurately to his noble purpose. Hamlet sheds light on his own behavior, not just in this scene but throughout act 3, when he begs the ghost not to “convert [his] stern effects,” so that what he has “to do will want true color –tears perchance for blood,” since he implies here that his “color” of anger has been adopted as a deliberate strategy and maintained with some effort in order to shame his mother out of her inconstancy, when he would rather weep with compassion (3.4.127-30). Later in the scene he tells the queen that he “must be cruel to be kind” (3.4.178). All this suggests that the current manifestation of the ghost, which is visible only to the prince, may simply be a symptom of Hamlet’s own suppressed compassion (3.4.131-39). 

Thus, as one of the play’s most astute critics puts it, “Hamlet’s tragedy is indeed the forced triumph of filial duty over sensitivity to his own heart.”[x] The closet scene offers further evidence that the prince now conceives of himself as on a “stern” moral mission to lambast what he goes on to call “the fatness of these pursy times” (3.4.153). This mission is dictated by his virtuous principles, which drive him to work his passions up artificially beyond their natural pitch and forbid him the relief that tears would bring, even though his real attitude to his mother is by now similar to that of the ghost. Ironically, Hamlet’s intense sensitivity to shame, evident here in his immediate assumption that the ghost has come “his tardy son to chide,” will lead him to feel that his current strategy is not sufficiently vengeful, even though one might infer from Claudius’s later reflections on the way in which “time qualifies the spark and fire of [love]” that he has succeeded in driving a wedge between the royal couple and so fulfilled his promise (3.4.106-08, 4.7.111-18). 

Even this relatively prudent and moderate achievement could be seen as needlessly destructive, however. Hamlet merely triggers a dormant guilt in Gertrude, reminding her of “black and grained spots” which she acknowledges “will not leave their tinct,” rather than forcing her, as he affects to believe, into an artificially rigid determination to “assume a virtue, if [she] have it not,” and to use “custom” to “change the stamp of nature” (3.4.89-91, 3.4.160-68). Gertrude makes real attachments, but lacks sufficient depth of passion to remain absolutely loyal: she says that her son has “cleft [her] heart in twain” and for the rest of the play she does indeed show a dual allegiance, devoting herself with an equal degree of desperate determination to defending her husband and to keeping the secret of her son’s sanity (3.4.156, 4.5.129, 4.1.7-12, 5.1.284-88, 4.1.24-27, 3.4.181-88, 3.4.197-99). Hamlet’s tirade leaves her in a state of constant panic, convinced that her soul is “sick” (4.5.17-20).This shows the futility, and indeed cruelty, of Hamlet’s attempts to reform characters who simply lack the depth of passion to align themselves fully with the demands of their own heart. Moreover, in attempting to treat the fickleness of his beloved mother as if it were a moral issue he has allowed abstract principles of justice to alienate him from his own “heart’s core,” where truly intimate attachments create enduring mutual needs. He prevents himself from crying with some difficulty after the ghost’s intervention, as we have seen, and only acknowledges his desire for reconciliation right at the end of the scene: “when you are desirous to be blest, I’ll blessing beg of you” (3.4.171-72). 

When Hamlet stabs Polonius as he is hiding behind the arras in his mother’s room, he is clearly hoping to kill the king in direct response to a shameful act of espionage (3.4.26). However, the extreme imprudence of this sort of noble action becomes evident when it emerges that in the current political climate even Polonius’s death is nearly enough to cause a civil war (4.5.112-22). Hamlet’s unnaturally cold reaction to his death is of the same calibre as his recent treatment of Gertrude and Ophelia: he merely says that he will “lug the guts into the neighbour room,” while summing Polonius up, again in moral terms, as a “knave,” albeit a “foolish prating” one (3.4.215). He sees his killing of Polonius as justified, not only by the code of honor, but by the mission that “heaven hath pleas’d…to punish [him] with,” in which he must play the role of God’s “scourge and minister” (3.4.173-75). Hamlet’s religious faith has been a feature of his character from the start of the play, when he contrasted his own belief in the supernatural with Horatio’s materialistic “philosophy” (1.5.166-7). Several of his soliloquies reveal his belief in an afterlife, at least in the first half of the play, while he habitually uses religious language when castigating Gertrude and Ophelia (1.2.131-32, 3.1.59-81, 3.3.79-86, 3.1.120-49, 3.4.76-84, 3.4.161-72). In the closet scene, however, as in the play as a whole, Shakespeare keeps his criticism of Hamlet’s piety and sense of honor indirect, and thus allows many in his audience to welcome the prince’s belated decision to “take arms” against a pervasive fickleness.

Hamlet’s next encounter with Rosencrantz and Guildenstern again illustrates the futility, and indeed cruelty, of attempts to judge innately weak characters by the highest standards. Whereas Hamlet seemed straight-forwardly warm-hearted earlier in the play when he appealed to “the rights of [his] fellowship” with his old school friends, he now he dismisses his conversation with them as a “trade” and scorns Rosencrantz’s appeal to their former friendship in a way that seems calculated to humiliate him (2.2.283-88, 3.2.334-36). The sharp contrast between these two conversations shows how Hamlet’s natural responses have been distorted by his noble principles over the course of the play. Ironically, the prince adapts the pipe image which he previously used to convey his respect for Horatio’s stoical self-control to express his scorn (3.2.350-72, 3.2.68-71). Hamlet, it seems, can avoid becoming “passion’s slave,” but his nobility is more obdurately persistent and less amenable to thoughtful restraint than his passion. Despite showing a clear understanding that the king is exerting pressure on his old school friends, the prince still condemns them as “adders fang’d,” just as he attacked Ophelia even though he knew that she was acting on Polonius’s orders (2.2.293-95, 3.4.203, 2.2.181-86, 2.2.403-12). If one compares his conversations with Ophelia and Gertrude, one can see that he becomes increasingly harsh during act 3 as he strives to demonstrate his own nobility.

Shakespeare has shown in act 3 that Hamlet’s noble and pious principles drive him to retain an artificial bitterness long after he should have allowed his “purpose… [to] fall unshaken” like “mellow” fruit (3.2.188-91). Whereas it is in the nature of intimate attachments to demand high standards of loyalty, these standards are shown to be too rigorous to be of any use in regulating a fickle society. 

Thought

The play’s examination of constancy and its limits is structured around Hamlet’s three key characteristics: having focused on passion in the first two acts and honor in the third, Shakespeare concentrates in the last two acts on thought itself. Having shown that passionate constancy is alien to the political world in the second act, Shakespeare now reverses his emphasis, highlighting the efficiency of prudent politicians who are unfettered either by noble scruples or passionate attachments. At the start of act 4 we are shown Claudius’s prudent ability to anticipate the opinions of “the distracted multitude,” which loves Hamlet to such an extent that “the offender’s scourge [would be] weigh’d” rather than “the offense” were he to try to punish the prince for the murder of Polonius (4.3.4-7). The reasons for Claudius’s delay are revealed to be similar to Hamlet’s own as implied in the Trojan speech, for the king confesses to Laertes that his hands have been tied, not only by the threat of civil war but by his love for Gertrude, who “lives almost by [Hamlet’s] looks” (4.7.11-25). These parallels provide further evidence that Hamlet’s delays are sensible, since the prudent Claudius is nothing if not an effective politician. 

In the end, however, Claudius’s ultimate priorities are of course very different from Hamlet’s: he overrides his concern for Gertrude’s feelings, developing a plan to dispose of his nephew in an indirect manner calculated to preserve political stability, simply by sending him to England to have him killed, and ultimately even allows his wife to drink poison rather than revealing his complicity in the plan to murder the prince (4.3.58-68, 5.2.290). Claudius illustrates the pragmatic insincerity of the political world when he dignifies the king of England’s fear of the “Danish sword” as “love” and disguises his own prudent inconstancy as loyal patriotism, declaring that Hamlet’s “liberty is full of threats to all, to you yourself, to us, to everyone” (4.3.58-61, 4.1.14-15). In contrast, the loyal and idealistic prince has come to be considered too “dangerous” to be allowed to remain in Denmark in such divided and “distracted” times, not just by Claudius, but also by his “wisest friends;” presumably the “better wisdoms” who had earlier supported Claudius’s claim to the throne over Hamlet’s (4.1.38-39, 4.3.1-11, 1.2.14-16). 

Hamlet’s philosophical nature comes to the fore in the last part of the play. His four main soliloquies show the structure of Shakespeare’s argument, since the first focuses on passion, the second and third on nobility and the fourth, concerning Fortinbras, on thought itself (1.2.129-59, 2.2.550-87, 3.1.87, 4.4.32-46). In the latter soliloquy the initial assumption seems to be that “godlike reason” must express itself in pious and honourable action, but Hamlet then admits that thought “quartered hath…ever three parts coward” and even notes that this leaves “one part wisdom” (4.4.38-43).[xi] The prince drily mocks those who are “puff’d” with “divine ambition” in his portrayal of Fortinbras’s assault on an insignificant piece of disputed ground in Poland, which is undertaken for “no cause without,” but simply to vent his noble desire to avenge his father’s death, and is likely to end in the “death of twenty thousand men,” who will die “for a fantasy and trick of fame” (4.4.49, 4.4.25-29, 4.4.60-62). Hamlet’s foregrounded aim in the soliloquy is to present Fortinbras’s very irrationality (and by implication his own) as a guarantee of nobility –he is willing to dare all “for an egg-shell” or “a straw when honor’s at the stake”– but from another perspective the prince’s emphasis on the insignificance of the disputed territory highlights the wanton destructiveness of the campaign (4.4.48-56). Hamlet himself draws the parallel to his own mission, and the oddness of his phrasing when he refers to “a father kill’d, a mother stain’d” as “excitements of…reason” serves to reinforce the point that spirited anger is rarely rational. 

The three major soliloquies on the subject of nobility are linked by the way in which the examples of acting, suicide and pointless invasion subvert Hamlet’s official argument. The prince’s emphasis has, however, shifted in act 4: whereas in the “to be” soliloquy he chose thought while favouring nobility, in the Fortinbras soliloquy he mocks nobility, while resolving that “from this time forth [his] thoughts be bloody or nothing worth” (4.4.65-66). From now on Hamlet becomes increasingly unpredictable, as his increasingly philosophical mode of thought clashes with his determination to allow his spirited sense of honor to rule his actions.

Although Horatio’s nature is more like Hamlet’s than Claudius’s, he serves the king prudently and ignobly, gaining his trust to such an extent that the wily king actually asks him to keep “good watch” over Ophelia and, later, to accompany the prince himself (4.5.74, 5.1.293). Although Horatio’s motive in taking on this role is almost certainly to protect his friend, he is as prudent as Claudius might wish in his approach to Ophelia, who he thinks might “strew dangerous conjectures in ill-breeding minds” (4.5.14-15). If Ophelia’s suicide were anywhere near as long drawn out as the queen’s graphic –although admittedly highly misleading– account of her ‘accident’ would suggest, the assumption must be that the watching Horatio allowed her to die (4.7.166-83). It may be significant that the grave-digger’s later argument, that a man cannot be accused of suicide if he merely lets “the water come to him” rather than actively entering it, would also imply that a passive witness of a suicide would be innocent of murder (5.1.9-20). If Horatio did indeed ‘suffer’ Ophelia’s death, this would of course illustrate his pragmatic approach to those who are not his friends and his indifference to commonly accepted codes of piety and nobility –although in the light of Ophelia’s utter desperation one could see his decision not to act as entirely compassionate. By serving Claudius Horatio shows that a thoughtful and passionate man can become involved in politics and even emulate the ambitious politician’s prudence in many situations. His pragmatism will, however, always be limited by his devotion to his friends: Horatio supports Hamlet to the bitter end, yet the prince is potentially far more dangerous to the state than Ophelia. 

Laertes’s response to his father’s death demonstrates the need to exercise prudence in political life. Shakespeare invites the comparison to Hamlet in an unusually explicit way, for the prince admits that he can “by the image of [his own] cause…see the portraiture of [Laertes’s],” and implies that he envies “the bravery of his grief” (5.2.77-80). Unlike Hamlet, Laertes is at first naively passionate, consigning “conscience and grace to the profoundest pit” without pausing to check the truth of the rumours that Claudius killed his father or worrying about causing a civil war as he leads a “riotous…rabble” against the king (4.5.100-39). Luckily Claudius is precisely the right man to respond peacefully and prudently rather than honourably or passionately to what amounts to an attempted coup, and his immediate suggestion that he should be tried before Laertes’s “wisest friends” probably prevents a civil war and saves many lives (4.5.203-13). By the time it has eventually been proven that Hamlet is the murderer, Laertes is calm enough to appreciate Claudius’s argument that any would-be avenger would be best advised to proceed with great caution lest his “arrows…revert….to [his] bow again,” since the people will always “convert [Hamlet’s] gyves to graces,” (4.7.16-24). 

Although the unphilosophical Laertes’s actions demonstrate that he accepts Claudius’s prudent but ignoble reasons for delay, he resists even more obdurately than Hamlet the thought that he should simply tolerate “a noble father lost” (4.7.25-29). Laertes avoids the internal debates which have allowed Hamlet to entertain, if not explicitly acknowledge, the radical notion that it might be best not to take revenge at all. We can see the differences between the two men most clearly in the contrast between Laertes’s blind acceptance that honour must be satisfied even if this were to involve “cut[ting Hamlet’s] throat i’ th’ church” and the prince’s decision to spare the praying Claudius, which, despite his own rhetoric, was essentially prudent and moderate (4.7.126). Claudius and Laertes together now come to embody the distorted combination of passion, honour and cunning which a completely thoughtful revenge would require in this context, as the cunning king attempts to direct the younger man’s passionate and noble spiritedness in such a way as to ensure that Hamlet will be disposed of without political disruption (4.7.134-39). In contrast to Hamlet himself, Laertes refuses to be thwarted by the constraints imposed by the political situation, but so thoroughly does he contort his honourable anger in response to these pressures that it is he who introduces the idea of poison, after Claudius has suggested killing the prince in an apparently sporting duel with an uncapped rapier (4.7.139-48). After deciding to “further think,” Claudius adds the poisoned chalice to ensure the success of the plan (4.7.148-62). In a world which is necessarily dominated by ambition and a prudent concern for political stability, Laertes’s passion and nobility ultimately serve only to make him Claudius’s willing puppet. 

Like the ghost and Hamlet himself, Laertes is both passionate and honourable. Claudius plays on both motives at once when he questions whether he is merely “the painting of a sorrow, a face without a heart,” lacking any real constancy, and refers casually to the “envy” evinced by the prince after hearing a “masterly report” of Laertes’s swordsmanship (4.7.95-123). Just as with Hamlet, Laertes’s deepest feelings are not focused on his father, whom he simply describes as “noble,” but in his case on Ophelia, “whose worth…stood challenger on mount of all the age for her perfections” (4.5.155-64, 4.7.25-29). Again like Hamlet, however, his anger and grief have faded by the time he comes to fight the prince, for he declares himself to be “satisfied in nature,” and admits that he is driven to carry on with the plan only by the traditional “terms of honor,” which offer no precedent for simply suffering the murder of one’s father (5.2.244-52). The sincerity of this speech is clearly demonstrated when he hesitates to employ the poisoned sword, confessing to himself that “it is almost against [his] conscience,” and as a result, despite being generally acknowledged to be the better swordsman, eventually falls victim to his own poison (5.2.296, 5.2.209). As Laertes dies he makes a plea to “exchange forgiveness” with the prince (5.2.329-31). Thus Laertes’s story echoes Hamlet’s in such a way as to bring out two of Shakespeare’s main criticisms of moral constancy: not only does the passionate and noble man’s intransigent spiritedness jar with the political world, but it also conflicts in the end with his own deeper nature. 

Having demonstrated the need for prudent inconstancy in public life, Shakespeare now shifts his focus for the last time from the political to the personal sphere. He has hitherto given the two spheres equal weight, but his deepest concern is to delineate the limits of constancy in personal relationships. His starting point is that the faith of the “true-love” must transcend all prudent restraint: the “cockle hat and staff” which distinguish such a lover in the mad Ophelia’s song are the conventional trappings of a pilgrim, emblematic of his single-minded fidelity (4.5.23-26). Ophelia’s intense grief reminds us, however, that such limitless devotion has its dark corollary. She mourns for her violets, traditionally symbolizing fidelity, which “wither’d all when [her] father died,” while most of her song concerns the bitterness of a foolish maid who allowed herself to be “tumbled” by a fickle lover (4.5.184-85, 4.5.48-66). Although Ophelia herself fails to control her actions, Shakespeare uses her gifts of herbs to suggest that such control is possible: thus Laertes is advised to “remember,” but with “thoughts,” while Ophelia gives Gertrude some of her rue –representing repentance– reminding her that it is a “herb of grace a Sundays” and exhorting both herself and the queen to “wear [it] with a difference” (4.5.175-83). While one cannot simply discard one’s inner “rue,” the implication is that one can choose how to act upon it. Unlike Laertes and Ophelia, Gertrude attempts to turn her misery to positive use and, as we have seen, protects her son in a careful and prudent manner, perhaps hoping to atone for her actions and achieve “grace” through the mutual “blessing” which Hamlet promised her (3.4.171-72).  

Ophelia’s immoderate bitterness is diametrically contrasted to the cynical detachment of the first gravedigger. At first the graveyard scene seems to suggest that philosophical thought exposes the futility of any attempt to resist the passage of time: the gravedigger’s punning demonstration that men were “gard’ners, ditchers and grave-makers” long before they “bore arms” hints at the artificiality of both the noble man’s war-like spirit and his hereditary status, and implies that human life in its natural form consists of nothing more than working for a living and dying (5.1.29-37). His second joke, which hinges on the fact that graves can last longer than ships, houses, sets of gallows and, by implication, even churches, suggests –in an understandably oblique way– that codes of piety and justice should be seen sub specie aeternitatis as artificial constructs, which simultaneously protect and remove us from nature, as ships and houses do, but are no more enduring than the cultures which create them, despite their apparent solidity (5.1.41-60). The gravedigger’s materialistic assumption that death strips us completely of our identity is evident in his bantering demonstration of the futility of respectfully digging a grave for something that used to be Ophelia, but is now merely an object (5.1.130-36). His familiarity with death seems to have fostered a calm acceptance of the insignificance of society’s most revered institutions and values, which has led him to wish for nothing more than to carry on in the ignoble role that he has performed cheerfully for thirty years (5.1.161-62). 

Hamlet himself has increasingly been drawn to a materialistic philosophy which reduces Polonius and the king to the status of mere “thing[s]” to be “eaten” by worms and beggars (3.3.36-71, 4.2.28-30, 4.3.19-31). His mocking contemplation of the futility of the politician’s ambition, the courtier’s concern with manners and the lawyer’s devotion to legal “quiddities” shows that he has abandoned his initial piety by now and come to share the gravedigger’s radical scepticism (5.1.78-117). He points out that the lawyers “seek out assurance,” like “sheep and calves” themselves, in “parchment made of sheep-skins…and of calves’-skins,” implying that they can only concern themselves so earnestly with securing property rights by ignoring the fact that their own “lands” will ultimately be narrowed to “this box” (5.1.103-117). A sober contemplation of death undermines the conventional codes of justice and honor to which the lawyer and courtier –and indeed the noble avenger– adhere, all of which seem designed to reinforce society’s illusory sense of its own lasting significance.

Through his song, a garbled version of a poem by Thomas Lord Vaux entitled The Aged Lover Renounceth Love, the gravedigger –Hamlet’s alter ego in this scene– displays a resignation to the transience of even the most constant attachments which is reminiscent of both Claudius’s rueful remark that love carries within its flame “a kind of week or snuff that will abate it” and the Player King’s resigned acceptance of “passion[s] ending” and purposes lost (4.7.110-18, 3.2.194-95). Crucially, however, when Hamlet attempts to mock his childhood attachment to Yorick, the court jester, now thirty years dead –“where be your gibes now, your gambols, your songs, your flashes of merriment”– his stance of detached scepticism is immediately undermined by the vividly affectionate quality of his memories of riding on Yorick’s back, laughing at his jokes and kissing him countless times (5.1.184-195). Whereas the mortality of the grandees of society reveals the futility of their claim to an enduring significance, Yorick’s death in no way detracts from the joy which he gave the young Hamlet. Moreover, precisely because Yorick was simply concerned to enjoy his relationship with the young prince, he inspired in Hamlet a lasting devotion which was far more intrinsically satisfying than the pride of the courtier, the lawyer or the politician. It is perhaps only in this humble and limited way that one can truly resist mutability: the lover’s fulfillment is of course fragile, perpetually threatened by the mortality of his beloved, but the lasting grief which Hamlet feels for Yorick is itself a sign of the intense loyalty which a joyous friendship can generate. It is typical of Hamlet that, despite his attempt to depreciate the significance of the relationship, he models a natural and moderate response to loss: his calm, yet bittersweet memories of Yorick position him somewhere between Vaux’s cynical “aged lover” and the desperate Ophelia.  

Just after Hamlet’s meditations on Yorick Horatio seems to contradict himself: for the first time in the scene he criticizes his friend for “consider[ing] too curiously” as he contemplates the ultimate insignificance of Alexander’s “noble dust,” although earlier in the scene he agreed with the prince’s mockery of the politician “that would circumvent God” and in fact repeatedly supported the prince’s satire on a variety of forms of pride (5.1.195-06, 5.1.78-81, 5.1.87, 5.1.113-15). Why should the humble and philosophical Horatio, who seems the last person to admire Alexander’s conquests, suddenly contradict himself in this way? The most likely answer, I would argue, is that he has been disturbed by the way in which Hamlet has bracketed his friendship with Yorick with the futile ambition of politicians and military commanders. It would be characteristic of the pragmatic Horatio  to defend proud spiritedness along with passionate friendship, despite his awareness of the futility of Alexander’s ambitions, on the grounds that it would be better for Hamlet to retain his noble delusions than to extend his sceptical philosophizing so far as to depreciate the value of love itself. One can deduce from Horatio’s changing responses in this scene that the philosopher should indeed conduct a radical critique of the social conventions which bolster pride, but should never attempt to distance himself from his own heart’s senseless core. To put the matter baldly: careful thought reveals that nothing is worth one’s constant devotion except intimate friendship, but also that such friendship is always worth it.

It is not devotion to Ophelia which leads Hamlet to leap into her grave during her funeral and grapple with Laertes, for he later admits to Horatio that the “tow’ring passion” which led him to declare his desire to “fight until [his] eyebrows will no longer wag” in order to prove that he loved her more than “forty thousand brothers” was merely a spirited desire to rival “the bravery of [Laertes’s] grief” (5.1.255-84, 5.2.76-80). Actually we have seen that Hamlet has moved on from his relationship with Ophelia to form a much deeper friendship, but this scene implies that he feels too ashamed of his own inconstancy to admit this to himself. At this point, for the first and only time in the play, what we might call Shakespeare’s covert satire on noble spiritedness becomes too obtrusive to be dismissed easily even by a casual reader or observer, since Hamlet openly admits that his desire to exceed Laertes’s “quantity of love” is childishly competitive (5.2.70). Moreover, Hamlet’s actions are made to contradict his deeper thinking in a particularly graphic way, since he wrestles Laertes in the very grave that has just provoked his reflections on the futility of Alexander and Caesar’s pursuit of honor. 

Shakespeare presents Hamlet’s professed loyalty to Ophelia in this scene as a pointless display of noble pride and shame, which perpetuates his mourning after his real passion has cooled. He uses the graveyard scene as a whole to show that on the one hand we “consider too curiously” if we attempt to use philosophy to detach ourselves from the lasting grief which stems from a deep attachment, but on the other that we should accept the ignoble fact that the intensity of such an attachment cannot be sustained when it is no longer stimulated by the actual experience of friendship. Shakespeare not only criticizes the Player King’s cynical resignation to a universal fickleness, but implies that the Player Queen’s urge to commit herself permanently to the memory of her husband, however natural in its origin, would eventually come to seem nothing more than a futile gesture, dictated by conventional ideas of virtue. In the last part of the play Shakespeare uses Ophelia’s story to promote what one might call a healthy inconstancy in mourning, in which destructively passionate and pointlessly noble responses to loss are prudently avoided, while the core experience of grief, which is not itself amenable to reason, is gradually allowed to soften into to a calm bittersweet affection. 

By apologizing for having “forgot[ten] himself” in Ophelia’s grave, albeit while simultaneously determining to “court [Laertes’s] favors,” Hamlet shows not only that he retains an ability to restrain his noble spiritedness, but also that he continues to rely on his deepening friendship with Horatio (5.2.75-78). Nevertheless, the prince increasingly gives rein to his honourable spiritedness as the play goes on, freeing himself to act decisively by adopting a new attitude of pious fatalism, which, like Fortinbras’s noble campaign, almost defines itself by its irrationality. Thus he praises “rashness” and “indiscretion” and declares that there is “a divinity that shapes our ends,” superior to “deep plots,” even though his real view is implicit not only in the thorough going materialism of his reflections in the graveyard, but in his dying comment that “the rest is silence” (5.2.6-11, 5.2.358). This new stance allows him to send Rosencrantz and Guildenstern to their deaths in what Horatio will later call “casual slaughters” and to dismiss them as “baser nature[s]” who “did make love to this employment” and so are justly caught in a clash of “mighty opposites” (5.2.57-62, 5.2.382). He claims that the deaths of his old school friends are not “near [his] conscience,” but still feels guilty enough to defend his actions from Horatio’s implicit reproach (5.2.56-58). His only response to Horatio’s worries regarding Claudius’s intentions is to declare that “a man’s life is no more than to say ‘one’,” while he rationalizes his decision to fight a duel with Laertes with the uncharacteristically glib thought that “there is a special providence in the fall of a sparrow,” adding that “since no man, of aught he leaves, knows what is’t to leave betimes, let be” (5.2.74, 5.2.219-24). Just as Horatio might have feared, this last remark suggests that Hamlet’s overly “curious” meditations on the ephemerality of all things have led him to a desperate nihilism of the type that might be familiar to a modern audience: since all deeds are equally insignificant and life no better than death, he reasons that he might as well act nobly and disdain the sort of misgivings regarding the proposed duel that “would perhaps trouble a woman” (5.2.215-16). 

Horatio more or less warns Hamlet to suspect foul play when he is challenged to the duel, but the prince has “a kind of fighting in [his] heart,” where all is “ill,” which leads him to court the “felicity” of death (5.2.4-5, 5.2.212-18, 5.2.347-48). This “fighting” is a reminder that there is still a part of Hamlet which is opposed to direct action against Claudius, despite his noble talk. The prince might well see death at the hands of Laertes as an honourable means of avoiding such action, as well as an effective way of escaping personal misery. Thus Hamlet finally chooses the option of noble, but futile self-destruction which he contemplated in the “to be” soliloquy. Nevertheless, the fact that he does at last act decisively against Claudius, but only in response to Gertrude’s poisoning, demonstrates that his passion is in the end stronger than his nobility (5.2.309-27). At the same time his delays have ensured that Gertrude never has to grieve for a murdered king and, perhaps more by luck than judgement, that Claudius’s guilt becomes clear enough to the assembled lords to justify his violent death and so to remove the risk of civil war. In this way amidst the devastation of the ending Shakespeare unobtrusively endorses Hamlet’s extended procrastination, showing it to be more prudent and compassionate than the noble alternative.

Horatio’s self-restraint is shown in the way in which he agrees emphatically with Hamlet’s remarks about a controlling “divinity,” perhaps because he considers noble piety preferable to nihilistic philosophy (5.2.6-11). Later, however, as he begins to realize that Hamlet is in real danger, he ignores the profession of belief in a “special providence” by which the prince rationalizes his acceptance of Laertes’s challenge and the spirited account which he gives of his own swordsmanship, where he has “been in continual practice,” urging his friend instead to use his “mind” before accepting the challenge, and undercutting his noble pride with the terse assurance that he “will lose” (5.2.209-18). When Hamlet at last actually asks his friend whether he would not now be “damned” if he did not take revenge –albeit framing the question as a matter of “conscience” in such a fervently pious manner as to make it appear rhetorical– Horatio simply makes the pragmatic point that “it must be shortly known to [Claudius]” that he has escaped from the ship (5.2.63-72). Here again Horatio ignores what we might call the moral issues and is simply concerned to anticipate the next move of a murderous king. Rather than prudently “suffering” the self-destruction of his disruptive friend, he focuses his thoughts entirely on protecting Hamlet, initially by supporting his pious fatalism, but then, when there is real danger, with a pragmatic realism which implicitly undermines his noble illusions. 

Horatio’s response to Hamlet’s death illustrates his characteristic mixture of “blood and judgment.” Typically, he presents his attempt at suicide as honourable in the “antique Roman” style, but his extreme distress is evident in his repeated efforts to resist Hamlet’s efforts to wrest the poisoned cup from his grasp (5.2.340-43). Horatio is not in the end the stoical rationalist that he might appear to be: his attempted suicide underscores his passionate affection for his friend. Nevertheless, even though Horatio obeys Hamlet for one last time and agrees to live on to “tell [his] story,” it is already clear from his blunt summary of “accidental judgments” and “casual slaughters” that his aim will not be to clear the prince’s “wounded name,” as the latter requested (5.2.382, 5.2.344-49). Horatio decides that an honest account of recent events must be:

                                             Presently perform’d

Even while men’s minds are wild, lest more mischance

              On plots and errors happen. (5.2.393-95) 

For precisely the same reasons one might have expected Horatio to tell Fortinbras immediately that Hamlet has nominated him to be the next king of Denmark, but, surprisingly, he chooses not do so (5.2.356-58). He mentions the nomination only when the hot-headed Fortinbras has already started to press his claims to the throne, and then so vaguely –“of that I shall have also cause to speak”– as to suggest that his motive in so doing might be to forestall rather than install the spirited young prince (5.2.391). Horatio’s careful prudence is also evident in his response to Hamlet’s last words, “the rest is silence,” which he seems to realize could be understood –probably correctly– by the assembled court on this very public occasion to mean “all that remains is non-existence” (5.2.358). The pragmatic Horatio, who, it should be remembered, reveals his materialistic philosophy only to his intimate friends, reassures the listening crowd that “flights of angels” will “sing” the prince to a “rest” which through a clever pun he now manages to identify with the peace of heaven rather than the silent void (1.5.166-67, 5.2.359-60). Because Horatio does not feel duty bound to honor Hamlet’s memory, he is free to “wear [his] rue with a difference,” promoting social stability in his characteristically manipulative manner, while he waits for his sadness to fade gradually, as it must do in the course of nature.

Thus Horatio’s “blood and judgment” combine in such a manner as to render him utterly devoted to Hamlet while he is alive, but completely pragmatic in his approach to the prince’s final wishes, which he realizes are noble rather than prudent. The contrast between this approach and Hamlet’s own noble commitment to honor his dead father’s request hints at Shakespeare’s critique of conventional ideas of virtuous loyalty. Throughout the play Horatio has obeyed all of Hamlet’s requests except where he judged that the prince’s life was in danger, but, unlike Hamlet himself and the Player Queen, he seems to realize that his loyalty has always been motivated by the actual experience of love, which means that the prince’s death frees him from all the obligations associated with friendship. Nevertheless, although Horatio seems now to be coolly focused on preserving political stability, it should not be forgotten that he would have committed suicide and left Denmark to its fate had not Hamlet begged him to remain alive to tell his story. Thus the play ends as it began; by showing us Horatio prioritizing his own passionate attachments, but dealing prudently and compassionately with a fickle and mutable world, even though this is never his primary consideration. In contrast, Hamlet’s dying speeches are perhaps his most foolish, since he concentrates on saving his reputation rather than on cementing his friendship with Horatio.

Conclusion

To sum up on the argument of the whole play: although the passionate man will be shocked and disturbed by the fickleness which he is bound to encounter both in politics and in his personal life, his sympathetic nature will eventually temper any urge he might feel to “take arms” against this pervasive inconstancy. Nevertheless, insofar as he is noble as well as passionate, he will be prone to value moral constancy over his natural inclinations, and may therefore be driven by his rigorous principles to attempt to punish or reform a fickle world. On a personal level this attempt is likely to be both cruel and futile, since most of those whom he loves are bound to be less deeply passionate than himself and therefore innately prone to inconstancy. On a political level his idealism may well be highly disruptive, since the state is often most efficiently managed by those whose detached, self-protective prudence enables them to prioritize political stability over both passionate attachments and moral principles. The play centres, in both a literal and metaphorical sense, on Hamlet’s speech in praise of Horatio, who reserves his devoted constancy for his friends, but has rooted out any noble or moral impulse to apply similar standards to a pervasively fickle society, although he does support political stability wherever possible in a coolly compassionate manner.[xii]

A thoughtful man will draw a distinction between noble or pious aspirations to a more lasting significance, which are shown in the graveyard scene to be illusions rooted in social convention rather than nature, and constant friendship, which offers substantial and enduring rewards, albeit on a humbler scale. Thus the only actions in the play which are truly effective are those by which Horatio demonstrates his unlimited and imprudent loyalty to Hamlet and so gains the prince’s complete trust. Friends are mortal, however, and grief is no more amenable to rational restraint than love, but at least the thoughtful man contains his grief and allows it to run its natural course.  He recognizes that bereavement frees him from any obligation to remain loyal to his beloved, since true constancy is not dictated by a moral code, but arises naturally from the fulfilling experience of friendship. Thus, returning to the three key elements around which the play revolves, Horatio’s loyalty remains entirely passionate, since his thoughtful nature allows him to root out any trace of noble constancy.

Shakespeare’s attempt to separate noble from natural constancy might seem irrelevant to the modern age, which generally attempts to base morality on sincere feeling rather than honor, but I would argue that “the struggle for recognition,” to use Fukuyama’s phrase, remains a key motive for virtue.[xiii] In fact one could argue that, paradoxically, moral action appeals particularly to the noble pride of the modern man precisely because it now presents itself as selflessly compassionate or indignant. Thus in our times the thoughtful and passionate are even less well placed than their Elizabethan counterparts to understand the intricate and ambiguous ways in which pride and shame can interact with natural passion to reinforce idealism. As I have argued elsewhere, Shakespeare’s core value is constancy in love, and what one might call the natural nobility of the lover as he strives to achieve fulfilment through perfect unity with his beloved.[xiv] In Hamlet he reminds us of his summum bonum, but, in order to prevent passionate readers from being distracted from the deepest demands of their own hearts, focuses mainly on a critique of noble constancy which is so radical that it is likely to startle audiences in any era, if it is fully understood. 


[i] For friendship as Shakespeare’s summum bonum see Richard Burrow, “Fulfilment in ‘As You Like It,’” Interpretation: a Journal of Political Philosophy 41/2, Fall (2014), 91-122. This should be seen as a companion piece to the current essay.

[ii] All references to Hamlet are taken from The Riverside Shakespeare, ed. G.Blakemore Evans et al. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997).

[iii]  See A.C.Bradley, “Shakespeare’s Tragic Period-‘Hamlet,’” in Twentieth Century Interpretations of “Hamlet,” ed. David Bevington (New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1968), 19-21; E.M.W.Tillyard, Shakespeare’s Problem Plays (London: Chatto and Windus), 19-21. 

[iv] Marilyn French, “Chaste Constancy in ‘Hamlet,” in “Hamlet”: Contemporary Critical Essays, ed. Martin Coyle (London: Macmillan, 1992), 97-99, 106-07.

[v] Dover Wilson, What Happens in “Hamlet” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 293-94.

[vi] For a sympathetic account of the arguments against “taking arms” see Helen Gardner, “The Historical Approach to ‘Hamlet,’” in Shakespeare: “Hamlet”; A Casebook (London: Macmillan, 1968), 145-48.

[vii] For a useful summary of the critics who view Hamlet as cruel and destructive, as well as those who oppose this view see Philip Edwards, “Tragic balance in ‘Hamlet,’” in “Hamlet”: Contemporary Critical Essays, ed. Martin Coyle (London, Macmillan, 1992), 19-21, 27.

[viii] The Riverside Shakespeare, 1213n284.

[ix] Leonard Tennenhouse, “Power in ‘Hamlet,’” in “Hamlet”: Contemporary Critical Essays, ed. Martin Coyle (London: Macmillan, 1992), 164.

[x] David Leverenz, “The Woman in Hamlet,” in “Hamlet”: Contemporary Critical Essays ed. Martin Coyle (London: Macmillan, 1992), 133.

[xi] D.G.James, “The New Doubt,” in Twentieth Century Interpretations of “Hamlet,” ed. David Bevington (New Jersey: Prentice Hall inc., 1968), 46.

[xii] Whatever is at the centre of an esoteric work is “the least exposed”: Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 13.

[xiii] Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin Books, 2012), 161.

[xiv] Richard Burrow, “Fulfilment in ‘As You Like It.’”

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Moderation in A Midsummer Night's Dream

In the great tradition of English literature love, by which I mean lasting, intimate attachment, tends to be presented as the highest good: one thinks of Austen, Conrad, and Dickens, not to mention Saul Bellow. This view differs both from the Platonic view that friendship is merely the means by which philosophy is pursued and from the modern tendency to reduce love to sexual desire and the will to power.[i] Now that attachment has come to be viewed by many psychologists as an absolutely basic drive, as fundamental as sexual desire or the instinct of self-preservation, we should give artists who explore its subtle dynamics their due philosophical weight.[ii] I would argue that Shakespeare’s works offer a particularly systematic account of the role which attachment plays in both personal and political life. The argument of A Midsummer Night’s Dream –and I use that word advisedly– is highly intricate, but the main thrust can be simply summarised: the more passionate the attachment, the greater the need for moderation.[iii] Moderation shadows desire at almost every point in the play, manifesting itself in rich and varied ways which often go well beyond simple self-restraint.

Whereas Theseus is eager to marry Hippoyta as soon as the old moon has waned, his conquered bride to be fears that her wedding day will arrive all too quickly (1.1.1-11).[iv] Theseus makes only decorous gestures towards continence and courtship. He blames the old moon for “linger[ing his] desires,” even though he will only have to wait for four days, and manages to present his lavish nuptial celebrations as an attempt to conciliate Hippolyta, although in reality the forced marriage represents the culmination of his “triumph” over the Amazons:

     Hippolyta, I woo’d thee with my sword,

     And won thy love doing thee injuries;

     But I will wed thee in another key,                                          

     With pomp, with triumph, and with revelling.

     (1.1.16-19)[v]

His tyrannical behaviour is contrasted to Bottom’s realisation that he must moderate his initial eagerness to take on the role of a ranting “tyrant” in the mechanicals’ play, if he wishes to “move storms” in his audience and be “more condoling” as “a lover that kills himself most gallant for love” (1.2.22-41). Bottom also restrains his desire to dominate the stage as a fierce lion, recognising that he would have to “roar you as gently as any sucking dove,” lest he should “fright the ladies out of their wits” (1.2.70-84). It is significant that the very creative fervour which drives him to volunteer for every role, including that of the heroine as well as the hero, eventually leads him to see that he must limit himself to one part for the good of the whole production (1.2.51-54).  

The contrast between Theseus and Bottom points towards the deeper themes of the play: Bottom’s recognition that it would be more effective to attract sympathy as the passionate Pyramus than to inspire awe as a great tyrant, his fervent concern for the sensibilities of his female audience and even his desire to play the part of the heroine all serve to establish an analogy between actors and lovers, which, I will argue, runs throughout the play.[vi] Like actors, it is implied, true lovers must learn to empathise with the needs of those whom they wish to captivate and adapt their behaviour accordingly. Thus Bottom’s journey from tyrant to lover illustrates the paradoxical process by which passionate lovers are driven to moderate their desires as soon as they realize that too demanding or overbearing an approach is likely to intimidate or alienate their beloveds and so prevent them from establishing the sympathetic rapport for which they long.[vii] We can infer from Bottom’s accommodations that the depth of a lover’s passion is likely to be commensurate with the care which he takes to moderate that passion. He restrains himself repeatedly and in a far less superficial way than the duke because he is much more eager to endear himself to his audience than Theseus is to establish an intimacy with Hippolyta. The non-erotic Theseus does not even make a serious effort to hide the fact that he is motivated by lust and honour, whereas the fervent Bottom knows that he must not only moderate his tyrannical ambitions, but actually seek to reinvent himself completely as a devoted lover, rather in the manner of a method actor: the role of Pyramus will “ask some tears in the true performing,” if he is to “move storms” (1.2.25-27). In the end Pyramus’s suicide does indeed move his aristocratic audience in just the way Bottom predicts, presumably because it keys into their own desire to be loved in a similarly self-denying manner (5.1.288-90). Bottom’s compromises might seem trivial, but the suicide which he is to enact reminds us that lovers can be driven to make the most extreme sacrifices, once they have enshrined their desire to unite with the beloved as a ruling passion. In such cases the instinct for self-preservation itself becomes just one of the many potentially divisive bodily needs which the true lover must suppress.  

Nevertheless, although desire culminates in moderation, one may infer from the opening scenes that it is rooted in tyranny: Theseus’s urbane manner and attention to decorum cannot disguise the fact that he is forcing Hippolyta to marry him –just as he previously “ravished” Perigenia (2.1.78)– while it should not be forgotten that Bottom’s initial impulse is to play a tyrant. The opening scenes provide several more examples of the potentially domineering nature of desire: a flippant remark –“You have her father’s love…do you marry him”– might alert us to the fact that only an overmastering affection for Demetrius could induce Hermia’s father, Egeus, to attempt to coerce his daughter into marrying him when she loves Lysander, who is not only “as well deriv’d” as his rival, but possibly even richer (1.1.93-94, 1.1.38-45, 1.1.99-102). Like Egeus and of course Demetrius himself, Helena shows that she is willing to risk Hermia’s happiness to further her own interests, betraying the secret of her friend’s elopement with Lysander simply in order to earn Demetrius’s gratitude and the chance to accompany him as he pursues the fleeing lovers into the wood (1.1.246-51). Overall then in this introductory section of the play Shakespeare shows that desire can manifest itself in two seemingly opposite ways by contrasting the tyrannical behaviour of Theseus, Helena and Egeus with Bottom’s moderation. His aim may be to act as one of those “honest neighbours” who Bottom hopes may encourage “reason and love [to] keep company” (3.1.143-46).

Although the opening scenes deal with a variety of tyrannical passions, the play as a whole focuses mainly on the ways in which incontinent sexual desire in particular can disrupt intimate attachments. Oberon uses the magic potion, which clearly symbolises sexual desire throughout the play, to make Titania “madly dote” on the first creature she sees so that he can kidnap her Indian page, to whom he seems to be intensely attracted (2.1.170-72, 2.1.20-27). He tells us that the potion was originally infused into a flower after a botched attempt by Cupid to wound a virgin’s heart (2.1.155-68). Cupid flies “between the cold moon and the earth,” implying that he normally strikes a delicate balance between austere restraint and gross sensuality, but in this case his misfired arrow falls to the ground away from the “chaste beams of the wat’ry moon” and becomes purely earthly (2.1.156, 2.1.162). Since the plant on which the arrow lands is now called “love-in-idleness,” we can presume that the intense physical desire which the potion stimulates in this lower form is fleeting and superficial compared to the more restrained love felt by the “hundred thousand hearts” wounded by the god in his usual, more balanced course (2.1.168, 2.1.159-60). Overall the Cupid parable suggests that in the majority of cases physical passion acts as a catalyst for a moderate and lasting devotion, but that this process can sometimes be disrupted by the intensity of sexual desire. Thus Oberon’s infidelity has clearly damaged his marriage, although the suggestion is that this sort of disruption is no more the norm than the unseasonable weather which is triggered by the couple’s fierce arguments (2.1.88-117). 

Shakespeare sets most of the play in the wildwood in order to explore the essential nature of desire in a world without conventional restraints. Here the potentially overbearing or tyrannical nature of sexual desire in particular is thrown into sharp relief.[viii] Despite his protests to the contrary, Oberon could be seen as the ruler of a sinister, nocturnal realm where all sorts of dreams and desires are liberated from conventional social constraints, including of course those which protected boys in ancient Athens from sexual predation (3.2.378-95, 4.1.93-98). Even on the most superficial viewing of the play audiences are invited to mock the childish wilfulness displayed by most of the characters, but those who wish to pursue the implications of the plot beyond the explicit narrative can see the disturbing consequences of sexual incontinence: the fate of the Indian boy is left vague, but Hippolyta is certainly being forced to marry Theseus, while Bottom would probably have been raped if he had not responded to Titania’s blandishments. Throughout the play we see how sexual desire can undermine even fairly deeply rooted attachments: the loyal Lysander is instantly charmed into transferring his affections to Helena; the “ancient love,” by which she and Hermia “grew together, like to a double cherry” is “rent…asunder” by jealousy; while Titania easily gives up a boy whom she has vowed to protect forever, simply because she loves an ass (2.2.103-44, 3.2.192-219, 4.1.59-61). Moreover, Bottom’s song about the pervasiveness of cuckoos, and therefore, by implication, of illegitimate children, reminds us of the impact of promiscuity on society at large (3.1.130-36). Puck’s unexpectedly sombre penultimate speech sums up this aspect of the play: dreams “follow… darkness,” while the night contains “the hungry lion,” emblematic perhaps of the potential ferocity of sexual desire (5.1.371-87). The implication is that purely sensual desires tend to be immoderate, since they are inherently private and inevitably ephemeral.

However, it is important to note that the fairies are also motivated by moderate emotions such as gratitude, sympathy and guilt: before Titania is distracted by her lust for Bottom she is moved to protect the Indian boy from the predatory Oberon by loyalty to the memory of the child’s mother, with whom she shared an intimate friendship (2.1.121-37). She also attempts to make peace with her husband by inviting him to “patiently dance in our round,” presumably in order to save her marriage, but also to limit the cataclysmic effects of the quarrel on the wider environment, which she clearly regrets deeply (2.1.140-41). (Dancing is a fitting emblem of the temperate joys of a harmonious marriage, since it combines instinctive delight with “patient” discipline and precise synchronization.) More surprisingly, perhaps, Oberon too honours “true love,” taking considerable pains throughout the play to harmonise the relationships between the four lovers’ and bless their marriages (2.1.259-66, 3.2.88-99, 5.1.401-22). His decision to release the doting Titania from his spell –after, however, he has secured the Indian boy– is prompted as much by “pity,” and perhaps therefore by guilt, as by jealousy, and he too suggests that they dance together, no doubt also in an attempt to restore marital harmony (4.1.47, 4.1.85-90). Thus, in this magical state of nature gratitude, sympathy and guilt continue to exert a deep influence. Ultimately, I would argue, these moderate emotions are derived from the need to form close, lasting attachments, since they all tend either to cement intimacy or to restrain potentially divisive passions. Although moderation is rooted in lovers’ needs and cultivated in personal relationships, the consideration which the fairies show towards the human world suggests that it will naturally spill over into a broader generosity which one might fairly call altruistic. Having said all this, it is also clear that Oberon and his potion have the power to disrupt even quite committed attachments. Thus the chaotic events of the wildwood highlight the need for the codes and conventions of the city, which, as Shakespeare later implies, play a valuable role in restraining sexual desire.

However, it would be a mistake to think that even crudely sensual desires are simply tyrannical. Titania’s physical passion for the transformed Bottom is initially expressed in the most overbearing terms: she orders her beloved to stay in the wood “whether thou wilt or no,” declaring bluntly, “I do love thee: therefore go with me,” presumably so that she can “kiss [his] fair large ears” and “wind [him] in [her] arms,” as Shakespeare euphemistically puts it (3.1.152-56, 4.1.4, 4.1.40). However, the fairy queen seems almost immediately to realise that sex with Bottom would be more pleasurable if it were consensual, for she quickly softens her fierce possessiveness, instructing her fairy servants to feed and entertain him in any way he desires (3.1.157-97, 4.1.1-39). Titania’s eagerness to minister to her beloved may be more transparently self-serving than that of the devoted romantic lover and is certainly more ephemeral (4.1.79), but it nevertheless suggests that even a purely physical passion has the potential to moderate itself. 

Conversely, we have seen that lasting attachments are rooted in a tyrannical desire to possess, even though they usually demand restraint. It is clearly frustrated devotion rather than simple physical attraction which drives Helena to pursue the fickle Demetrius relentlessly through the wood: her fervent assertion that she is “as true as steel” to her beloved, who is “all the world” to her, substantiates Lysander’s earlier claim that she “dotes, devoutly dotes, dotes in idolatry” on Demetrius, ever since “he made love to [her] and won her soul” (2.1.196-97, 2.1.223-26, 1.1.106-10). Deep attachments clearly create their own intransigent demands, which seem to be even more pressing than sexual attraction: there are strong indications that Helena would let Demetrius sleep with her, not primarily out of sexual desire, but simply as a way of demonstrating her absolute devotion (2.1.214-26). Helena professes a servility which is far more extreme than Titania’s attempts to conciliate Bottom: she will “fawn” on Demetrius like a “spaniel,” and is even resigned to the possibility that he might assault her, for no “mischief” could equal the ongoing pain of separation (2.1.203-04, 2.1.236-39). Her behaviour is paradoxical, however, for she forces her servility on her beloved, disregarding his repeated requests to be left alone as completely as the predatory Apollo ignored Daphne’s protests (2.1.230-34). Her shamelessly intrusive pursuit of Demetrius contradicts her apparently self-denying determination to serve him, revealing it to be essentially a strategy by which she hopes to possess her beloved, body and soul; albeit one that she maintains with absolute sincerity. Similarly, the previously coy Hermia is driven to abandon all dignity and restraint when Lysander deserts her, resorting in the end simply to clinging desperately to her beloved (3.2.257-68). It is likely then that the tension between moderation and tyrannical desire is embedded in the nature of passion itself, since the most devoted attachments appear to be rooted in a potentially predatory urge to possess the beloved, while even purely sensual seducers instinctively adopt moderate strategies.

Helena is driven to give direct expression to her tyrannical possessiveness only as a last resort, when she fears that she has lost her beloved forever. Her desperate pursuit of Demetrius is thus the exception which proves the rule that lovers are naturally moderate when their loyalty is reciprocated. The overbearing passion which leads Hermia and Lysander to reject family and civic ties as well as all their own arguments for patient resignation also induces them to treat each other with restraint in the end, even after they have entered the wildwood, where they are completely free to follow their own inclinations (1.1.132-68). As they settle down for the night Lysander eagerly proposes that they have sex, but Hermia tactfully but firmly declines (2.2.41-61). She concludes her tactful refusal with a plea, “Thy love ne’er alter till thy sweet life end” (2.2.61), which partly expresses a simple hope that her lover should remain faithful despite his patent frustration, but at the same time suggests (in an understandably indirect manner) that his love might be more likely to “alter” in the first place if she acceded to his demands. Hermia clearly fears that her lover might be distracted from his pursuit of a lasting attachment by the fleeting intensity of sexual pleasure; a concern which Lysander perfectly understands, as his pun on ‘lying with’ and ‘lying to’ reveals (2.2.52). Although Lysander is insistent enough to illustrate the potential unruliness of sexual desire, he fairly quickly agrees to prioritise his longing for a lasting relationship over his physical passion, sealing his commitment with a great oath: “then end life when I end loyalty” (2.2.62-63). In this way Shakespeare shows us that lasting, mutual attachments naturally impose their own restraints: Lysander would in the end rather please his beloved than satisfy himself sexually, while Hermia resists his advances (and no doubt her own sexual desire) because she realises that a physical consummation might interfere with her deeper objectives.[ix] The scene implies that social conventions like marriage which help to reinforce continence are rooted in a natural concern on the part of lovers to ensure that sexual desire is regulated by deep and lasting attachments.[x]

Quite apart from sexual desire, the fierce possessiveness of attachment itself is disguised and sublimated in loyal relationships. Unlike Helena, Lysander and Hermia can behave as if their mutual commitment to serve were an end in itself, because they are both so sure that their deepest needs will be satisfied. The amusing indirectness of their conversation is itself a sign of the couple’s moderation: since they both understand that their fulfilment depends on achieving as close a union as possible with their lover, they both work hard to preserve an illusion of selflessness, even though their ultimate desire is to possess the beloved, body and soul. Similarly, Bottom’s tyrannical ambitions are in the end side-lined by his humble eagerness to establish a rapport with his audience, even though, ironically, his humility itself stems originally from a desire to captivate the audience completely. This analysis is not as reductive as it seems: the lover’s apparent self-effacement is no less noble for being rooted ultimately in a desire to further his own deeper interests; in fact, paradoxically, it seems that he can only fulfil his longing to achieve complete intimacy with his beloved if his self-abasement is sincere and absolute. Love may be an act, as the central metaphor of the play implies, but it is one that can only be successful if both the actors involved immerse themselves so completely in their role that they can be said to reinvent themselves as each other’s devoted servants. The story of Pyramus and Thisbe reminds us that love can demand the most extreme sacrifices, but it should not be forgotten that ordinary, committed relationships are also inevitably founded on countless minor acts of moderation and self-denial. Thus, as Lysander and Hermia repeatedly prioritise their long term relationship over potentially divisive desires, they build up a shared fund of trust, gratitude and mutual sympathy. 

Shakespeare even shows us in detail how lovers can present themselves as thoroughly humble: in the next rehearsal scene the mechanicals plan to subvert what they fondly imagine to be the terrifying spectacle of Pyramus’s sword and the “fearful” lion by a direct address to the audience, in which they will reassure any ladies in the audience who might find the play frightening that they are just weavers and joiners acting parts (3.1.9-46). Bottom, now much more proactively temperate, carefully instructs Snug, who is playing the lion, to step out of role and urge his female audience in a manner that is neither servile nor bossy –“entreat” is pedantically preferred both to “beseech” and “request”– “not to fear, not to tremble,” since he is in reality their humble servant; a point which is to be underlined by a solemn oath, as it was in Lysander’s equivalent speech to Hermia: “my life for yours” (3.1.39-42). To achieve the deep rapport which they ultimately desire, Shakespeare implies that lovers should court their beloveds in just the way Bottom recommends, emphasising their willingness to moderate the potentially tyrannical demands of the body. 

The errors committed by the mechanicals as they rehearse their play are designed to hint at the contrast between the fickleness of physical passion and the constancy of deep attachments: Bottom, for instance, mistakenly calls Thisbe’s breath “odious” instead of “odorous” (3.1.82-85). The potential ‘odiousness’ of sexual desire is implicitly linked with its fleetingness: Pyramus’s complexion is like “the red rose” set on a phallic “triumphant brier,” but at the same time somehow manages to display a “lily-white,” or funereal, pallor (3.1.93-94). By delivering “all his part at once, cues and all” Flute misrepresents Thisbe as immediately agreeing to meet Pyramus at “Ninny’s tomb,” as if she is so spellbound by the revelation of his physical charms –on which she dwells at some length– that she simply assumes that he is “true as truest horse, that yet would never tire” (3.1.93-100). In Flute’s version, Thisbe has indeed behaved like a “ninny,” or fool, since she has cut short the conversations that would have allowed her to gauge her lover’s trustworthiness, whereas in Quince’s original script Pyramus is given time to prove himself the very embodiment of fidelity. Taking his cue from “never tire” –just as Lysander was inspired to proclaim his undying loyalty by Hermia’s prayer that he should remain constant– Quince’s Pyramus declares that whatever physical charm he might possess is unimportant, since fidelity itself is the only truly beautiful thing: “If I were fair, Thisby, I were only thine” (3.1.102-03).

This contrast is sharpened by a recurrent trope in which sight and hearing are juxtaposed and contrasted. It is significant that the most faithful lovers in the play, Pyramus and Thisbe, must conduct their courtship entirely through conversation because of the wall that divides them, whereas the love potion, which stimulates a purely physical attraction, is applied specifically to the eyes. Throughout the play eyes, whether looking or being looked at, embody the power of physical desire to initiate or destroy relationships in an instant. Helena ruefully reflects that love is traditionally represented as a blind child because it gives “dignity” to “things base and vile” (1.1.232-41). The symbolism of dreams and charmed vision which runs throughout the play implies that lovers often behave overbearingly because their desires distort their perspective, overriding or completely transforming uncongenial truths; for if the imagination “apprehends some joy, it comprehends some bringer of that joy” (5.1.19-20). Thus Helena cannot accept that her beloved has deserted her, while Egeus must believe that Hermia has been “bewitch’d” in order to make sense of her preference for Lysander over Demetrius (1.1.27). The arbitrariness of judgements based purely on physical beauty is implied by the fact that the charmed Lysander praises Helena’s eyes in particular, while Helena herself is convinced that her rival’s eyes are more attractive than her own (2.2.121-22, 2.2.91-99, 1.1.230). Although, like the blindfolded Cupid, lovers see only what they want to see, they feel that they must rationalise their arbitrary visions: thus Lysander is convinced that “reason says [Helena is] the worthier maid,” while Titania describes the transformed weaver as “wise” and of “fair virtue” simply because her eye is “enthralled to [his] shape” (1.1.232-37, 2.2.116, 3.1.139-40, 3.1.147). 

Conversely, whereas Titania orders her fairies to “tie up my lover’s tongue, bring him silently,” Hermia misses Lysander’s words rather than his body when he deserts her, and knows his voice so well that she finds him even when “dark night…from the eye his function takes” (3.1.201, 2.2.152-55, 3.2.177-82). Whereas Lysander’s admiration for his new mistress’s beauty is completely fickle –“who will not change a raven for a dove”– and Titania’s “eyes do loathe [Bottom’s] visage” as soon the love potion is removed, Hermia remains utterly constant, as is shown here by her determination to find “either death” or her lover as soon as she realizes that he has gone (2.2.114, 4.1.79, 2.2.156). Like Pyramus, Hermia has been encouraged by Lysander’s repeated vows of loyalty to rely on him to such an extent that she is willing to risk her life in order to preserve the relationship. 

However, Bottom’s stunned account of his affair with Titania –he is much more deeply affected by the affair than the queen– implies that sexual delight and the satisfactions of intimacy can merge together seamlessly in truly passionate relationships, reinforcing each other in a way which seems to dissolve the dichotomy of sight and hearing: “The eye of man hath not heard, the ear of man hath not seen…what my dream was” (4.1.204-14). Just as audiences might continue to be entertained by the workers’ play after Snug has punctured the illusion of the lion, so committed lovers will be free to enjoy what one might call the spectacle of their beloved’s body, suspending their painstakingly acquired understanding that on a deeper, but of course less immediately stimulating level, he is in fact a determinedly humble human being, whose physical appetites are regulated by a desire to establish and sustain a lasting intimacy. Love of this sort constitutes a summum bonum, or heaven on earth, as Bottom’s allusion to chapter 2, verse 9 of the First Epistle to the Corinthians suggests.[xi] (It should be noted at this point that Demetrius never has the love potion removed from his eyes.)

As we have seen, lovers who are thoroughly alive to their own deeper interests yearn for a relationship of absolute constancy. Once this goal has been enshrined as their ruling passion, they strive to transcend any urge which might divide them from their beloved, and especially their bodily drives, which are of course ineluctably private. Thus Hermia is the last of the four lovers to succumb to sleep, having driven her body to a point where her “legs can keep no pace with [her] desires” (3.2.444-45). As she settles down for the night, her first impulse is to bemoan her own “woe,” but she concludes her desperate soliloquy with an impassioned prayer that “Heaven shield Lysander, if they mean a fray,” regardless of the fact that her beloved has just rejected her cruelly and is even at that very moment attempting to fight Demetrius for the right to court Helena, her hated rival (3.2.442-447). Over the course of a committed relationship Hermia’s attachment to Lysander has clearly become a ruling passion, inspiring a deep concern for his welfare which overrides her own pain and humiliation. 

Although Shakespeare makes less attempt than usual to develop the characters of the four lovers –perhaps in order to highlight the arbitrariness of desire– they are by no means interchangeable in the way that some critics have argued.[xii] Helena’s eventual decision to abandon the chase, although taken reluctantly as it involves leaving behind her “foolish heart,” implies that Demetrius left her before the alchemical process by which desire is transmuted into self-denial had time to run its course (3.2.314-20, 3.2.341-43). Unlike Hermia, who stays awake the longest of the four lovers, Helena focuses purely on her own humiliation and fatigue as she is settling down, and therefore welcomes sleep as a release from her pain (3.2.431-36). Lysander, whose passion for Helena is based entirely on physical attraction, is the first to sleep, while Demetrius stays awake a little longer, indicating perhaps that he retains some vestiges of his previous attachment alongside his magically induced sexual desire (3.2.418-30). The superficiality of the men’s attraction to Helena is ironically indicated by the fact that they leave her to escape the enraged Hermia as best she can while they fight for the right to protect her (3.2.330-43). Thus Shakespeare hints at a sort of hierarchy of eroticism, using the characters’ resistance to sleep as a measure of the extent to which their attachment overrides their other needs and desires. 

Shakespeare’s celebration of moderate, constant relationships has political implications. The play certainly defends the freedom of lovers to choose their own partner, since it implicitly criticises Theseus’s cool indifference to Hermia’s wishes and ultimately rewards her determination to reject the city and pursue her dreams. However, although Hermia’s innate constancy is undoubtedly a substantial force, the painful and chaotic events of the wildwood suggest that desire requires some degree of social regulation. This in turn requires political authority, but Shakespeare implies that such authority creates its own problems. The contrast between Theseus and the passionate Hippolyta –whose name literally means ‘horse let loose’– exposes the duke’s emotional detachment. Hippolyta’s nostalgic account of the “musical…discord” and “sweet thunder” of Hercules’s pack points again towards the paradox of desire, for the exuberant energy of dogs is typically tempered by an instinctively loyal obedience –reinforced no doubt in this case by the dogs’ Spartan breeding– which leads them to focus single-mindedly on the hunt (4.1.112-18). In contrast, Theseus declares initially that he can only hear a “musical confusion” when his own hounds give chase, but then Hippolyta’s praise of Hercules’s pack seems to goad him into asserting that they are in fact uniquely “tuneable” (4.1.110-11, 4.1.124-26). We can infer from this that the duke is so concerned to emphasise his own ability to control the inchoate desires of his subjects that he overlooks the extent to which these desires are self-regulating. Similarly, Theseus dismisses the events of the night as the “shaping fantasies” of “the lunatic, the lover, and the poet,” whereas Hippolyta argues that with “all their minds transfigur’d so together [the lovers’ story] grows to something of great constancy” (5.1.2-27). Since “constancy” may mean ‘loyalty’ as well as ‘consistency,’ the queen’s response could be taken to imply that dreams can indeed become substantial when they inspire absolute, mutual fidelity. It is arguably Theseus rather than the lovers who lives in a fantasy world, since he appears to prioritise the insubstantial rewards of status and honour over such dreams.

When Hippolyta intervenes –with characteristic compassion– to spare the mechanicals embarrassment, because she “love[s] not to see wretchedness o’ercharged, and duty in his service perishing,” Theseus initially assures her that he will show the actors “noble respect,” since he is used to having to “pick a welcome” from subjects who are overcome by “the modesty of fearful duty,” but then in fact proceeds to mock them mercilessly (5.1.85-105, 5.1.125-26, 5.1.182-83, 5.1.215-18, 5.1.235-38, 5.1.253-54, 5.1.355-61). This implies that the gulf in status between the duke and his subjects has prevented him from cultivating moderate emotions such as guilt, sympathy and gratitude in the give and take of ordinary relationships. He is restrained, if at all, by a proud determination to pay lip service to his gentlemanly code of honour: thus he behaves with all due decorum as he coerces Hippolyta into marriage and, by offering Hermia the option of becoming a nun, even manages to present his enforcement of Egeus’s tyrannical demands as an act of mercy (1.1.38-90). In contrast with Oberon, who always responds to the lovers sympathetically, Theseus treats Hermia in a coolly authoritarian manner, only reversing his judgement that she must marry Demetrius in the end because of the latter’s change of heart (4.1.154-81). Even he cannot completely override the desires of his subjects, it seems. Theseus’s detachment means that his own marriage is likely to be as unsuccessful as Oberon’s, although for very different reasons. By forcing Hippolyta to marry him without acknowledging her resentment, far less begging her forgiveness, he has surely forfeited any chance of possessing her in any manner beyond the purely physical. Because he is too detached to be able to appreciate the role played by moderate emotions in constant relationships, he tends to see passion simply as a disruptive force which needs to be suppressed. Thus Theseus is as likely to create frustration by repressing eros as Oberon is to cause chaos by liberating it. His emotional detachment is presented as an inherent problem in political life, since it stems from the statesman’s necessarily elevated status.  

Nevertheless, Shakespeare implies that it is still possible for the city to play a role in reinforcing natural constancy, while at the same time encouraging erotic freedom. This balance is, I would argue, the underlying theme of the mechanicals’ discussion of props. When they discover that light might be provided on the date of the performance simply by opening the casement, Quince suggests that it would also be prudent to have an actor “present the person of Moonshine” (3.1.59-61). Like the moonlight with which it is traditionally associated, chastity is natural, at least according to the above argument, but not of course entirely reliable. The artificial moon will supplement the actual one in the same way as the restrictions imposed by social codes and institutions might complement the innate moderation of the true lover. Similarly, the artificial wall that separates the lovers –a particularly graphic embodiment of the power of social constraints– might be seen as reinforcing the natural barrier represented by the moon’s “bush of thorns” (3.1.61-71). Thus the innate modesty of Pyramus and Thisbe –signified by the fact that the lovers’ elopement is to be by moonlight– has doubtless been encouraged by the restrictions of the wall, which have hitherto limited them to a purely verbal courtship (3.1.49-50, 3.1.62-71). Similarly, although Hermia and Lysander’s mutual loyalty is rooted in their passionate attachment, it is also reinforced by conventional codes of honour and piety which set a high value on chastity and marital fidelity: Hermia displays an honourable concern for what “becomes a virtuous bachelor and a maid,” while Lysander’s vow of loyalty is couched in pious terms: “Amen, amen, to that fair prayer say I” (2.2.58-62).[xiii]

By criticising both forced marriages and the chaos of the wildwood the play suggests that a good regime would encourage free erotic choice in the initial stages of a relationship, but would subsequently strive to consolidate that choice, reinforcing an innate bias towards loyalty with a robust framework of traditional codes and institutions.[xiv] The realms of Theseus and Oberon are, respectively, repressive and chaotic, but each contains elements which hint at the possibility of achieving such a balance: the fact that Theseus ultimately finds himself sympathising with Pyramus’s absolute, self-denying devotion to Thisbe –and therefore implicitly with his decision to reject the city– suggests that art can move even the coolest politicians to appreciate the potential nobility of moderate emotions (5.1.288-90). Conversely, the fairy king’s decision to venture into the city before the wedding day in order to ensure that the couples “ever true in loving be” implies an acceptance on his part that even the most passionate unions may benefit from being ratified by marriage (5.1.407-08). Shakespeare’s decision to set the play in ancient Athens reinforces the sense that he has some such compromise in mind, since Athens is conventionally seen as allowing a degree of erotic freedom, but within a tight framework of traditional laws.  

In the last two acts Shakespeare begins to focus on the relationship between the dramatist and his audience in its own right, rather than as a metaphor for courtship. This shift in focus is introduced by Bottom’s lengthy meditation on his mysterious dream. Unlike Theseus, who criticizes poets alongside lovers and madmen for mistaking their imagined visions for reality, Bottom does not consider his dream of love to be any less substantial because it is impossible to “expound” in any rational way; indeed he sees the elusiveness of his experience as a sign of its awesome profundity: “man’s hand is not able to taste, his tongue to conceive, nor his heart to report what my dream was” (5.1.4-22, 4.1.206-14). Bottom’s dream has “no bottom,” for ruling passions are by definition limitless, even if they entail moderate strategies (4.1.216). Nevertheless, although such experiences cannot be analysed, it seems that they can be evoked through poetry, especially tragedy: Bottom decides that his ballad would become “more gracious” if it were recounted immediately after Thisbe’s death, presumably because her suicide would be likely to remind the audience of the limitlessness of their own passionate dreams (4.1.218-19). Nevertheless, Bottom, whose name reminds us of his own capacity and inclination to set limits, believes that poetry can best evoke ‘bottomless’ dreams if it is carefully structured: he plans to “get Peter Quince to write a ballet of this dream,” no doubt in the “eight and eight” form which he seems to favour (4.1.214-15, 3.1.23-26). (By now Quince has come to embody the moderate element or phase of the creative process, since it is his role throughout the play to shape Bottom’s impetuous visions into a form which might please the audience: 1.2.55, 1.2.74-77, 1.2.85-89, 3.1.47-61, 5.1.108-115). It seems that poets, like lovers –not to mention weavers like Bottom– must exercise nit-picking care in order to realise their creative visions. We find the same tension in philosophy itself: Shakespeare’s exhaustive exploration of attachment is limited to the moderate means by which a noetic intuition of fulfilment might be realised, since the effectiveness of these means can only be measured in relation to the supreme good, whereas the good itself is desired immoderately for its own sake and is therefore impossible to measure.[xv]

The fact that Bottom –whom we may by now identify as Shakespeare’s alter ego– is not in the end allowed to recite his ballad at Theseus’s revels could be taken as a hint that a serious evocation of love would be inappropriate in A Midsummer Night’s Dream (5.1.355-56). The parallels between the plots of Romeo and Juliet and the Pyramus and Thisbe play remind us that elsewhere Shakespeare is perfectly willing to use tragedy to make ‘bottomless’ passions “more gracious,” and so invite us to wonder why he turns to comedy in this particular play. If we think of the three productions which Theseus dismisses as representing approaches that Shakespeare himself has rejected for various reasons, we may gain a rare insight into the playwright’s priorities and strategies. It is significant that Theseus actually approves of the first piece –a poem “sung by an Athenian eunuch” celebrating Hercules’s victory over an army of Centaurs who attempted to abduct a bride from her own wedding– so much so in fact that he has already told it to his love “in glory of my kinsman” (5.1.44-47). Like Shakespeare’s own play, this poem defends marriage, but it does so in a worthy, moralistic manner, more congenial to honour-lovers like Theseus than to passionate poets. It does not offer a thoughtful or passionate analysis of the erotic foundation of constancy, as is evident from the fact that its sentiments are entirely compatible with Theseus’s approval of forced marriages.

The second piece, which would have dealt with the Bacchanals “tearing the Thracian singer” when he rebuffs their sexual advances, echoes the paradoxical theme of Shakespeare’s own play much more closely, since Orpheus’s stubborn continence is motivated by passion; in his case grief for his beloved Eurydice (5.1.48-49). Orpheus is of course “a singer,” or poet, which means that his “tearing” could serve as an apt symbol for the resentment that an audience is likely to feel towards a playwright who seems to scorn sexual desire. This invites us to wonder how Shakespeare himself avoids incurring a similar resentment. The answer to this question is implicit in Theseus’s decision to prefer the Pyramus and Thisbe play over an uncompromisingly “keen and critical” attack on “the death of Learning,” on the grounds that the former might provoke “merry tears…of loud laughter,” albeit unintentionally (5.1.52-55, 5.1.68-70). Comedy can, it seems, divert audiences –in both senses of the word– from themes which they are likely to find dry or objectionable, or both. Shakespeare uses Quince’s contradictory portrayal of his work as “a tedious brief scene” containing “tragical mirth” to insinuate that his own apparently frivolous play might nevertheless instruct those who are prepared to reflect at length on its darker implications (5.1.56-60).[xvi]

We can infer from the above that Shakespeare practises the moderation that he preaches in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, emulating Bottom’s attempts to disarm the audience, although in his case to deliberately comic effect. Audaciously, he hints at these tactics in the epilogue, where he has Puck urge any who might be “offended” to see the play merely as “a weak and idle…dream” (5.1.423-28). Puck is best understood as embodying the spirit of comedy itself: he is introduced as Oberon’s jester, a “merry wanderer of the night,” who lives to make himself and –incidentally– others “loff and waxen in their mirth” at his trivial pranks (2.1.42-57; see also 3.2.114, 3.2.352-53). If this is his symbolic role in the play, then his unique detachment from any romantic or sexual entanglement –Oberon notes that Puck “could…not” see Cupid– can be seen as a way of reminding us that humour is the antithesis of, and even at times the antidote to, passion (2.1.155). Puck’s stance of detached, mocking superiority –“Lord what fools these mortals be”– is characteristic of comedy, as is his reduction of sexual and romantic love to its basest level –“the man shall have his mare again”– through the tricks with the love potion and the ass’s head (3.2.115, 3.2.463). Shakespeare ensures that the audience broadly share Puck’s perspective throughout the play, which means that the playwright can explore the dangers of immoderate sexual desire without causing offence. 

The other side of the play’s argument is, however, completely missed by Puck: because he assumes that romance is purely a matter of animal attraction, and therefore that nearly all relationships will “fail, confounding oath on oath,” the hobgoblin cannot understand that Bottom’s dream transcends his physical relationship with Titania, or that the lovers’ “fond pageant,” may culminate in sincere expressions of loyal devotion (3.2.92-93, 3.2.114). It is significant that the mistake he makes with the love potion stems from his failure to understand Hermia and Lysander’s continence (2.2.76-79). As when Theseus’s laughter suddenly turns to pity for Pyramus, the audience’s Puck-like detachment may at times be punctured, especially when Hermia and Helena’s suffering reveals, however dimly, the potential nobility of passion. Thus the ambiguity of Puck, who is sharp-witted in his contempt for physical passion, but cold in his failure to sympathise with romantic attachment, points those who want to understand the play towards Shakespeare’s ambivalent attitude to desire.     

To sum up: Shakespeare practises his own moderate strategies, using comedy to disguise his critique of incontinence, since he is aware that many in the audience will find it deeply uncongenial.[xvii] He bases his esoteric argument on his intuition that fulfilment is to be found in lasting, intimate attachment, which he distinguishes sharply from sexual gratification, while acknowledging that these two very different types of pleasure may merge seamlessly in a deeply erotic relationship. Romantic relationships of this sort are originally rooted in an entirely selfish urge to possess, or unite with the other forever, body and soul, but passionate lovers are driven to moderate their desires as soon as they realize that too demanding or overbearing an approach is likely to alienate their beloveds and so prevent them from establishing the sympathetic rapport for which they long. Such a rapport can only be achieved through conversation, since it is only in conversation that lovers can reassure their beloveds that they are willing to restrain potentially divisive passions. In contrast, unalloyed sexual desire tends to be particularly overbearing and disruptive, since it can be satisfied in a manner that requires neither constancy nor intimacy. The most basic demand of romantic love is therefore sexual fidelity, but true lovers will also be prepared to practise continence even within a loyal relationship in order to prevent their attachment from being overshadowed and perhaps ultimately side-lined by the fleeting intensity of an early consummation. As such lovers ascend the erotic hierarchy, they will begin to sublimate their desire to possess their beloveds in increasingly radical ways, making all sorts of sacrifices in their efforts to cement trust and inspire gratitude. In their pursuit of the summum bonum of an absolutely harmonious union lovers will in the end devote themselves to their partners with such determination and, one might say, nobility of purpose that the selfish core of the attachment is completely concealed from all concerned. Shakespeare would therefore reject modern distinctions between altruism and egotism and fact and value as springing from a failure to recognise that even –or indeed especially– the most domineering egotist can only satisfy his deepest desires by recreating himself as his beloved’s most devoted servant.

Even as he contrasts the moderation of deep attachment with the potential tyranny of sexual desire, Shakespeare implies that this view is in some ways an oversimplification. A passionate lover may in the end abandon their strategic moderation after the breakdown of a relationship and resort to more direct methods in a desperate attempt to retain possession of the beloved, thus exposing the tyrannical core of the attachment for the first time. Conversely, even the most crudely sensual seducer may find it useful to exercise some degree of moderation in order to establish a consensual relationship with the object of their desires. It is therefore possible that the tension between moderation and tyrannical desire is embedded in the very nature of passion itself. 

Although all lovers long for constancy, whether they know it or not, the chaotic events of the wildwood imply that in many cases this longing needs to be consolidated by careful social regulation. Shakespeare implies that a good regime would encourage lovers to make a free erotic choice, but would then use established codes of piety and honour as well as binding marital vows to control the vagaries of sexual desire.[xviii] Such a regime would avoid the extremes of chaotic liberalism and repressive authoritarianism. In traditional cities statesmen tend to view desire as merely disruptive, and therefore in need of suppression, since their own elevated status prevents them from experiencing the rewards of moderation as they are generated in the give and take of ordinary relationships. Conversely, in contemporary liberal democracies lovers must rely entirely on those intrinsic rewards to secure their mutual commitment, since it is generally accepted in such regimes that no authority should override individual erotic choice. In this modern wildwood many purely passionate commitments of this sort will endure in an absolutely robust way, but a fair proportion will also inevitably be disrupted, particularly by sexual infidelity.


[i] Allan Bloom, Love and Friendship (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), p. 410, p. 500. See also David Bolotin, Plato’s dialogue on Friendship (London; Cornell University Press, 1979), p. 208.

[ii] John Bowlby, A Secure Base: Clinical Applications of Attachment Theory (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 26.

[iii] For the view that the tension between desire and restraint is fundamental to the play see David Bevington, ‘”But We Are Spirits of Another Sort”: The Dark Side of Love and Magic in A Midsummer Night’s Dream’, in Richard Dutton (ed.), A Midsummer Night’s Dream, New Casebook series (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), pp. 24-37.

[iv] All references to the play are from The Riverside Shakespeare, ed. G. Blakemore Evans et al. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997).

[v] A. D. Nuttall, ‘A Midsummer Night’s Dream: Comedy as Apotrope of Myth’, Shakespeare Survey: An annual Survey of Shakespeare Studies and Production; 53: Shakespeare and Narrative (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 52.

[vi] For the parallel between lovers and actors see John Russell Brown, Shakespeare and his Comedies, 2nd edn, with a new chapter on the last comedies (London, Methuen, 1962), p. 90.

[vii] Like Bottom, Socrates pursues pleasures which require him to moderate his tyrannical nature. However, Bottom’s understanding of true pleasure differs radically from Socrates: see Leo Strauss, On Tyranny. An Interpretation of Xenophon’s ‘Hiero’, 2nd edn revised and enlarged (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1963), pp. 105-06.

[viii] Jan Kott, Shakespeare Our Contemporary, trans. Boleslaw Taborski, 2nd edn revised 1967, University Paperback Drama Book series (London: Methuen, 1967), pp. 176-83.

[ix] Alexander Leggatt, Shakespeare’s Comedy of Love (London: Methuen, 1974; reprinted 1978), p. 111. See also Bevington, p.31.

[x] For the view that the lovers have been habituated into continence see Elliott Krieger, A Marxist Study of Shakespeare’s Comedies(London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1979), p. 41.

[xi] Frank Kermode, ‘The Mature Comedies’, in John Russell Brown and Bernard Harris (eds), Stratford-upon-Avon Studies 3: Early Shakespeare (London: Edward Arnold, 1961), pp. 218-20.

[xii] Jan Kott, p. 175.

[xiii] The critical debate over whether the continence of the eloping lovers is natural or the product of society is summarised in Nicolas Tredell, Shakespeare: A Midsummer Night’s Dream (London and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 85. My own view is that it is both. 

[xiv] For a similar view see Bevington, pp. 31-2.

[xv] Stanley Rosen, Plato’s Statesman: The Web of Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 187.

[xvi] According to Leo Strauss, Aristophanes uses comedy in a similar way: Socrates and Aristophanes (New York: Basic Bks., 1966). 

[xvii] Compare Plato’s way of resolving this tension, which Shakespeare implicitly criticises: Leo Strauss, The City and the Man(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), pp. 109-15.

[xviii] For the play’s celebration of ordinary marital life see Donald C. Miller, ‘Titania and the Changeling’ in G. Kirchner, L. Whitbread, Donald C. Miller, A. H. King, Eilert Ekwall, Z. S. Fink, ‘Notes and News’ English Studies: A Journal of English Language and Literature, 22.1 (1940), p. 66.